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  The first essay tests whether Chapter 11 restructuring outcomes are affected by time constraints in 
busy  bankruptcy  courts.    Using  the  passage  of  the  Bankruptcy  Abuse  Prevention  and  Consumer 
Protection Act in 2005 as an exogenous shock to court caseloads, I estimate the impact of bankruptcy 
caseload changes on the outcomes of firms in Chapter 11.  I find that as bankruptcy judges become busier 
they  tend  to  allow  more  firms  to  reorganize.    Firms  that reorganize  in  busy  courts  spend  longer  in 
bankruptcy, while firms that are dismissed from busy courts are more likely to re-file for bankruptcy 
within three years of their original filing.  In addition, busy courts impose costs on local banks, which 
report higher charge-offs on business lending when caseload increases.   
Using novel data that has complete coverage of claims for 136 Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection 
filings and that includes detailed information on claims transfers, in the second essay we provide the first 
empirical  insight  on  how  a  firm’s  ownership  changes  during  the  bankruptcy  process  and  how  these 
changes  impact  bankruptcy  outcomes.  Pre-bankruptcy  ownership  concentration  is  important  for  the 
coordination of a prearranged bankruptcy filing and is associated with a faster bankruptcy resolution and 
a  higher  likelihood  of  a  successful  reorganization.  However,  as  the  trading  of  claims  in  bankruptcy 
concentrates ownership further, the probability of liquidation increases and recovery rates decrease. 
The third essay studies whether prize-linked savings (PLS) accounts, which offer random, lottery-
like payouts to account holders in lieu of risk-free interest, can aid individuals in increasing savings levels 
by adding the chance to “win big.”  Using micro-level data, we show that PLS is attractive to a broad 
group  of  individuals  across  all  age,  race,  and  income  levels.    We  find  that  financially  constrained iv 
 
individuals  and  those  with  no  other  deposit  accounts  are  particularly  likely  to  open  a  PLS  account.  
Participants in the PLS program increased their total savings on average by 1.1% of annual income, a 
31% increase from the mean level of savings.  Deposits in PLS do not cannibalize savings in standard 
savings products.  Instead, PLS appears to act as a substitute for lottery gambling. 
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1.1.  Introduction 
The purpose of Chapter 11 bankruptcy is to protect the assets of financially distressed firms from 
seizure by creditors while the restructuring options available to the firm can be considered.  As pointed 
out by Hart (2000), one of the main goals of an efficient bankruptcy procedure is to reorganize distressed 
firms only when their value as a going concern exceeds their liquidation value.  Bankruptcy, then, has an 
important impact on the allocation of capital in an economy, as it acts as a filter that separates distressed 
firms that are still economically viable from those whose assets should be redeployed via liquidation.  
Prior research, reviewed below, has focused on how the design of bankruptcy procedures might affect the 
allocation of capital by altering the outcome of the case or causing frictions that diminish the overall 
value of the distressed firm.  This essay builds on these previous studies by showing that the efficiency of 
the court itself (not just the laws that govern the court) has an important impact on the costs of financial 
distress and on the ultimate outcome of the bankruptcy.   2 
 
In particular, I focus on the total caseload that bankruptcy judges must deal with.  Judge workload 
fluctuates widely as economic conditions change.  For example, total bankruptcy filings rise nationwide 
on average by 32% during economic recessions.  Large differences in workload are also common cross-
sectionally,  as  local  economic  deteriorations  lead  to  increasing  caseload  for  judges  in  those  areas.
1  
Because total judge workload is counter -cyclical, judges are busiest exactly when financial distress is 
worst.   As Judge David S. Kennedy stated, ―Actually, there are times and days when I feel like the 
bankruptcy  court  today  is  more  a  de  facto  emergency  room  for  financially  distressed  consumer  and 
commercial debtors…as judges, I note that sometimes we can just get too busy.‖ (Bankruptcy Judgeship 
Needs, 2009)
2 
The bankruptcy judge plays an integral role in Chapter 11 restructuring.  As Gilson (1999) states, 
―the Bankruptcy Code effectively requires judges to set corporate operating policies…judges have broad 
powers to influence how the firm’s assets are managed.‖  The bankruptcy judge is ultimately responsible 
for  determining  whether  a  debtor  firm  should  be  liquidated  or  reorganized,  and  for  ensuring  that 
reorganized firms have a reasonable chance at avoiding financial distress in the future.  A large body of 
research has focused on whether judges tend to be more friendly towards debtors or creditors during this 
process (Chang & Schoar, 2007; Hotchkiss, 1995; LoPucki, 1983; Morrison, 2005).  Judges who allow 
the continuation of the firm are typically viewed as pro-debtor, as continuation can benefit equity holders 
who prefer riskier outcomes due to limited liability (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) or provide private benefits 
to the debtor’s management (Aghion, Hart, & Moore, 1992).  Failing to liquidate non-viable firms harms 
creditors, who do not participate in the upside potential of the firm and may even receive higher recovery 
rates  under  liquidation,  depending  on  the  ability  to  redeploy  the  assets  of  the  firm  (Benmelech  & 
                                                                 
1 For example, the collapse in house prices in 2007 and 2008 hit Arizona much more severely than Texas.  As a 
result, in 2009 there were 5,000 bankruptcy filings per judge in Arizona, as compared to roughly half as many cases 
per judge in Texas. 
2 Legal researchers have long been concerned about the effect of heavy caseloads on federal judges’ decision-
making.  See, for example, Friendly (1973) and Ginsburg (1983). 3 
 
Bergman,  2009).    In  this  chapter,  I  examine  variations  in  time  constraints  that  judges  face  and  test 
whether busy judges are more or less likely to allow firms to emerge from Chapter 11.   
It is natural to expect that time constraints will affect judge decision-making.  A time-pressured 
judge will find it costly to gather and consider information about each case, thereby increasing the risk of 
errors in judgment.  Given this, a busy judge may be reluctant to liquidate a distressed firm, preferring 
instead to allow the firm to reorganize and preserving the option to liquidate the firm at a future date.
3  In 
addition, psychological research shows that when individuals are stressed or fatigued they are unable to 
think through complex problems, and hence tend to ―kick the can down the road‖ by putting off final 
decisions or deferring to others whenever possible (Huang, 2011; Karau & Kelly, 1992; Pocheptsova, 
Amir, Dhar, & Baumeister, 2009).  Individuals with strict time constraints tend to focus only on finding a 
quick solution to the task at hand, often exhibiting less scrutiny of the merits of that solution and ignoring 
other important issues that seem less pressing, even when this behavior is quite costly to the individual 
(Kahneman,  2011;  Perlow,  1999;  Shah,  Mullainathan,  &  Shafir,  2012).    Applying  this  logic  to 
bankruptcy, a time-pressured bankruptcy judge will likely be reluctant to make the final decision of 
liquidating a marginal firm, and will instead defer to the debtor’s management since by default the debtor 
retains control of the firm after filing (Franks, Nyborg, & Torous, 1996).
4 
To empirically test the impact of busy courts on financially distressed firms, I use a natural 
experiment that exogenously impacted the caseload of bankruptcy courts.  In 2005, Congress passed the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Protection and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA), which made it substantially more 
difficult for households to file for bankruptcy protection.  After the October 17
th, 2005 deadline imposed 
by BAPCPA, non-business bankruptcy filings dropped dramatically, and stayed at extremely low levels 
                                                                 
3 This would be the case if the judge’s preferences are such that he prefers continuation of an unviable firm (a type I 
error) to liquidation of a viable firm (a type II error). 
4 An alternative hypothesis is that busy judges might seek to do whatever necessary to clear their dockets as quickly 
as possible.  Because liquidations and dismissals take less court time than reorganizations, under this hypothesis it  
would be expected that busy judges would liquidate and dismiss more cases and reorganize fewer cases.  Cross -
sectionally, this hypothesis would also predict that busy judges would seek particularly to liquidate the largest and 
most complex firms, as these  are the most costly for overburdened judges to deal with.  The empirical evidence 
presented in Section 1.5 is exactly contrary to this idea, suggesting that judges’ reactions to heavy caseloads are 
more nuanced. 4 
 
until the onset of the financial crisis (Figure 1.1, Panel A).  Since bankruptcy judges rule on both business 
and non-business cases (i.e., there is no specialization among bankruptcy judges), BAPCPA created a 
large shock to the workload of bankruptcy judges across the nation, cutting average caseloads in half.  
BAPCPA did not impact all districts equally, however.  In particular, courts that handled a relatively 
higher share of personal bankruptcy cases saw caseloads drop by larger amounts after BAPCPA took 
effect.  For example, prior to BAPCPA, a judge in the District of Oregon spent about 78% of her time on 
non-business bankruptcy cases, and BAPCPA reduced her caseload by 62%.  Just south of Oregon, in the 
Northern District of California, judges spent about 71% of their time on non-business cases, and the 
corresponding drop in caseload was only 39%.  Using difference-in-differences specifications, I exploit 
this  exogenous  variation  to  estimate  the  causal  effect  of  total  judge  caseload  on  a  variety  of  firm 
outcomes.  
Using  information  on  3,327  Chapter  11  bankruptcies  filed  between  2004  and  2007,  I  find 
evidence that busy bankruptcy judges that were exogenously busier due to BAPCPA are more likely to 
allow debtor firms to restructure and emerge from bankruptcy, rather than being liquidated via conversion 
of the case to Chapter 7 or dismissed from court altogether.  This is especially true for larger, more 
complex firms, which would be most likely to tax already overburdened judges.  As a result, bankrupt 
companies that might have been liquidated in a less-busy court are allowed to reorganize and emerge 
from bankruptcy.  This suggests that as judges become busier, they become more pro-debtor as well. 
To understand the impact of this shift in bankruptcy outcomes, I test whether firms which exit 
bankruptcy in busy courts are able to avoid financial distress in the future.  Following previous literature
5, 
I use the recidivism rate – the probability that a firm re-enters bankruptcy within 3 years of its original  
   
                                                                 
5 Chang & Schoar (2007) state that ―re-filing, even more than firm dissolution, can be seen as the ultimate failure of 
the  bankruptcy  process.‖    Gilson  (1997)  and  Hotchkiss  (1995)  use  recidivism  as  a  measure  of  inefficient 
restructuring as well.  Recidivism is also commonly used to assess the efficiency of mortgage loan modifications 
(see, for example, TransUnion, 2012). 5 
 
Panel A: Non-business case filings (number of filings) 
 
 
Panel B: Business Chapter 11 case filings 
 
FIGURE 1.1 - BANKRUPTCY CASES FILED PER QUARTER – NON-BUSINESS AND CH. 11 
Panel A shows the total number of non-business bankruptcy filings per quarter in the U.S. Courts system from 
1980Q2 – 2011Q2, while Panel B shows the total number of Business Chapter 11 cases filed.  In both charts, the 
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filing – as an indicator of firms which exit bankruptcy but remain fragile or distressed.
6  I find that firms 
which successfully reorganize in busy bankruptcy courts are no more likely to re-file for bankruptcy than 
firms that reorganize is less busy cour ts.  However, firms which are dismissed from busy courts  have 
substantially higher recidivism rates, suggesting that either these dismissed firms are more willing to re -
file in busy courts in hopes of obtaining a more favorable outcome the second time, or that the causes for 
dismissal in busy courts are less sound .  Regardless of the reason, recidivism almost surely raises the 
costs of financial distress for these firms as they are not rehabilitated or liquidated  the first time through 
court. 
Because the equity value of the bankrupt firm is negative or close to zero, additional costs of 
financial distress must be principally borne by the creditors of the firm.  Using regulatory data reported by 
commercial banks, I indirectly measure the  default costs passed  on to creditors by examining the net 
charge-off rate of commercial and industrial (C&I) loans reported by banks that were particularly exposed 
to the BAPCPA caseload shock.  Because local banks are the predominant source of funding for small 
businesses (Petersen & Rajan, 1994), they should bear the brunt of higher  bankruptcy costs when these 
firms default.  Consistent with this intuition, I find that banks that are located in exogenously busier 
bankruptcy districts report higher C&I loan charge-off rates. 
The economic impact of judge caseload is large.  Using the estimates from the BAPCPA natural 
experiment as guide, I estimate that a 32% rise in filings (the average rise during economic recessions) 
increases the probability that a bankrupt firm will be reorganized by 8.2 percentage points, a 27% increase 
from the unconditional probability of 30%.  This same shock to bankruptcy caseloads more than doubles 
the recidivism rate among firms that are dismissed from court after their first filing, and increases the net 
charge-off rate on C&I loans by 24 basis points, a 47% rise relative to the mean rate of 51 basis points. 
                                                                 
6 A firm might be unviable for one of two reasons.  First, it might be economically unviable if, regardless of its 
capital structure, it cannot be profitable.  Second, it could be financially unviable if it exits bankruptcy with elevated 
leverage, leaving it overly exposed to temporary shocks going forward.  7 
 
In addition to these main findings, I find that crowded bankruptcy courts impose other costs on 
financially  distressed  firms,  including  increased  time  spent  in  bankruptcy.    As  one  might  expect, 
bankruptcy stays – the length of time between the filing and resolution of the case – are longer in busy 
courts, particularly for firms that eventually reorganize.  I estimate that a 32% increase in court workload 
lengthens the stay in bankruptcy by six months for a reorganizing debtor.  Longer stays in bankruptcy 
require debtor firms to have more cash on hand in order to continue operations while in court.  As a result, 
I find that smaller firms, which have less access to outside capital, are more likely to sell assets in order to 
raise cash. 
These results are robust to a battery of checks that verify that the estimates are not driven by 
alternative channels, i.e. the exclusion restriction is satisfied.  In particular, controlling for differential 
effects over time by industry, size, or geographic region does not affect the results.  I also confirm that the 
results  are  not  affected  by  sample  composition  effects  by  using  a  matched  sample  before  and  after 
BAPCPA.  In all cases the impact of caseload on bankruptcy outcomes remains largely unchanged. 
Taken  together,  my  results  show  that  overall  costs  of  financial  distress  are  higher  in  busy 
bankruptcy courts, and that busy bankruptcy judges make different decisions regarding the allocation of 
assets of bankrupt firms by liquidating fewer firms.  These findings relate to a large literature on the costs 
of financial distress (Andrade & Kaplan, 1998; Bris, Welch, & Zhu, 2006; Elkamhi, Parsons, & Ericsson, 
2012; Warner, 1977) as well as investigations into the design of bankruptcy systems and their impact on 
debt contracts (Aghion et al., 1992; Bolton & Scharfstein, 1996; Gennaioli & Rossi, 2010; Gertner & 
Scharfstein, 1991; Strömberg, 2000).  In addition, this essay also broadly relates to the literature on 
complexity costs and bounded rationality (Cohen & Lou, 2012; Hirshleifer & Teoh, 2003; Hong & Stein, 
1999).  In this vein, research that examines job performance and decision-making under time constraints 
is particularly relevant to my research.
7  Fich & Shivdasani (2006) show that busy boards are associated 
with weak corporate governance.   Coviello, Ichino, & Persico (2010) show that judges who juggle too 
                                                                 
7 See (Jex, 1998) for an overview of the psychological research in this area. 8 
 
many cases at once have worse job performance.  Huang (2011), using an empirical methodology similar 
to mine, finds that busy appellate court judges exhibit lightened scrutiny over district court decisions. 
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 gives more background about the role of 
the judge in Chapter 11 bankruptcy and measures of judge caseload.  Section 1.3 describes the impact of 
BAPCPA on court caseload and develops my empirical strategy.  Section 1.4 describes the data in my 
sample.    Section  1.5  analyses  the  impact  of  caseload  shocks  on  restructuring  firms.    Section  1.6 
concludes. 
1.2.  Bankruptcy process 
1.2.1.  The role of the bankruptcy judge 
When a corporation files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, it is randomly assigned to one of 
the bankruptcy judges in the district in which it files.
8  From the first-day motions until the end of the 
bankruptcy case, the judge’s main role is to review motions that are brought before the court and to 
determine whether to grant those motions.  Typically, each motion is accompanied with a brief which lays 
out the argument for granting the petition.  It is estimated that bankruptcy judges on average read well 
over 100 pages of legal briefs a day, and at least one judge admits that ―eye fatigue and irritability set in 
well  before  page  50‖  (Keane,  2010).    After  reviewing  the  motion,  a  hearing  is  held  in  which  oral 
arguments can also be presented on either side, and the judge will make a ruling either immediately (so-
called ―ruling from the bench‖) or in writing afterwards.   
Among the most important motions brought before the judge are petitions to dismiss a bankruptcy 
case or convert it to Chapter 7 liquidation.  While conversion to Chapter 7 almost certainly means the 
death of the firm, motions for dismissal are less clear.  Dismissal from court essentially means that the 
                                                                 
8  Debtors  can  file  for  bankruptcy  in  any  court  containing  the  debtor’s  ―domicile,  residence,  principal  place  of 
business…or principal assets in the United States.‖  The debtor may also file in a court ―in which there is a pending 
case…containing  such  person’s  affiliate,  general  partner,  or  partnership.‖  (28  USC  §  1408)    In  the  case  of 
corporations, this is typically interpreted to mean that a firm can file either (1) where they are incorporated, (2) 
where they are headquartered, or (3) where they do the bulk of their business.  This gives the largest, nationwide 
firms substantial leeway in the choice of bankruptcy venue, but for most corporations these three locations are one 
and the same and therefore they are not able to ―shop‖ for a more suitable bankruptcy venue.  In my sample, 295 
firms (8.9%) filed in bankruptcy districts different from the address they reported on their petitions.  Excluding these 
firms from the sample does not change any of my conclusions. 9 
 
firm remains as if no bankruptcy had ever been filed.  Negotiations can continue between debtors and 
creditors, but creditors are given power to seize assets or seek legal action against the debtor.  Dismissed 
firms can re-file for bankruptcy, but will typically have to show that they are in need of bankruptcy 
protection and have potential to be successfully rehabilitated; otherwise, the case will be dismissed again, 
potentially with legal consequences for a bad-faith filing.  Overall, dismissal is a close equivalent to 
conversion in many cases; the firm is dismissed from court but will still be liquidated because it has not 
been restructured in any way.  Morrison (2005) confirms that most dismissed firms cease operations 
shortly after exiting bankruptcy.
9  This is particularly true for smaller firms, which have less  ability to 
fight lawsuits in court or negotiate with creditors outside of court.   
Because it is the bankruptcy judge who gives the final decision on  the motion to dismiss or 
convert, he acts as an important filter in determining which firms are economical ly viable and which 
should be liquidated.  Indeed, Morrison (2005) states that, ―Neither debtors (managers or equity-holders) 
nor creditors dominate the bankruptcy process.  Instead, bankruptcy judges play a major role in filtering 
failing  firms  from  viable  ones.‖  The  judge’s  ability  to  correctly  determine  where  capital  can  most 
effectively be allocated largely determines the efficiency of the Chapter 11 process itself. 
Another key role of the bankruptcy judge is to rule on the feasibility of a Chapter 11 plan of 
reorganization.  Once a Chapter 11 filing has taken place, the debtor has a 120-day exclusivity period 
within which it has the sole right to file a plan of reorganization.
10  The plan of reorganization outlines 
how the debt of the firm will be restructured and the creditors of the firm will be repaid.  The plan must 
also estimate the enterprise value of the firm under Chapter 11 continuation, and show that this  value is 
greater than the expected value if the firm were to be liquidated under Chapter 7.  With a plan formulated, 
                                                                 
9 In the appendix I provide more detail about why firms are dismissed from court and what happens to them after 
they leave court. 
10 The debtor can petition the judge to extend this period of time, up to a maximum of 18 months.  Once the 
exclusivity period has expired, a creditor, group of creditors, or a case truste e are allowed to file competing plans.  
In practice the vast majority of plans are created and filed by the debtor, after negotiating with creditors  (Weiss, 
1990).   10 
 
the proponents of the plan create a disclosure statement which, once approved by the judge, is sent out to 
all creditors so that they can vote on whether to accept it or not.
11 
Even after a plan has been accepted by the creditors, however, the judge has the final say.
12  
Specifically, the judge must find that the plan is filed in good faith, gives a superior recovery to creditors 
than if the firm had been liquidated in Chapter 7, and is feasible.  To find that the plan is feasible, the 
judge must ―find that confirmation of the plan is not likely to be followed by liquidation or the need for 
further financial reorganization‖ (United States Courts, 2011).  In short, the judge must agree that the plan 
does enough to ensure that the firm will be viable going forward.  While this objective is specifically laid 
out for the judge in the Bankruptcy Code, there are no direct monetary consequences for a judge who 
allows an unviable firm to reorganize, since in practice it is nearly impossible to determine when this 
occurs.  However, there are reputational concerns for bankruptcy judges.
13  In particular, all of a judge’s 
decisions are part of the public record, and any ruling can be appealed before a higher court.   
Aside from direct decisions that determine whether a firm is allowed to reorganize, judges also 
rule on motions which alter other important aspects of the bankruptcy process.  One of the most important 
of these is the motion to sell assets.  The sale of an asset in bankruptcy can ease negotiations between 
debtors and creditors because it replaces the asset, which creditors typically do not want to own, with cash 
that creditors are happy to take.  Assets sold in these so-called ―Section 363‖ sales (named after the 
section  of  the  Bankruptcy  Code  that  governs  the  sales)  are  sold  free  and  clear  of  any  liens,  giving 
protection to potential buyers from further legal action (Gilson, 2010).  However, Pulvino (1999) shows 
that assets sold in Chapter 11 restructuring are typically sold at deeply discounted prices, indicating that 
these sales could hurt recovery rates for creditors.   Pulvino (1999) argues that in general asset sales 
benefit the debtor, because the proceeds of the sale bring much-needed cash into the firm, allowing it to 
                                                                 
11 A plan is approved if at least one half in number and two thirds in value of all creditors in each voting class 
(seniority level) votes in favor of the plan. 
12 In fact, the judge can even force creditors to accept a plan they have voted against in a so-called ―cram-down‖ if 
she feels that the plan is the best overall options available to the firm. 
13 For example, Weidlich & Kary (2008) reported specifically on Judge James Peck’s reputation when he was 
assigned Lehman Brothers bankruptcy case. 11 
 
continue operating during bankruptcy or to pay off creditors that the debtor does not want voting on the 
plan of reorganization.
14  It is up to the judge to determine whether these sales should be allowed to take 
place and to ensure that the auction process is fair.     
Other motions that judges consider include petitions to lift the automatic stay and allow creditors 
to seize certain assets, to extend the exclusivity period, or to allow the use of cash collateral.   Each of 
these decisions can tip the balance of power between debtors and creditors, indirectly affecting the ability 
of a firm to successfully reorganize.  
1.2.2.  Measuring bankruptcy court caseload 
The number of bankruptcy judgeships in the United States is determined by Congress, and the 
creation of new judgeships requires the passage of a bill by both the House of Representatives and the 
Senate.  Every other year, the Judicial Conference of the United States conducts a study of the caseload of 
bankruptcy judges and recommends to Congress the number of new judgeships that are needed for each 
bankruptcy district.  Despite consistent pleas for more judges from the Judicial Conference, the last time 
Congress  approved  new  permanent  judgeships  was  in  1992.
15  As a result,  judge workloads have 
increased dramatically.  From 1980 to 2010, total bankruptcy filings rose by 381% while the total number 
of bankruptcy judges only increased by 53%.   Put differently, the average bankruptcy judge in 201 0 
handled 3.1 times more cases than the average judge in 1980. 
But  each  bankruptcy  case  does  not  demand  an  equal  amount  of  the judge’s time.    Personal 
Chapter 7 cases rarely even go before a judge, while a complex Chapter 11 filing will take many hours of 
court time.  Because of these differences, the Judicial Conference uses a weighting system to calculate the 
caseload for each bankruptcy district.  The weights come from a judge time study conducted in 1989 
(Bermant, Lombard, & Wiggins, 1991), and indicate the number of hours a judge spends on each of six 
types of bankruptcy cases (Table 1.1): non-business Chapter 7, business Chapter 7, Chapter 11, Chapter 
                                                                 
14 Only creditors that are deemed ―impaired‖—meaning they do not receive 100% recovery—are allowed to vote on 
the plan.  By paying off some creditors with cash proceeds, they can be blocked from voting on the plan. 
15 In 2005, 28 new temporary judgeships were created in conjunction with BAPCPA, although the Judicial 
Conference had requested 47 permanent positions.  Section 1.3 discusses BAPCPA in more detail. 12 
 
12, Chapter 13, and other.  While non-business Chapter 7 cases on average take only 6 minutes of a 
judge’s time, the average Chapter 11 case uses up nearly 8 hours.
16  Following the Judicial Conference, I 
measure caseload as the weighted number of cases filed per judge in each bankruptcy district.  Because 
the weights are expressed in the number of hours the judge is expected to spend on the case, weighted 
caseload can be interpreted as the number of hours (per year) the judge would spend administering the 
particular mix of six bankruptcy case types filed in his bankruptcy district.   
TABLE 1.1 





Ch. 11  7.559 
Ch. 12  4.04 
Business Ch. 7  0.397 
Ch. 13  0.381 
Other  0.194 
Non-business Ch. 7  0.101 
 
On a weighted basis, judges in 1980 had, on average, a total caseload of 503 hours per year.  By 
2010, that workload had more than doubled to 1,141 hours per year.  However, much of that increase 
came in the first few years of the 1980s, when business bankruptcy filings rose quickly in the aftermath of 
two closely-spaced economic recessions.  Although the number of business bankruptcy filings has fallen 
since  that  time,  increased  numbers  of  personal  bankruptcies  have  left the  overall  caseload relatively 
unchanged.  As shown in Figure 1.2, since 1983 total weighted caseload has fluctuated around 1,000 
hours per year.  In general, total bankruptcy caseload rises during or shortly after economic recessions, 
and often these increases can be substantial.  The average peak-to-trough change in caseload since 1983 is 
264 hours, or 25% of the mean caseload per year.   
                                                                 
16 This is an average across all Chapter 11 cases filed in 1989.  Since the average size of Chapter 11 firms has 
increased since this time, it is likely that this underestimates the true total time that Chapter 11 cases consume.  
Further, it does not account for ―mega‖ Chapter 11 cases such as Lehman Brothers or Enron, whose complexity and 
public nature costs judges significantly more time. 13 
 
 
FIGURE 1.2 - CASELOAD PER JUDGE 
This figure displays the total weighted caseload per judge across the U.S. courts system from 1980Q2 – 2011Q2.  
The y-axis can be interpreted as the total expected hours a judge will spend on case-work annually.  The vertical line 
identifies the passage of BAPCPA in October 2005, while light-gray shading indicates NBER recessions. 
Moreover, there is wide variation in caseload across the 89 bankruptcy districts in the U.S.
17  
Taking the average weighted case load for each district from 1983   –  2011,  I  find  that  the  standard 
deviation across districts is 311 hours, or 7.8 40-hour work weeks.  At the extremes, the bankruptcy judge 
in Vermont had an average total workload of 305 hours per year, while the judges of the Western District 
of Tennessee averaged 1,664 hours per year.  More recently, areas that have experienced particularly 
difficult economic recessions have seen dramatic increases in the caseload required of each judge.  For 
example, since 2009, bankruptcy districts in Nevada (2,161 hours), Middle District of Florida (2,041 
                                                                 
17 There are a total of 94 bankruptcy districts in the U.S. Courts system, but I exclude the Northern Marianas Islands, 
the Virgin Islands, Guam, and Puerto Rico  from  my study.   In addition,  the Western and Eastern Districts of 
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hours), Eastern Michigan (1,865 hours), Northern Mississippi (1,833 hours) and Northern Georgia (1,771 
hours) have been particularly stressed.  
1.3.  Identification strategy 
Bankruptcy filings typically rise when economic conditions deteriorate, leaving judges with the 
heaviest workloads during economic recessions.  Because of this, a simple comparison of the bankruptcy 
outcomes of firms that file in busy courts versus those that file in non-busy courts would be confounded 
by multiple other factors.  In particular, during recessions firms have worse outside options for dealing 
with financial distress.  Raising new capital is difficult because credit is tight, asset sales would likely 
yield lower proceeds due to fire sale pricing, and negotiations with creditors might be more difficult as 
creditors are potentially facing their own financial issues during recessions.  Further, there are potentially 
selection biases as high-beta firms are more likely to go bankruptcy in recessions.  For these reasons, I 
cannot simply compare firms that file during busy times to those that file when judges have more time 
available.   
In order to identify the causal effect of caseloads on restructuring, I use difference-in-difference 
specifications that exploit an exogenous shock to caseloads that affected some bankruptcy districts more 
than others.  On April 20, 2005, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act was 
signed into law by President George W. Bush, although most of the provisions of the Act only applied to 
bankruptcy cases that were filed on or after October 17 of that same year.  BAPCPA was focused mainly 
on non-business bankruptcies, and, as its name suggests, its primary aim was to prevent abuse of the 
bankruptcy system by individual filers.   
Prior to BAPCPA, individual filers could choose the chapter of bankruptcy under which they 
filed.    BAPCPA  instituted  a  ―means  test‖  which  forces  high-income  filers  to  file  for  Chapter  13 
bankruptcy,  where  less  debt  is  discharged  and  future  income  must  be  pledged  towards  paying  back 
creditors, instead of Chapter 7.  In addition to the means test, BAPCPA increased the costs of filing for 
bankruptcy  by  between  50-70%  because  of  increases  in  filing  fees,  lawyer  fees,  and  required  debt 15 
 
counseling (United States Government Accountability Office, 2008).  Finally, BAPCPA also capped the 
amount of homestead exemptions at $125,000, which impacted filers in states that traditionally allowed 
home owners to protect large amounts of home equity. 
Because the law was passed in April but not effective until October, there was a window within 
which individuals could still file under the old law, and this explains the large spike in filings in mid-2005 
as  individuals  rushed  to  file  before  the  October  17
th  effective  date  (Figure  1.1,  Panel  A).    More 
importantly, though, once the law took effect personal bankruptcy filings dropped to the lowest levels on 
record, and remained depressed for some time, leaving judges with substantially fewer cases on their 
dockets  that  they  had  to  deal  with.
18  Bankruptcy judges do not specialize in a particular type of 
bankruptcy.  Because of this,  all judges  were  affected  by  the  rush  to file  and  subsequent  dearth  of 
consumer bankruptcy filings.  In effect, BAPCPA created a natural shock to bankruptcy caseloads faced 
by courts across the nation.
19     
The drop in personal bankruptcy filings was both large and long-lasting.  In 2004-2005, before 
BAPCPA took effect, the average caseload for bankruptcy judges was 1,059 hours, while in the two years 
after BAPCPA average caseload was only 566 hours ( Table 1.2).   In essence, BAPCPA halved the 
caseloads faced by bankruptcy courts, and filings stayed low well into 2008 (Figure  1.1, Panel A).
20  To 
put this shock in perspective, the average peak-to-trough change in nationwide caseload prior to BAPCPA 
was about 265 hours.  
Although BAPCPA was focused on personal bankruptcy, it did include three main provisions that 
affected Chapter 11 restructuring as well.  First, the law capped extensions of the exclusivity period – the 
amount of time that the debtor has the exclusive right to file a plan of reorganization – at 18 months total,  
                                                                 
18 Other research has shown that after BAPCPA individuals found other ways to deal with financial distress besides 
bankrtupcy, such as defaulting on mortgages (Li, White, & Zhu, 2011; Morgan, Iverson, & Botsch, 2012). 
19 Importantly, bankruptcy law firms typically do specialize, and therefore the rush of filings would affect personal 
bankruptcy law firms but not corporate bankruptcy law firms.  Figure A.1 in the appendix lays out how the various 
parties  involved  in  bankruptcy  interact,  and  shows  how  the  BAPCPA  shock  feeds  through  to  the  judge  via 
household bankruptcy filings only. 
20 When the financial crisis hit in 2008, caseloads began rising quickly, reaching pre-BAPCPA levels in early 2009. 16 
 
TABLE 1.2 
CASELOAD SUMMARY STATISTICS 
This table reports the distribution of caseload for the eight quarters before and after  BAPCPA, as  well as the 
distribution of the non-business share of caseload in 2003 for the 89 bankruptcy districts in my sample.  Caseload is 
measured as the weighted number of filings in each district per quarter per bankruptcy judge, using the weights in 
Table 1.1.  I multiply caseload by four in order to annualize the figures.  The weights in Table 1.1 represent the 
number of hours a judge is expected to spend on a bankruptcy case, and therefore the caseload statistics presented in 
this table can be interpreted as the total number of hours a judge will spend administering cases per year.  BAPCPA 
Caselod Drop is defined as the difference in the average caseload from 2004Q1-2005Q4 and the average caseload 
from 2006Q1-2007Q4 for each district.  In the last two lines of the table, the sample is split into those firms that had 
below- and above-median share of non-business caseload in 2003, to show that the drop was significantly larger in 
those districts that had fewer business bankruptcy filings. 
 









Non-business Share of Caseload (2003)  89  79.4%  11.5%  63.2%  81.6%  92.3% 
Avg. caseload 2004-2005 (pre-BAPCPA)  89  1095.05  429.90  425.07  1107.66  1842.90 
Avg. caseload 2006-2007 (post-BAPCPA)  89  565.54  267.99  165.76  543.23  1063.19 
BAPCPA Caseload Drop  89  529.51  215.27  207.77  528.87  908.77 
   Below-median non-business caseload  45  456.54  196.30  170.56  484.20  792.15 
   Above-median non-business caseload  44  604.14  210.08  321.32  566.18  1000.40 
 
while previously extensions were unlimited.  It also limited the window within which the debtor has to 
decide  whether  it  will assume  or  reject  leases  on commercial  property.    Second,  BAPCPA  imposed 
penalties on repeat filers.  Firms that re-file for bankruptcy within one year after reorganizing have the 
automatic stay lifted after 30 days unless the court grants an extension.  Third, BAPCPA made ―pre-
packaged‖ bankruptcy filings more attractive by allowing the solicitation of votes on the prearranged plan 
to continue while the firm formally files for bankruptcy.
21   
These alterations to the law did induce a few firms to file for Chapter 11 just before the effective 
date of October 17
th, 2005.  In the week before BAPCPA took effect 343 firms filed for Chapter 11, 
compared with only 45 in the week after.  However, it does not appear that BAPCPA altered the Chapter 
11 filing rate in an economically significant way (see Figure 1.1, Panel B).  By the first quarter of 2006 
the number of filings was nearly identical to the number in the third quarter of 2005.  Further, this mini 
―rush to file‖ is driven completely by the smallest firms that file for Chapter 11.  These firms are excluded 
                                                                 
21 See Chapter 2 of Gilson (2010) for a full overview of how BAPCPA affected Chapter 11 bankruptcy. 17 
 
from my sample (see Section 1.4).  In my sample, there is no observable change in the business Chapter 
11 bankruptcy filing rate around the passage of BAPCPA.  
Because BAPCPA affected some aspects of the Chapter 11 process, and to avoid possible impacts 
of time effects
22, I do not simply compare cases that were filed before and after the law to test the impact 
of caseload on bankruptcy outcomes.  Instead, I employ a difference -in-differences framework that 
focuses on bankruptcy districts that were disproportionately affected by the law.   Because of BAPCPA’s 
focus on consumer bankruptcies, its passage caused a disproportionately larger drop in caseload in those 
districts that spend more of their time on non-business bankruptcy filings.  I use the share of caseload that 
stems from non-business filings in 2003 as a measure of how consumer-oriented each court is.
23  A 
bankruptcy district that spends the majority of its time on personal bankruptcies saw its workload drop by 
more because of BAPCPA.   
For example, Figure 1.3, Panel A shows the differential impact of BAPCPA in two bordering 
bankruptcy districts, the Western and Middle Districts of Pennsylvania.  Because Western Pennsylvania 
takes in Pittsburgh, its bankruptcy court is more b usiness-oriented.  In 2003, non-business bankruptcies 
accounted for 67% of total caseload in Western Pennsylvania, while the non-business share of caseload in 
the Middle District was  83%.  Because of this,  when BAPCPA passed and the non-business filing rate 
dropped, caseload dropped by more in the consumer-centric Middle District than in the Western district.  
Specifically, caseload in the Middle District dropped by about 800 hours after BAPCPA, as compared to a 
drop of only 485 hours in the Western District. 
This pattern holds across for the full sample.  Panel B of Figure 1.3 plots the average caseload of 
consumer-centric bankruptcy districts – defined as those districts that had an above-median non-business 
share of caseload in 2003 – versus the caseload of the more business-centric courts.  Importantly, the two  
                                                                 
22 Baird & Rasmussen (2002) and Bharath, Panchapegesan, & Werner (2010) explore how Chapter 11 is changing 
over time.  My empirical strategy nets out any time effects by comparing firms that filed in the same quarter to each 
other. 
23 The non-business share of caseload is quite static over time.  For example, the cross-sectional correlation between 
this measure in 1995 and 2003 is 0.76 and significant at the 1% level. 18 
 
Panel A: Western and Middle Districts of Pennsylvania 
 
 
Panel B: Average across all business- and consumer-centric districts 
 
FIGURE 1.3 - BAPCPA’S EFFECT ON CONSUMER- AND BUSINESS-CENTRIC  
BANKRUPTCY DISTRICTS  
This figure shows how court caseload evolved in consumer- and business-centric districts from 2004-2007.  Panel A 
uses an example of two neighboring bankruptcy districts: the Western and Middle Districts of Pennsylvania.  The 
Middle District of Pennsylvania spends about 83% of its time on consumer bankruptcy cases, as compared to 67% in 
the Western District.  BAPCPA decreased caseload by substantially more in the consumer-centric Middle District.  
Panel B shows a similar pattern for all 89 bankruptcy districts.  In this chart, districts with an above-median non-
business share of caseload are classified as ―consumer-centric,‖ while the remaining districts are ―business-centric.‖  
The average caseload for each group is then plotted in the solid and dotted lines over time.  Because BAPCPA 
disproportionately impacted the consumer-centric groups, the difference between the two lines (indicated by the 
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FIGURE 1.4 - BUSINESS CASELOAD AND THE BAPCPA CASELOAD DROP 
This figure plots the decrease in caseloads due to BAPCPA against the non-business share of caseload in 2003 for 
each of the 89 bankruptcy districts in my sample.  The drop in caseload is calculated as the average caseload in the 
district during 2004-2005 less the average caseload in 2006-2007.  The non-business share of caseload is the share 
of weighted caseload in 2003 that is due to non-business bankruptcy filings.  Districts shown in red also received 
new judgeships with the passage of BAPCPA, and consequently had larger drops in caseload than would otherwise 
be expected. 
 
sets have parallel trends before and after BAPCPA, but the consumer-centric courts experienced a larger 
drop in caseload when BAPCPA took effect.  This can be seen even more clearly in Figure 1.4, which 
shows a scatter plot comparing the drop in caseload from before BAPCPA (2004-2005) to after BAPCPA 
(2006-2007) against the non-business share of 2003 bankruptcy caseload in each district.  The positive 
relationship between non-business caseload and the impact of BAPCPA is quite robust.
24  This is formally 
   
                                                                 
24 Delaware and the Southern District of New York show up as clear outliers in Figure 1.4.  In Section 1.5.6, I check 
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TABLE 1.3 
DECREASE IN CASELOAD DUE TO BAPCPA IN CONSUMER-CENTRIC DISTRICTS 
This table shows that bankruptcy districts that had a higher share of non-business cases in 2003 experienced larger 
declines  in  caseload  following  BAPCPA.    In  each  regression,  the  dependent  variable  is  the  drop  in  caseload 
following  BAPCPA,  defined  as  the  difference  in  the  average  caseload  from  2004Q1-2005Q4  and  the  average 
caseload  from  2006Q1-2007Q4  for  each  bankruptcy  district.    Non-Business  Caseload  (2003)  is  the  share  of 
weighted caseload in 2003 that was attributable to non-business bankruptcy filings.  In the second column, I control 
for the number of new judgeships that were created by BAPCPA (28 judgeships in 20 districts).  In the final column, 
controls are added for changes in economic conditions and total population from the pre-BAPCPA period (2004-
2005) to the post-BAPCPA period (2006-2007).  All regressions are estimated by regular OLS, and robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses.  ***,  ** and  * indicate statistical significance at    1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
Dependent variable:  BAPCPA Caseload drop 
Non-Business Caseload (2003)  555.076**  772.055***  714.222*** 
 
(257.969)  (218.711)  (229.337) 
# of new judges  --  108.906**  146.058*** 
   
(44.580)  (38.557) 
Change in unemployment rate  --  --  4.907 
     
(51.278) 
Change in house price appreciation  --  --  -1,037.417*** 
     
(252.373) 
Growth in per capita income  --  --  200.056 
     
(1,000.379) 
Population growth  --  --  1,043.399 
     
(979.314) 
        Observations  89  89  89 
R-squared  0.089  0.204  0.325 
 
 
tested in a regression setting in Table 1.3.  Without accounting for any other variables, a one standard 
deviation increase in the non-business share of caseload (increase of 11.5 percentage points) results in an 
additional caseload decrease of 64 hours following BAPCPA, a drop of 12%.  This effect persists after 
controlling  for  other  factors  that  impacted  caseloads.    Aside  from  affecting  filing  rates  for  personal 
bankruptcy, BAPCPA also created 28 new judgeships, which resulted in decreased caseloads per judge in 
20 affected districts.  Including a control for the number of new judges appointed following BAPCPA 
strengthens the relationship between non-business caseload share and the decrease in workload.  In this 
specification, a bankruptcy district with a one standard deviation higher share of non-business caseload 21 
 
experienced an additional caseload drop of 90 hours following BAPCPA, or more than 2 full work weeks.  
Controlling  for  changes  unemployment,  house  prices,  per  capita  income,  and  population  in  each 
bankruptcy district does not  affect the relationship between non-business caseload and the BAPCPA 
shock.    This  is  important,  as  it  shows  that,  although  caseload  is  affected  by  changes  in  economic 
conditions (e.g. changes in house prices), the variable that I use to identify the effect of BAPCPA is 
orthogonal to these factors.   
To better visualize which districts were most affected by BAPCPA, Figure 1.5 shows a map that 
color-codes each bankruptcy district according to the 2003 non-business share of total caseload.  Yellow 
districts  are those that  are  the  most consumer-centric  and thus  saw caseload drop  by  the  most  after 
BAPCPA, while red districts are business-centric and experienced smaller declines in caseload.  While it 
is clear that there is some clustering (e.g. southern states tend to be the most consumer-centric), there is 
significant variation even across nearby districts, especially in the Northeast and Midwest.  In Section 
1.5.7, I describe robustness checks that verify that geographic clustering of consumer-centric districts has 
no effect on my empirical results. 
The  identification  of  particular  bankruptcy  districts  that  were  disproportionately  affected  by 
BAPCPA allows me to estimate difference-in-differences regressions of the form: 
       (                             )                        
where      is the outcome of interest for bankruptcy filing i, in bankruptcy district d, in quarter t, and   is a 
vector of firm characteristics,    is a bankruptcy district fixed effect, and    is a time fixed effect.  The 
coefficient  of  interest  is   ,  which  captures  the  impact  of  filing  in  the  post-BAPCPA  period  when 
bankruptcy  caseloads  were  low,  in  districts  which  experienced  the  largest  declines  in  bankruptcy 
caseload.  Because it is more natural to think of an increase in caseload (e.g. when a recession hits) rather 
than a decrease, in the results presented in Section 1.5 I multiply                               
by negative one and call this variable ―busy court‖.   This adjustment does not change the significance or 22 
 
 
FIGURE 1.5 - U.S. BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT MAP 
This map displays the 89 bankruptcy districts across the United States.  Colors correspond to the share of 2003 
caseload that was related to non-business bankruptcy filings.  Districts in yellow have the highest non-business share 
of caseload and hence experienced the largest drop in workload following BAPCPA.  Red districts are the most 
business-centric, while orange districts lie in the middle of the distribution.   
 
magnitude of  ; it is simply easier to interpret in the context of caseload increases due to recessions.
25  I 
include in my sample firms that filed for Ch. 11 between January 1, 2004 and December 31, 2007, a time 
period centered on the passage of BAPCPA that ends before main increase in caseload due to the onset of 
the financial crisis in 2008.  Following Bertrand, Duflo, & Mullainathan (2004), in all specifications I 
cluster standard errors by bankruptcy district in order to account for serial correlation within bankruptcy 
courts. 
                                                                 
25  Indeed,  this  is  equivalent  to  estimating  the  interaction  term                          ,  which  identifies 
business-centric bankruptcy districts instead of consumer-centric districts, since                           
             (                  )                             (               )  
             (               )     . 23 
 
  While the above specification captures the overall effect of BAPCPA, one would expect that the 
impact of a drop in caseload varies depending on the complexity and relative bargaining power of the 
bankrupt firm.  Large firms in particular are more complex (often with hundreds or even thousands of 
creditors and intricate seniority issues that the judge must deal with) and have a stronger presence in court 
because they are better-able to hire top-notch lawyers, demand more of their creditors and suppliers, and 
are also more likely to get press coverage should they go belly up.  The smallest firms are much more 
straight-forward, and in these cases creditors or the trustee may have as much ability to sway the judge as 
the firm itself.  To empirically test whether caseload fluctuations differ by the size of the firm, I add 
another interaction term to the regression equation: 
        (                             )
    (                                    (     ))                       
where       is the assets or liabilities of the firm (whichever is largest) at filing.  Here, the coefficient    
captures the differential effect that the law had on large firms, while    captures the estimated impact of 
BAPCPA on a firm of             .  In order to isolate the true impact of the triple interaction term, in 
these  regressions  I  include                  (     )  as  an  additional  control  in    .    Once  again, 
regression results are reported with the two interaction terms multiplied by -1 in order to put    and    in 
terms of increases in caseload, rather than decreases. 
  The  difference-in-differences  estimator  shows  the  causal  impact  of  caseload  on  bankruptcy 
outcomes only if the exclusion restriction holds.  The confound that one worries about is whether firms 
that file in consumer-centric bankruptcy districts all changed in a particular way after BAPCPA, and that 
this change was unrelated to judge caseload.  For example, larger firms tend to be located in more urban 
areas, which also tend to have fewer non-business bankruptcies.  If larger firms also became more likely 
to  be  reorganized  after  BAPCPA  for  reasons  unrelated  to  judge  caseload,  this  would  confound  the 
difference-in-difference estimators in the equations above.   In Section 1.5.6 I test for these alternate 
channels by including size-by-time fixed effects and industry-by-time fixed effects.  These additional 24 
 
controls allow for there to be varying trends over time for different firm sizes or industries, thus ruling out 
alternative stories that relate to the composition of firms filing in particular bankruptcy districts.  In all 
cases including these controls do not affect my estimates. 
  A second possible confound in difference-in-differences estimates is changes in the composition 
of the sample before and after BAPCPA.  If different kinds of firms file for bankruptcy after BAPCPA, 
then it is possible that my estimated effects are due to changes in the types of bankrupt firms rather than 
changes in caseload.  The fact that the filing rate of Chapter 11 debtors did not change with the passage of 
BAPCPA suggests that there was a not a significant shift in the propensity of a firm to file for bankruptcy 
around  that  time.   The  composition  issue  can  be  further addressed  by  creating  a  paired  sample that 
matches firms that filed for bankruptcy before BAPCPA to firms with similar characteristics that filed 
afterwards.  Matching in this way holds the composition of debtors constant before and after BAPCPA.  
Using the covariates in the vector   , I create such a matched sample using a propensity score matching 
model and find that all results continue to hold when the regressions are run on this limited sample. 
  A  final  concern  relates  to  forum  shopping.    Some  firms  do  have  discretion  in  choosing  the 
bankruptcy district where they file, and therefore they could move to a different venue if low or high 
caseloads in a particular court will adversely affect their outcome.  This selection effect could potentially 
bias my estimates.  As described in Section 1.4 below, my sample consists mostly of mid-size firms that 
do not have a choice in venue.  Regardless, I can use the address of the firm to identify debtors that file in 
non-local bankruptcy districts, and take that as an indicator of firms that picked an alternate venue.  I find 
that 8.7% of the filings in my sample occurred in states other than the home state of the debtor.  Omitting 
these firms from the sample does not alter my results. 
1.4.  Data 
I  gather  information  on  Chapter  11  bankruptcy  filings  from  LexisNexis  Law,  which  obtains 
bankruptcy  filing  data  from  the  U.S.  Courts  system.    I  focus  on  a four-year  period  surrounding  the 
passage of BAPCPA, from 2004-2007.  I end the sample in 2007 to avoid the sharp uptick in caseload 
that resulted from the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009, and also to have a 3-year period (2008-2010) in 25 
 
which I can examine recidivism into bankruptcy for firms that file near the end of my sample.  During this 
period, LexisNexis has legal information on 14,825 separate business Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings in the 
50 states and the District of Columbia.
  Because LexisNexis’ data comes directly from the U.S. Courts, 
there is essentially 100% coverage of Chapter 11 cases in my data.  The benefit of using data from 
LexisNexis is that it is more easily obtained for the entire, nationwide set of bankruptcies.  While several 
previous bankruptcy studies have used court records to compile data on bankruptcies, due to the difficulty 
of obtaining this data directly from the U.S. Courts these studies have typically been limited in scope, 
typically focusing only on a subset of bankruptcy districts or only on public firms, which have more 
information readily available.  To my knowledge, this is the first study to make use of LexisNexis’ 
universal coverage. 
The LexisNexis data contains legal information from the U.S. Courts system, including the date 
the case was filed, the court in which it was filed, the judge assigned to the case, an indicator of whether 
the filing was voluntary
26 or not, a flag indicating whether the debtor has distributable assets, and status 
updates on the case.  From the status updates, I can determine the outcome of the case: whether it was 
dismissed from court, converted to Chapter 7, transferred to another court, or reorganized. 
I augment this legal information with financial data obtained from Capital IQ and The Deal 
Pipeline.   From these two sources, I obtain the full list of firms that filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 
their databases, and match them to LexisNexis using bankruptcy case number, filing date, company name, 
and address.  Using this information, I am able to match over 99% of Chapter 11 cases in Capital IQ and 
The Deal Pipeline during my sample period.  From Capital IQ and The Deal Pipeline, I obtain the assets 
and liabilities reported by the firm at the time of the bankruptcy filing, the industry of the firm, and a flag 
indicating whether the firm obtained debtor -in-possession (DIP) financing.  I also use the text in the 
description of the bankruptcy to determine whether the firm filed with a pre-arranged or ―pre-packaged‖ 
bankruptcy plan. 
                                                                 
26 A ―voluntary‖ filing is one in which the debtor filed the petition, while ―involuntary‖ filings are instigated by a 
creditor or creditors. 26 
 
Between Capital IQ and The Deal Pipeline, I match a total of 7,223 firms to LexisNexis, which 
makes up 49% of the 14,825 total bankruptcy filings between 2004 and 2007.  To get the final sample, I 
remove firms which are transferred to other courts or for which there is no exit information in LexisNexis 
(651 firms).  Finally, about half of the filings recorded in Capital IQ or The Deal Pipeline are missing 
information on industry, assets, or liabilities, reducing my final sample to 3,327 firms, or 22% of all firms 
that filed for bankruptcy during the sample period. 
Because I rely on financial information in Capital IQ and The Deal Pipeline, which do not have 
information on the smallest firms, the sample used in this study is composed of larger, more complex 
firms than the overall sample of Chapter 11 filers.  For example, 14.1% of the firms in my sample filed 
jointly with related entities, while only 6.9% of the out-of-sample firms did so.  The larger firms in my 
sample are precisely the cases in which judges are needed to mediate complex negotiations, determine 
just outcomes, and discern when liquidation is the optimal path for a firm.   
Although my sample is limited only to those firms that are in Capital IQ or The Deal Pipeline, it 
still  contains  a  significant  number  of  smaller  firms.    Table  1.4  provides  summary  statistics  on  the 
bankrupt firms in my sample.  The median firm reports  $2.06 million in assets and $3.5 million in 
liabilities at filing, while roughly 10% of my sample has either assets or liabilities of less than $1 million.  
On the other extreme the firm at the 90
th percentile had assets or liabilities of about $50 million.  Sample 
firms reported being underwater (liabilities > assets) in 61% of the cases at the time of filing, and the 
median liabilities to assets ratio is 1.31.   
Firms may try to under-report the true value of their assets in order to appear more in need of 
bankruptcy protection than they really are.  Because of this, for many debtor firms total liabilities is likely 
a better measure of the size of the firm than total assets.  To overcome this issue, I define a new variable 
size, equal to the maximum of either assets or liabilities at filing, to capture the true scale of the firm.  The 
median firm has a size of $4.4 million, but the distribution contains a few outliers (e.g. Delta Airlines) that 





This table provides summary statistics of the characteristics of the bankruptcy cases in the sample.  Panels A and B 
pertain to data used on bankruptcy filings.  In Panel A,  size is defined as the maximum of assets or liabilities 
reported at filing.  Panel C provides information on the commercial bank panel data used in Section 1.5.4.  All 




Panel A: Continuous variables 
   Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
5
th 
Percentile  Median 
95
th 
Percentile  Max 
Dependent variables: 
                 Months in Bankruptcy  3327  18.36  16.70  1.55  13.06  53.19  93.91 
   Sale Price / Assets  430  0.585  2.588  0  0.226  1.127  42.00 
Control variables: 
                 Size at filing  3327  $156.65  $5,303.69  $0.71  $4.42  $112.00  $301,816 
   Winsorized size at filing  3327  $28.53  $94.97  $0.71  $4.42  $112.00  $745 
Other descriptive stats: 
                 Assets at filing  3327  $141.64  $5,284.58  $0.05  $2.06  $75.00  $301,816 
   Liabilities at filing  3327  $61.91  $834.56  $0.50  $3.50  $100.00  $28,270 
   Liabilities / Assets  3291  13.61  94.86  0.33  1.31  35.00  3559 
   Employees (when available)  900  1,079.82  6,656.93  8  120  3,206  146,600 
   # of entities filing jointly  3327  1.677  3.952  1  1  4  133 
 
Panel B: Binary variables 
   Obs.  % Obs. 
Dependent variables: 
       Outcome: 
          Reorganized  3327  29.82% 
      Liquidated  3327  36.10% 
         converted to Chapter 7  3327  28.13% 
         in Chapter 11  3327  4.36% 
         section 363 sale of all assets  3327  6.85% 
      Dismissed  3327  34.08% 
   Has asset sale  3327  13.01% 
   Re-files for bankruptcy within 3 years  2089  5.18% 
      Reorganized  953  2.52% 
      Dismissed  1133  7.41% 
   Pre-packaged bankruptcy  3327  1.41% 
   Obtained DIP loan  3327  15.87% 
Control variables: 
       Liabilities > Assets  3327  61.14% 
   Has related filings  3327  14.10% 
   Distributable assets  3327  92.28% 
   Involuntary filing  3327  1.17% 28 
 
TABLE 1.4 – continued 
 
Panel C: Commercial Banks 





Percentile  Median 
95
th 
Percentile  Max 
Dependent variable: 
                 Net C&I loan charge-offs (% of 
total C&I loans)  29012  0.51%  1.43%  -0.33%  0.02%  2.92%  9.33% 
Control variables: 
                 Annual asset growth  29012  7.67%  12.00%  -6.32%  5.42%  30.12%  63.27% 
   Net charge-off rate on all other 
lending  29012  0.16%  0.34%  -0.43%  0.06%  0.70%  2.44% 
 
decrease the influence of these outliers, and in Section 1.5.6 I describe robustness checks that verify that 
these outliers are not driving my results. 
Based on the description of the bankruptcy in Capital IQ or The Deal Pipeline, I only find that 47 
(1.4%) of the firms in my sample filed pre-packaged plans.  When a firm has a pre-packaged plan, the 
judge has very little to do in the case, and so in most of my empirical results I omit these firms from the 
sample.
27  Unconditionally, debtors are a bit more likely to be liquidated (36.1%) or dismissed (34.1%) 
than reorganized (29.8%).  Liquidation can come in three different forms, however: conversion to Chapter 
7  (28.1%),  liquidation  directly  from  Chapter  11  via  a  ―liquidating  plan‖
28  (4.4%),  or  the  sale  of 
substantially all assets of the firm via a section 363 sale (6.9%).  These are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive; a firm that sells all of its assets in a section 363 sale is often subsequently liquidated via 
Chapter 7 or a Chapter 11 liquidating plan. 
I measure recidivism rates as the propensity to file for either Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
within three years of the original filing date of the bankruptcy.  To identify repeat filers, I use information 
on all business bankruptcy filings (either Chapter 7 or Chapter 11) from LexisNexis from 2004-2010, and 
                                                                 
27 When a debtor files with a pre-packaged plan of reorganization, the judge must still determine that the plan is fair 
and that it provides higher recovery rates for creditors than if the firm were liquidated under Chapter 7, but this 
approval  is  nearly  always  given.    In  my  sample,  all  but  one  of  the  firms  that  filed  with  pre-packaged  plans 
successfully reorganized; the other firm was dismissed from court. 
28 Liquidating plans in Chapter 11 function just like reorganizing plans: they are proposed, voted on, and approved 
in the same manner.  The only difference is that there is no expectation that the debtor will continue operations after 
exiting. 29 
 
match the original Chapter 11 filings to future Chapter 7 or 11 filings using tax ids, firm names and 
aliases, and addresses of the bankrupt firms.  Limiting to a 3-year window avoids time effects; firms that 
file for bankruptcy in 2004 have a much longer time period in which to re-file that those that file in 2007, 
and will thus naturally have a higher recidivism rate if the whole time period is examined.  Also, I do not 
count firms that re-file within 3 months of their original filing as having re-filed, since these can hardly be 
considered ―separate‖ bankruptcies; these firms likely exited court due to unusual circumstances (e.g. 
they were dismissed for failing to file the proper paperwork) and quickly re-filed once the issue was 
resolved.  The 3-month cutoff is somewhat arbitrary; my results are identical if I use a 2-month or 4-
month cutoff instead.  On average, 2.5% of reorganized firms and 7.4% of dismissed firms re-file for 
bankruptcy within 3 years of their original filing in my sample.
29   
The  sample  firms  are  well -dispersed  both  geographically  and  across  industries.    All  89 
bankruptcy districts are represented in the sample, with the median district having 22 bankruptcies and the 
largest bankruptcy district (Southern District of New York) only composing 6% of the sample.  I use  
reported SIC codes or written industry descriptions  from Capital IQ  and The Deal Pipeline to classify 
each firm according to the   Fama-French 30 industry classification, and  have coverage across all 3 0 
industries. 
Both Capital IQ and The Deal Pipeline maintain databases of bankruptcy sales transactions.  I use 
these databases to identify firms which sell assets during the course of  bankruptcy, and find that 13% of 
the firms in my sample have an asset sale recorded.  In many cases it is difficult to determine  exactly 
which assets were sold in the auction; the transaction might list a particular piece of property or a division 
of the company, or it might just list the name of the company.  In 53% of the sales (228 cases), however, 
the phrase ―substantially all assets‖ is used in the description of the asset, signifying that in these cases the 
entire firm was sold.  I mark these firms have having been liquidated completely. 
                                                                 
29 I do not consider firms that are liquidated in my analyses of recidivism, since by and large these firms cease to 
exist after their original bankruptcy and cannot re-file.  Exceptions to this would include firms that are converted to 
Chapter 7 but later re-instated to Chapter 11 or dismissed from court, or firms which are sold as going concerns to a 
single buyer and continue to operate as separate entities.  30 
 
Because recovery rates are not available for private companies, I cannot measure the impact of 
caseload on creditors directly for each bankruptcy filing.  Instead, I turn to regulatory data reported by 
U.S. commercial banks in the Consolidated Report of Condition and Income (commonly known as the 
Call  Reports).    From  the end-of-year  Call  Reports from  2004-2007,  I  obtain information  on the  net 
charge-offs reported by each bank on its commercial and industrial (C&I) lending.  Net charge-offs are 
calculated as the total amount written off during the year less any recoveries received on C&I loans and 
hence represent the aggregate loss on C&I lending sustained by the bank.  For each year, I scale total net 
charge-offs by the average outstanding amount of C&I loans held by the bank over the course of the 
year.
30  In addition to this main dependent variable, I also collect information on asset growth and the net 
charge-off rate on all other lending at the bank.  To avoid undue influence of outliers, I winsorize each of 
these variables at the 1
st and 99
th percentiles. 
The exposure of each bank to the BAPCPA shock depends on its location; banks in consumer-
centric  districts  saw  caseloads  drop  by  more  after  BAPCPA  than  those  located  in  business-centric 
districts.  Using the FDIC’s Summary of Deposits data from 2003, I first determine the share of a bank’s 
deposits that were located in each bankruptcy district in that year.  I then calculate the weighted average 
non-business share of caseload across all bankruptcy districts in which a bank has deposits, using the 
share of deposits in each district as a weight.  This weighted average of non-business caseload then acts as 
a proxy for the size of the caseload shock experienced by the bank following BAPCPA.
31  
   
                                                                 
30 Taking the average across all four quarters helps account for timing issues in the recognition of charge-offs by the 
bank.  Specifically, some of the charge-offs reported at the end of the year will be related to loans that went bad 
earlier in the year.  The appendix gives more information on loan loss accounting, as well as tests using alternative 
measures of loan losses.  Results using alternative measures give similar results. 
31 The appendix contains more detail on LexisNexis’ coverage of bankruptcy filings and the variables derived from 
the data, and the dispersion of cases by industry and bankruptcy district. 31 
 
1.5.  The effect of heavy caseload on Chapter 11 restructuring 
1.5.1.  Bankruptcy outcomes: reorganization, liquidation, or dismissal  
In this section, I first focus on estimating the effect that decreased caseloads following BAPCPA 
had on the outcome for firms in Chapter 11.  In general, a firm that files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy can 
have one of three outcomes:  
1.  Reorganization:  a  restructuring  plan  is  formed  and  accepted,  previous  debtors  are  paid 
according to the plan, a new capital structure is put in place, and the debtor emerges from 
bankruptcy 
2.  Liquidation: the debtor’s case is converted to Chapter 7, the debtor is liquidated directly 
from Chapter 11, or the debtor’s assets are sold as part of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy auction 
3.  Dismissal:  the  case  is  dismissed  and  the  debtor  remains  as  if  no  bankruptcy  filing  had 
occurred. 
Having  established  in  Section  1.3  that  bankruptcy  districts  with  fewer  business  cases  were 
disproportionately affected by BAPCPA, I use the non-business share of caseload as a proxy for the size 
of the caseload drop and estimate its effect on bankruptcy outcomes using the difference-in-differences 
methodology outlined in Section 1.3.  I exclude from these regressions firms that filed with pre-packaged 
bankruptcy plans, since the court has little to do in such cases.  In these models, I control for: 
-  The natural log of the size of the firm, where size is defined as      (                  ) at the 
time of the bankruptcy filing. 
-  A dummy variable equal to one if liabilities are greater than assets, indicating firms that are more 
financially distressed.  I use a dummy variable rather than the actual liabilities to assets ratio 
because some firms report very low assets, resulting in extremely high ratios.  However, my 
results are unchanged if I use the liabilities to assets ratio instead of this indicator variable. 
-  A dummy variable equal to one if the firm had subsidiaries or related entities that filed at the 
same time. 32 
 
-  A dummy variable equal to one if the firm had non-exempt assets available for distribution to 
creditors, according to a flag recorded in LexisNexis.   
-  An indicator of whether the filing was voluntary (filed by the firm) or involuntary (filed by 
creditors).  Only 1.2% of the sample filings were involuntary, but these cases are typically much 
more likely to be dismissed from court. 
-  An indicator variable equal to one if the firm obtained DIP financing.  Obtaining a DIP loan is 
important for firms that need cash to continue to operate during bankruptcy proceedings, and is 
typically associated with a higher likelihood of reorganization (Dahiya, John, Puri,    am  rez, 
2003). 
-  Fixed effects for 30 Fama-French industries, fixed effects for the quarter in which the firm filed 
for bankruptcy (there are a total of 16 quarters in my sample period), and fixed effects for the 
bankruptcy district in which the firm filed (89 districts).  
In the results presented in Table 1.5, there are two main coefficients of interest.  First, the variable 
busy court, defined as -1 times the interaction of a post-BAPCPA dummy and the non-business share of 
caseload in the bankruptcy district, captures the effect of filing in districts which experienced the smallest 
decreases in caseload following BAPCPA.  Because my estimates include both industry and quarter fixed 
effects, the coefficient on busy court effectively compares two firms from the same industry that filed for 
bankruptcy in the same quarter but in districts that had exogenously different caseload due to BAPCPA.  
The  estimates  show  that  Chapter  11  debtors  that  filed  in  districts  with  the  heaviest  caseloads  were 
significantly more likely to emerge from bankruptcy via reorganization, and instead are less likely to be 
dismissed from court.  As explain in Section 1.2.1 above, dismissal favors creditors by allowing them to 
seize assets and in most cases is akin to liquidation, especially for small firms.  My results show that busy 
judges are more willing to allow firms to reorganize and emerge from bankruptcy while less-busy judges 







THE EFFECT OF CASELOAD ON BANKRUPTCY OUTCOME  
This table explores the relation between the change in caseload due to BAPCPA and whether the bankrupt firm was reorganized, liquidated, or dismissed from 
court.  Busy court is defined as the interaction of a post-BAPCPA dummy, equal to one if the firm filed on or after 17 October 2005, and -1*non-business 
caseload, the share of caseload in 2003 that was derived from non-business filings.  Size is the maximum of either assets or liabilities reported at the time of 
filing.  The other control variables indicate whether the firm reported liabilities > assets at filing, if the firm had other related entities that filed jointly, if the firm 
had assets available for distribution to creditors, if the filing was involuntary (filed by a creditor), and if the firm obtained DIP financing.  All regressions include 
89 district fixed effects, 16 quarter fixed effects, and 30 industry fixed effects.  All models are estimated using linear least squares. Standard errors are clustered 
by bankruptcy district and reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at   1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
Dependent Variable:  Reorganized 
Liquidated 
Dismissed  All liquidations  Conversion to Ch. 7 
Busy court  0.149**  0.087  -0.017  0.074  -0.005  0.053  -0.132**  -0.161** 
 
(0.061)  (0.068)  (0.054)  (0.067)  (0.039)  (0.047)  (0.058)  (0.073) 
Busy court * ln(size)  --  0.044**  --  -0.066***  --  -0.039**  --  0.022 








Post BAPCPA * ln(size)  --  0.013  --  -0.029**  --  -0.003  --  0.016 








Ln(size)  0.008  0.022**  0.024***  0.011  -0.000  -0.019**  -0.032***  -0.033*** 
 
(0.006)  (0.010)  (0.008)  (0.010)  (0.006)  (0.009)  (0.006)  (0.009) 
Liabilities > assets at filing  -0.015  -0.015  0.070***  0.070***  0.063***  0.063***  -0.054***  -0.054*** 
 
(0.019)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.020)  (0.020) 
Group filing  0.039  0.034  0.035  0.040  0.017  0.023  -0.074***  -0.074*** 
 
(0.029)  (0.029)  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027) 
Distributable assets  0.218***  0.218***  -0.517***  -0.518***  -0.555***  -0.555***  0.300***  0.300*** 
 
(0.022)  (0.021)  (0.040)  (0.039)  (0.043)  (0.042)  (0.036)  (0.036) 
Involuntary  -0.020  -0.016  0.180*  0.174*  0.123  0.119  -0.160***  -0.158*** 
 
(0.095)  (0.095)  (0.091)  (0.091)  (0.095)  (0.096)  (0.058)  (0.058) 
Got DIP loan  0.073***  0.070**  0.058**  0.060**  -0.045*  -0.041*  -0.131***  -0.131*** 
 
(0.027)  (0.027)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.018)  (0.019) 
Quarter, industry, and district fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  3,280  3,280  3,280  3,280  3,280  3,280  3,280  3,280 
R-squared  0.064  0.065  0.128  0.130  0.147  0.149  0.127  0.128  
34 
 
The  second  coefficient  of  interest  in  Table  1.5  is  the  impact  of  the  interaction  term  busy 
court*ln(size), which tests whether these effects differ by the size of the firm.  I find that while all firms 
are more likely to be reorganized in busy courts, this is particularly true for larger firms.  Busy judges will 
have the hardest time determining the viability of the largest, most complex bankrupt firms, and so it is 
unsurprising that higher caseloads have the biggest impact on the largest firms.  In addition, larger firms 
are likely better able to lobby a busy judge to allow reorganization: they can better afford high quality 
lawyers, and the (likely negative) publicity for the judge will be much larger if a large firm is liquidated.
32  
The differential impact of caseload on large firms comes through increased liquid ations rather than 
dismissals, which relates to the fact that large firms in general are less likely to be dismissed.  While 
dismissal likely means the death of the firm for small firms, a large firm that is dismissed may be more 
likely to re-file, file in another district, or find a way to negotiate with its creditors.  As can be seen in the 
coefficients on ln(Size) in Table 1.5, large firms are substantially less likely to be dismissed from court, 
but more likely to be liquidated.  When a judge determines that a large firm should not be reorganized, he 
is  likely  to  choose  to  liquidate  the  firm  directly.  Less-busy  judges  in  particular  are  more  likely  to 
liquidate a firm.  All of this effect comes through liquidations via conversion to Chapter 7, rather than 
liquidating plans in Chapter 11 or 363 sales of all the firm’s assets. 
There are several ways to quantify the economic magnitude of these estimates.  As described in 
Section 1.3, a one standard deviation increase in the non-business share of caseload (11.5%) is associated 
with an additional 64.1 hour drop in caseload following BAPCPA.
 33   Thus, I estimate that on average, a 
64-hour increase in caseload increases the probability of reorganization by                     , a 
modest increase from the unconditional mean of 29.8%.  However, a 64-hour shock is relatively small 
compared to many of the caseload changes that occur in bankruptcy courts.  The true economic impact of 
                                                                 
32 Judge career concerns have received a fair amount of attention in the academic literature as a possible reason why 
judges are reluctant to liquidate large firms.  Recent examples include  LoPucki (2005) and Gennaioli & Rossi 
(2010). 
33  Because the diff-in-diff regressions do not control for other factors that affect the caseload drop, I use the 
estimates from the specification which simply regresses business caseload share on the decrease in casel oad with no 
other controls.  
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changes in caseload can be better understood in the context of typical observed changes in caseload.  
Nationwide, weighted caseload per judge has on average risen by 305.6 hours in the two years following 
the mid-point of an economic recession  (as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research), 
which is 4.77 times larger than the 64.1 hour increase mentioned above.  Thus, a rough estimate of the 
impact  of  increased  filings  following  economic  recessions  is  that  they  increase  the  probability  of 
reorganization by                   , a much more substantial amount.   
A caseload shock of 306 hours is on the same order of magnitude of many other standard changes 
in bankruptcy caseload.  Since 1983, the average nationwide peak-to-trough change in caseload has been 
264 hours.  The standard deviation of nationwide caseload over time (since 1980) is 188 hours.  Variation 
across bankruptcy districts tends to be more substantial.  If one ranks the 89 districts by their average 
caseload since 1980, moving from the district at the 25
th percentile (Hawaii) to the 75
th percentile (Utah) 
results in an increased caseload of 457 hours.  The standard deviation across all 89 districts is 361 hours.  
In order to give a sense of the economic magnitude of my estimates, I will continue to use the typical 
increase in caseload following recessions of 306 hours in the rest of the chapter, following the logic laid 
out in the paragraph above.
34 
Returning to the impact of caseloads on the outcome of the bankruptcy, I now provide  estimates 
of the size of the impact depending on the size of the firm.   The firm at the 10
th percentile in my sample 
has size equal to $1 million, the median firm has size of $4.42 million, and the firm at the 90
th percentile 
has size of $48.9 million.  Using this as a guideline, I use firms of size $1 million, $5 million, and $50 
million to give an idea of how the change in caseloads affects firms of varying sizes.  Based on the 
coefficients in Table 1.5, Table 1.6 shows the estimated impact that a 306-hour increase in bankruptcy 
caseloads would have on the probability of each bankruptcy outcome: 
                                                                 
34 It is important to note that using a shock of 306 hours makes the assumption that my difference-in-differences 
estimates are externally valid, i.e. can be applied outside of the difference-in-differences context.  One should keep 
in mind that typical increases in caseload occur when economic conditions deteriorate, when outside factors other 




IMPACT OF 306-HOUR CASELOAD SHOCK ON BANKRUPTCY OUTCOME 
   Firm size 
Change in probability of:  $1 million  $5 million  $50 million 
Reorganization  4.8  8.7***  18.2*** 
Liquidation  4.1  -1.8  -16.0*** 
Dismissal  -8.9**  -6.9**  -2.2 
In this and future tables that display the estimated impact of a recessionary rise in caseload, ***, **, and * 
are used to indicate whether the estimate is statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively.  These tests are performed using a Wald test of the linear combination               (    ), 
where    is the coefficient on busy court and    is the coefficient on busy court*ln(size).  Note that it is 
possible that the effect on large firms is statistically different from the effect on small firms even while 
neither is statistically different from zero.   
1.5.2.  Time in bankruptcy 
Several  previous  studies  have  used  the  time  in  bankruptcy  as  an  indirect  measure  of  total 
bankruptcy costs, including Bris et al. (2006), Franks & Torous (1989) and Thorburn (2000).  To the 
extent that increases in caseload force courts to stretch out the proceedings for each bankruptcy case, 
filings in busier courts could be substantially more costly than those in less-busy courts.  Importantly, Bris 
et al. (2006) find that judges are particularly important determinants of the speed of the bankruptcy case, 
suggesting that judges have large amounts of leeway in determining the speed at which cases resolve.
35  
In Panel A of  Table 1.7, I test whether busy bankruptcy courts clog the system and force Chapt er 11 
debtors to spend a longer amount of time in bankruptcy.     For these regressions, I define time in 
bankruptcy as the number of months between the filing date of the case and the date that a resolution was 
reached.  For reorganizations and dismissals, the resolution date corresponds to the date on which the case 
was discharged from court.  For liquidations, the resolution date is the date on which the case is converted  
                                                                 
35 In one conversation I had with a bankruptcy judge, another judge was singled out as running a ―rocket docket‖ 
court, in which everything was streamlined in order to minimize the amount of time a case was in court.  I indeed 
find that this is the case in my data: the ―rocket docket‖ judge moved Chapter 11 cases through court almost 5 




THE EFFECT OF CASELOAD ON TIME IN BANKRUPTCY 
This table explores the relation between the change in caseload due to BAPCPA and the duration of the firm’s stay 
in bankruptcy.  The dependent variable is the number of months between the bankruptcy filing and the resolution 
date of the bankruptcy.  In Panel A all bankruptcy cases are included, and controls for the outcome of the case.  
Panel B splits the sample by bankruptcy outcome: reorganized, liquidated, and dismissed.  All independent variables 
are defined as in Table 1.5, with the addition of controls for the outcome of the bankruptcy case in Panel A.  For 
clarity, the key variables that identify the effect of caseload on time in bankruptcy are shaded.  All regressions 
include 89 district fixed effects, 16 quarter fixed effects, and 30 industry fixed effects.  All models are estimated 
using linear least squares. Standard errors are clustered by bankruptcy district and reported in parenthesis. ***, ** 
and * indicate statistical significance at   1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
Panel A: All Bankruptcy Cases 
Dependent variable:  Months in bankruptcy 
Busy court  2.034  1.017 
 
(3.711)  (3.357) 
Busy court * ln(size)  --  0.53 
   
(0.737) 
Post BAPCPA * ln(size)  --  -1.013** 
   
(0.393) 
Ln(size)  1.644***  2.628*** 
 
(0.261)  (0.520) 
Liabilities > assets at filing  -0.296  -0.276 
 
(0.539)  (0.536) 
Group filing  -0.171  -0.419 
 
(0.874)  (0.847) 
Distributable assets  4.569***  4.619*** 
 
(1.009)  (0.997) 
Involuntary  2.016  2.045 
 
(3.919)  (3.982) 
Got DIP loan  3.991***  3.771*** 
 
(1.000)  (1.007) 
Liquidated  -9.419***  -12.989*** 
 
(0.892)  (0.718) 
Dismissed  -13.036***  -9.333*** 
 
(0.735)  (0.881) 
Quarter, industry, and district fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
      Observations  3,280  3,280 
R-squared  0.236  0.240 
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TABLE 1.7 – continued 
 
Panel B: Sample split by bankruptcy outcome 
Dependent variable:  Months in bankruptcy 
Sample:  Reorganized  Liquidated  Dismissed 
Busy court  11.069*  11.915**  -4.189  -6.743  -4.951  -4.928 
 
(5.892)  (5.052)  (4.332)  (6.586)  (4.107)  (4.410) 
Busy court * ln(size)  --  -0.527  --  2.144  --  0.065 






Post BAPCPA * ln(size)  --  -0.019  --  -2.332**  --  0.195 






Ln(size)  1.482***  1.279  2.635***  5.434***  0.832**  0.715 
 
(0.551)  (0.787)  (0.426)  (0.702)  (0.357)  (0.846) 
Liabilities > assets at filing  -0.888  -0.870  -1.762*  -1.635*  1.696**  1.690** 
 
(1.070)  (1.066)  (0.932)  (0.923)  (0.797)  (0.803) 
Group filing  -1.464  -1.395  -0.559  -1.307  2.116  2.120 
 
(1.606)  (1.579)  (1.352)  (1.330)  (1.719)  (1.717) 
Distributable assets  -4.592  -4.612  3.451***  3.667***  5.440***  5.449*** 
 
(3.907)  (3.912)  (1.113)  (1.099)  (1.972)  (1.983) 






(4.363)  (4.422)  (5.016)  (5.286)  (2.726)  (2.711) 
Got DIP loan  -1.504  -1.462  6.365***  6.175***  8.143***  8.162*** 
 
(1.938)  (1.945)  (1.680)  (1.657)  (2.051)  (2.074) 
Quarter, industry, and district fixed 
effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
              Observations  953  953  1,194  1,194  1,133  1,133 
R-squared  0.131  0.131  0.222  0.247  0.101  0.101 
to Chapter 7.  Converted cases will remain in court for several months after this date while the trustee 
oversees the liquidation of the assets, but at this point the judge has little left to do on the case, as the 
decision to liquidate has already been made. 
I find that there is no average effect of caseload on time in bankruptcy.  This is remarkable, as it 
suggests that judges who are exogenously busier than others spend less time per case (or longer hours in 
court each day), rather than extending the total amount of time a firm is in court.  But, while I find no 
overall effect of caseload on time in bankruptcy, this isn’t necessarily true for all firms.    
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In Panel B of Table 1.7 I report regressions that repeat the time in bankruptcy regression for the 
subsets of firms that were reorganized, liquidated, or dismissed.  I find that firms that reorganize in busy 
courts tend to have longer stays in bankruptcy, while firms that are liquidated or dismissed spend slightly 
less  time  in  bankruptcy.    This  suggests  that  busy  judges  optimize  their  time  by  taking  longer  with 
reorganizations  and  making  up  for  this  with  quicker  liquidations  or  dismissals.    These  effects  are 
attenuated slightly for larger firms. 
In terms of economic magnitude, the 306-hour average rise in caseload following a recession 
would be expected to have the following impact on bankrupt firms: 
TABLE 1.8 
IMPACT OF 306-HOUR CASELOAD SHOCK ON TIME IN BANKRUPTCY 
Increase in # of months in 
bankruptcy 
Firm size 
$1 million  $5 million  $50 million 
All cases  0.56  1.03  2.17 
   Reorganizations  6.56**  6.09*  4.96 
   Liquidations  -3.71  -1.81  2.80 
   Dismissals  -2.71  -2.66  -2.52 
 
Given that the median reorganization in my sample takes 23.1 months, the above table estimates a 26% 
increase  in  reorganization  times  with  a  306-hour  increase  in  caseload.    For  reference,  the  median 
liquidation lasts just 10.6 months and the median dismissal is in court for 7.9 months.  Taken together, 
these  results  suggest  that,  although  busy  judges  allow  firms  to  reorganize  more  often,  these 
reorganizations typically take significantly longer and are thus more costly overall.   
1.5.3.  Recidivism 
Ideally, an efficient bankruptcy court would separate those firms that are economically viable from those 
that are not in the least possible time, and then ensure that the firms that leave court have a good chance 
of not falling back into bankruptcy.  I have already shown that firms that eventually reorganize in busy 
courts take longer to exit, suggesting that efficiency is reduced at least for these firms.  In this section I 




THE EFFECT OF CASELOAD ON RECIDIVISM 
This table explores the relation between the change in caseload due to BAPCPA and the likelihood a firm re-files for 
bankruptcy.  The dependent variable is equal to one if the firm filed for either Chapter 11 or Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
within three years of its original bankruptcy filing, but more than 3 months after that date.  All independent variables 
are defined as in Table 1.5, with the addition of a dummy variable equal to one if the firm’s original filing was 
dismissed from court.  For clarity, the key variables that identify the impact of caseload are shaded.  All regressions 
include 89 district fixed effects, 16 quarter fixed effects, and 30 industry fixed effects.  All models are estimated 
using linear least squares. Standard errors are clustered by bankruptcy district and reported in parenthesis. ***, ** 
and * indicate statistical significance at   1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
Dependent Variable:  Re-filed for bankruptcy within 3 years 
Sample:  Reorganized  Dismissed 
          Busy court  0.000  0.021  0.368***  0.413*** 
 
(0.027)  (0.035)  (0.131)  (0.130) 
Busy court * ln(size)  --  -0.011  --  -0.073** 




Post BAPCPA * ln(size)  --  0.007  --  -0.074** 




Ln(size)  0.003  -0.006  0.002  0.016 
 
(0.006)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.013) 
Liabilities > assets at filing  0.006  0.007  -0.029**  -0.027** 
 
(0.009)  (0.010)  (0.013)  (0.012) 
Group filing  0.006  0.008  -0.037  -0.037 
 
(0.015)  (0.015)  (0.025)  (0.026) 
Distributable assets  0.023  0.022  -0.045  -0.047 
 
(0.015)  (0.015)  (0.066)  (0.067) 
Involuntary  -0.045**  -0.047**  -0.074**  -0.080** 
 
(0.019)  (0.019)  (0.036)  (0.037) 
Got DIP loan  0.023  0.026  0.033  0.032 
 
(0.020)  (0.021)  (0.049)  (0.048) 
Quarter, industry, and district fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
          Observations  953  953  1,133  1,133 
R-squared  0.043  0.048  0.069  0.073 
 
I test whether the drop in caseload following BAPCPA affected the probability that a firm re-files 




36  In this analysis I only consider firms that are either reorganized or dismissed from 
court, as liquidated firms cease to exist and therefore cannot re-file for bankruptcy.  Results are presented 
in  Table  1.9.  I find that  busier courts see  significantly  higher  recidivism.    However, this effect  is 
concentrated among firms that are dismissed from court, while debtors that are reorganized in busy courts 
do not appear to have hig her recidivism rates.  In addition, the effects appear to be the strongest for 
smaller firms.  An increase in bankruptcy caseloads of 306 hours would have the following impact on the 
recidivism rates for firms of various sizes: 
TABLE 1.10 
IMPACT OF 306-HOUR CASELOAD SHOCK ON RECIDIVISM 
Increase in probability of 
re-filing withing 3 years 
Firm size 
$1 million  $5 million  $50 million 
All cases  7.76***  5.81**  1.07 
   Reorganizations  1.16  0.18  -2.19 
   Dismissals  22.74***  16.27**  0.55 
 
These estimated impacts are quite large; the unconditional probability of a dismissed firm re-filing for 
bankruptcy within 3 years is only 7.4%, suggesting that the 306-hour shock to caseload more than doubles 
the recidivism rate for the median firm. 
The fact that firms that reorganize in busy courts are no more likely to re-file for bankruptcy is 
somewhat surprising given the results in Section 1.5.1, which show that busy judges tend to allow more 
reorganizations and fewer dismissals.  If more marginal firms are being reorganized, one might expect 
that more of them would re-encounter financial distress and end up in bankruptcy once again.   One 
possibility is that the 3-year horizon is too short to find an effect for reorganized firms, which likely take 
longer to re-enter financial distress than dismissed firms.  In particular, results in Section 1.5.2 show that 
firms that reorganize in busy courts take longer to exit their initial bankruptcy, leaving a shorter window 
                                                                 
36 As mentioned previously, I do not count a firm as having re-filed if it files again within three months of its 
original filing date, as such filings are likely due to cases in which the firm was dismissed on a technicality and then 
subsequently re-filed once the problem was rectified.  
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before the end of the 3-year horizon within which the re-filing might take place.
37  It is also possible that a 
high percentage of reorganized firms continue to experience financial distress outside of court, even if 
they do not file for bankruptcy again, as documented in previous research  (Chang & Schoar, 2007; 
Gilson, 1997; Hotchkiss, 1995; Morrison, 2005) .  On the other hand, it is possible that the quality of 
restructurings in busy courts is equally as high as that of less busy courts, albeit at elevated costs due to 
longer stays in bankruptcy.  Regardless, within a 3-year window, it does not appear that the exogenous 
shock to caseload resulted in higher recidivism for firms that reorganize in busier courts.  
Meanwhile, dismissed firms re-file at significantly higher rates.  There are at least three reasons 
why this could be the case.  First, if busy judges tend to be more pro-debtor, as argued previously, then a 
firm which gets dismissed from court might be more willing to try re-filing in the busy court in hopes of 
getting a more favorable outcome the second time in court.  Second, busy judges may  be unwilling or 
unable to spend the time necessary to find proper cause for dismissal, thereby making it easier for debtors 
to appeal the decision or fix the issue that led to the initial dismissal and re-file for bankruptcy protection 
shortly thereafter.  Third, it is possible that a higher portion of the firms that  busy judges dismiss from 
court are viable entities in need of Chapter 11 protection in order to restructure.   
Two further tests can shed some light on the mechanism that drives higher recidivism in busy 
courts.  First, defining recidivism to only include re-filings that occur more than 12 months (but still less 
than 3 years) after the initial filing does not alter the economic magnitude or statistical significance of the 
results.  Thus, the high recidivism rate among firms dismissed from busy courts is not due to quick re -
filings that occur less than a year after the initial filing, which casts doubt on the idea that the recidivism 
effect is driven by firms dismissed by busy judges only because of technicalities or firms that quickly re-
file in busy courts in hopes of getting a more lenient judge the second time through .  Second, the 
recidivism effect is driven completely by re-filings for Chapter 11 (so-called ―Chapter 22‖ bankruptcies, 
which account for a little more than half of the re-filings in my sample), rather than firms who file for 
                                                                 
37 I cannot test longer horizons, as my data end in December 2010.  
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Chapter 7 in their second filing.  This shows that the effect is not being driven by unviable firms that 
choose to liquidate in court after being initially dismissed from busy courts.
38  Rather, elevated recidivism 
in busy courts comes from dismissed firms that survive for at least a few months and then attempt to 
restructure in Chapter 11 once again.   
Regardless of whether high recidivism among dismissed firms in busy courts reflects debtors 
seeking to take advantage of pro -debtor courts or firms which were initially dismissed that could truly 
benefit from bankruptcy protection, increased recidivism likely drives up both direct and indirect costs of 
financial distress for these firms, since it drags out the legal process as well as the period of financial 
distress.  Because the value of equity in these firms is at or near zero, the bulk of these costs will be borne 
by the original creditors of the firm.    
1.5.4.  Bank charge-offs 
If busy courts impose higher costs on restructuring firms, these costs will be largely passed on to 
creditors, since these firms have little or no equity.  I use net charge-offs on commercial and industrial 
(C&I) loans reported by commercial banks as a measure of the total default costs borne by banks.  Banks 
are the main creditors for many small and mid-sized businesses (Petersen & Rajan, 1994), and since the 
majority of C&I loans are unsecured one would expect losses to be concentrated in this lending.
39   
As described in Section IV, I use a bank’s exposure to bankruptcy districts with lower non-
business caseload as a proxy for banks that experienced exogenously busier bankruptcy courts post-
BAPCPA.  Essentially, banks whose branches are located in more consumer-centric bankruptcy districts 
are likely to lend to businesses that are also located in those districts, and thus these banks would have 
seen caseloads drop by the largest amount after BAPCPA.  In Table 1.11, I report panel regressions that 
contain annual data for 7,741 commercial banks from 2004-2007.  In these regressions, the dependent  
                                                                 
38 For brevity, the results from these two tests are unreported, but are available from the author by request. 
39 According to the Survey of Terms of Business Lending, produced by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, 
about 60% of C&I lending is unsecured.  Commercial Real Estate (CRE) loans, the other major category of business 
lending, are typically secured and thus more insulated from default costs.  Consistent with this, in unreported 




THE EFFECT OF CASELOAD ON C&I LOAN CHARGE-OFFS 
This table shows how changes in caseload affected the performance of commercial and industrial (C&I) loans held 
by commercial banks.  These panel regressions use regulatory data reported by commercial banks at year-end from 
2004-2007.  The dependent variable is defined as the total charge-offs on C&I loans reported by the bank during the 
calendar year less any recoveries received on C&I loans, as a percentage of the average total outstanding balance of 
C&I loans held by the bank over the year.  Busy court is defined as the interaction of a post-BAPCPA dummy, equal 
to one for all 2006 and 2007 observations, and -1*non-business caseload.  Because some banks have branches in 
multiple bankruptcy districts, non-business caseload in this table is defined as the weighted average non-business 
share of court caseload across all districts in which the bank had deposits in 2003.  The share of deposits held in 
each bankruptcy district serves as the weight in this average.  Asset growth is defined as the log difference in assets 
from the previous year.  Net charge-off rate on all other loans is defined similarly to the dependent variable.  In the 
second and third columns controls are added for local economic conditions.  All regressions include fixed effects for 
the 7,741 banks included in the sample as well as year fixed effects.  All models are estimated by OLS.  Standard 
errors are clustered by bank to account for serial correlation across years, and are reported in parentheses.  ***, **, 




Net charge-offs on C&I loans  
(% of total C&I loans) 
        Busy court  0.375**  0.437**  1.151 
 
(0.188)  (0.194)  (0.729) 
Busy court * ln(assets)  --  --  -0.127 
     
(0.120) 
Post BAPCPA * ln(assets)  --  --  -0.095 
     
(0.095) 
Asset growth  -0.395***  -0.382***  -0.379*** 
 
(0.096)  (0.097)  (0.097) 
Net charge-off rate on all other loans  0.673***  0.664***  0.663*** 
 
(0.067)  (0.068)  (0.068) 
Ln(per captia income)  --  -0.822  -0.848 
   
(0.549)  (0.552) 
Ln(population)  --  -2.336***  -2.387*** 
   
(0.756)  (0.757) 
Unemployment rate  --  0.067**  0.067** 
   
(0.030)  (0.030) 
House price appreciation  --  -0.194  -0.186 
   
(0.226)  (0.228) 
Fixed effects: 
         Bank  Yes  Yes  Yes 
   Year  Yes  Yes  Yes 
        Observations  29,012  29,012  29,012 




variable is total net charge-offs on C&I loans reported by the bank in a particular year, scaled by the 
average total outstanding C&I lending reported across the four quarterly reports during the year.  I use the 
average of C&I lending over the year to give a better measure of the total amount of C&I  lending 
typically done by the bank, and to help account for the fact that credit losses can be reported with a lag.  
However, my results are unchanged if I scale by C&I lending reported at the end of the year, or averages 
over longer periods of time.
40  In all specifications I include both bank and year fixed effects, and cluster 
the standard errors by bank in order to account for serial correlation within each bank.  I also control for 
the asset growth at each bank and the net charge off rate on all other l oans.  These variables control for 
the overall growth of the bank and its overall loan performance during the year.  I winsorize all bank-level 
variables at the 1
st and 99
th percentiles to prevent undue influence from outliers. 
Consistent with the idea that busy bankruptcy courts impose higher restructuring costs, I find that 
banks that were located in exogenously busier bankruptcy courts saw higher business loan charge-offs 
relative to banks in less-busy courts.  This effect is unchanged if I add controls for the general economic 
conditions where each bank was located, showing that this effect is orthogonal to any effects of the 
general economy on loan defaults.
41  Although estimated imprecisely, the results also suggest that charge-
offs increase in particular for smaller banks when caseload rises.
42  This result parallels the finding that 
busy courts tend to be pro -debtor in particular for larger firms.  In this case, the negative effects of 
caseload appear to be borne mostly by smaller banks, which may lack  the resources needed to serve on 
creditor’s committees or lobby the court in their favor.  In terms of economic magnitude, a 306-hour 
                                                                 
40 Scaling charge-offs by total C&I lending makes this measure an estimate of the probability of default multiplied 
by the loss given default on C&I loans, i.e. total expected losses.  Because busy bankruptcy courts likely affect just 
the loss given default (not the probability of default), ideally I would use credit losses scaled by the total amount of 
defaulted loans as the dependent variable in these regressions.   However, getting a clean measure of loss given 
default is not possible from the Call Reports.  The appendix gives more detail on this issue, and shows that two 
alternative proxies for loss given default produce nearly identical results. 
41  These economic indicators are all first calculated for each bankruptcy district using county-level data weighted by 
the population of each county.  Then for each bank, I take the weighted average across all bankruptcy districts in 
which the bank had deposits, using the amount of deposits in each district as the weight.  
42 This result is not statistically significant.  Using two alternative measures of loan charge-offs, in the appendix I do 
find significant differences between large and small banks.  
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increase in caseload is estimated to increase net C&I loan charge offs by an average of 24 basis points, 
which is a 47% increase from the mean of 51 basis points, or 0.17 standard deviations. 
1.5.5.  Bankruptcy Sales and DIP Financing 
Asset sales are an important feature of the bankruptcy process.   Through Section 363 of the 
Bankruptcy Code, the debtor firm is able to sell some or all of its assets to a third party without the need 
of creating a plan of reorganization and going through the voting process, although these sales must still 
be approved by the court.  In general, the judge must verify that there is a ―good business reason‖ for the 
sale (Wolf, Charles & Lees, 2010).   
One of the main benefits of 363 sales is that they bring cash to the firm much more quickly than a 
traditional  reorganization  plan.    Because  of  this,  363  sales  occur  more  often  under  emergency 
circumstances when firms need cash quickly and cannot bring in outside capital through DIP lending.
43  
Thus, when the bankruptcy process is expected to be drawn out, such as when bankruptcy caseloads are 
high, more asset sales should be expected.   Further, busy judges are also more likely to approve asset 
sales, since they typically speed up the bankruptcy process by removing the need for complex  debtor-
creditor negotiations and detailed reorganization plans.   
Table  1.12, which returns to the bankruptcy filings data,   shows that this is the case.  After 
BAPCPA, the courts that experienced the largest drop in caseload also had the largest decrease  in the 
share of cases that had 363 sales.  My estimates suggest that the rise in caseload after a recession would 
increase asset sales by 4.7 percentage points, a 36% increase over the unconditional mean of 13%.  The 
impact does not vary much depending on the size of the firm, although it appears to be greatest for small 
firms (though the difference between large and small firms is statistically insignificant) .  This makes 
sense, since small firms have a harder time accessing outside capital and therefore w ould more likely 
have to resort to asset sales in cases when the bankruptcy filing drags on for a long period of time.  
                                                                 
43  Lehman  Brothers,  Chrysler  and  General  Motors  are  good  examples  of  this  motive.    In  each  case  the  judge 
approved a quick asset sale because the firms’ value as a going concern was diminishing like a ―melting ice cube,‖ 




THE EFFECT OF CASELOAD ON ASSET SALES AND DIP LENDING 
This table explores the relation between the change in caseload due to BAPCPA and the need to raise capital during 
bankruptcy.    In  the  first  two  columns,  the  dependent  variable  is  equal  to  one  if  the  firm  sold  any  assets  in 
bankruptcy.  In the middle two columns the dependent variable is the sale price scaled by the assets of the firm, for 
this firms that had at least one asset sale.  In the final two columns the dependent variable is equal to one if the firm 
obtained debtor-in-possession financing.  All control variables are defined as in Table 1.5, with the addition of a 
control for whether the asset sale was for substantially all of the assets of the firm.  For clarity, the key variables that 
identify the impact of caseload are shaded.  All regressions include 89 district fixed effects, 16 quarter fixed effects, 
and 30 industry fixed effects.  All models are estimated using linear least squares. Standard errors are clustered by 
bankruptcy district and reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at   1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively.  
Dependent Variable:  Has asset sale  Sale price / assets  Obtained DIP Loan 
              Busy court  0.086**  0.105**  -0.191  -3.098  0.110  0.110 
 
(0.038)  (0.043)  (0.660)  (2.474)  (0.067)  (0.075) 
Busy court * ln(size)  --  -0.012  --  1.105  --  -0.002 






Post BAPCPA * ln(size)  --  0.004  --  0.029  --  -0.027* 






Ln(size)  0.053***  0.044***  -0.525**  -0.189*  0.090***  0.108*** 
 
(0.005)  (0.008)  (0.254)  (0.096)  (0.005)  (0.007) 
Liabilities > assets at filing  -0.007  -0.007  -0.727*  -0.753*  0.021*  0.022* 
 
(0.012)  (0.012)  (0.434)  (0.431)  (0.012)  (0.012) 
Group filing  0.080***  0.083***  0.272  0.216  0.105***  0.101*** 
 
(0.020)  (0.021)  (0.236)  (0.219)  (0.019)  (0.019) 
Distributable assets  0.031***  0.031***  -0.122  -0.301  0.016  0.016 
 
(0.011)  (0.011)  (0.354)  (0.390)  (0.014)  (0.014) 
Involuntary  0.086  0.085  0.084  0.242  -0.006  -0.005 
 
(0.068)  (0.068)  (0.292)  (0.278)  (0.090)  (0.089) 
Got DIP loan  0.259***  0.260***  0.463  0.584  --  -- 
 
(0.028)  (0.027)  (0.455)  (0.497) 
    Substantially all assets sold  --  --  0.426  0.503*  --  -- 
     
(0.281)  (0.299) 
    Prepackaged bankruptcy  --  --  --  --  0.162**  0.160** 
         
(0.069)  (0.068) 
Quarter, industry, and district fixed 
effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
              Observations  3,280  3,280  422  422  3,327  3,327 





Firms that are forced to sell assets should also be expected to have to sell at lower prices (Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1992, 2011).  While data from Capital IQ and The Deal Pipeline does contain prices on the 
bankruptcy transactions, it is difficult to measure whether these prices are discounted from full value 
because I cannot observe exactly which assets are sold.  As a proxy, I scale the selling price by the total 
assets of the firm, and test whether 363 sales that take place in busy courts have lower price-to-asset ratios 
than those that are in less-busy courts.  This is a very rough proxy, as it is driven not only by ―fire sale‖ 
prices but also by the amount of assets the firm is selling.  For example, a firm that is selling substantially 
all of its assets will have a higher price-to-asset ratio than a firm that is selling only a small piece of the 
business, regardless of whether either firm is selling at discounted prices.  I control for this to the extent 
possible by including a dummy variable indicating whether the transaction noted that the firm is selling 
substantially  all  assets.
44  In  Table  1.12  I test whether the  sale price-to-asset ratio is affected by 
bankruptcy caseload for the 422 sales in my sample.   I fail to find a strong relationship between sale 
prices and court caseload, likely due to a lack of statistical power and imprecise measurement.  However, 
the estimates are in the anticipated direction: small firms, which sell more often when courts are busy, 
also sell at lower prices when courts are busy.  Large firms appear to be able to either find buyers willing 
to pay higher prices, or can find enough cash to wait through longer bankruptcy periods without selling 
assets. 
Selling assets raises  is one way that  cash-strapped  debtors can raise capital .  An alternative 
method of gaining cash is through the issuance of  a DIP loan, which can provide the working capital 
necessary to maintain operations through a potentially longer bankruptcy stay.  The final two columns of 
Table 1.12 test whether firms in busy bankruptcy courts are more likely to obtain DIP financing.  While 
the coefficient is in the anticipated direction (debtors in busy courts are more likely to get a DIP loan), the 
estimated effect is not quite statistically significant (p-value=0.103). 
                                                                 
44 If I restrict the regression to the subsample of sales in  which substantially all assets are sold I find similar 
coefficient estimates.  
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While the statistical precision of these estimates is not overwhelmingly strong, all of the estimates 
in Table 1.12 point in the direction that increases in caseload force bankrupt firms to obtain excess cash, 
either through asset sales or debtor-in-possession financing.  A summary of the impact of a 306-hour 
increase in bankruptcy caseloads on the propensity to sell assets, on the sale price / asset ratio and on the 
propensity of obtain DIP financing is as follows: 
TABLE 1.13 
IMPACT OF 306-HOUR CASELOAD SHOCK ON ASSET SALES AND DIP FINANCING 
  
Firm size 
$1 million  $5 million  $50 million 
Increase in probability of 
having asset sale  5.78**  4.72**  2.13 
Change in price / asset 
ratio  -1.71  -0.73  1.65 
Increase in probability of 
DIP financing  6.06  5.88  5.45 
 
It is important to keep in mind that my sample period is 2004-2007, a time when it was relatively 
easy to obtain credit and when merger & acquisition activity was quite robust.  Using BAPCPA for 
identification  is  nice  because  it  allows  me  to  focus  directly  on  an  exogenous  shock  to  judge  time 
constraints.  However, typically courts become crowded during economic recessions, when credit is tight 
and M&A activity is depressed.  In  my sample, I find that  firms are able to compensate for longer 
bankruptcy stays by selling assets or obtaining DIP financing, but in recessionary periods they may not be 
able to find a willing buyer for their assets or a DIP lender.  If this is the case, then the impact of heavy 
caseloads in recessions is likely larger than I have estimated.  Rather than obtaining DIP financing, firms 
could well be forced to sell assets in 363 sales (as Chrysler and General Motors did in 2009) or simply 
liquidate completely.  Further, asset sales in recessions are also sub-optimal due to deeply discounted 
―fire sale‖ prices and a lack of buyers who can best use the assets (Shleifer & Vishny, 1992).  In this way, 




1.5.6.  Robustness 
As Table 1.4 shows, there are a few very large firms in my sample, including several large 
airlines such as Delta, US Airways, and Northwest Airlines, as well as large auto parts manufacturers like 
Dana, Collins & Aikman, and Dura Automotive.  Although my specifications always use the natural log 
of size, which diminishes the outsize impact of these outliers, some concern could remain that these 
―mega‖ bankruptcies weigh too heavily in my results.  To account for this, I first winsorize size at the 99
th 
percentile ($744.8 million) before taking the natural log, and re-run my specifications.  Winsorizing in 
this way reduces the mean size from $156.7 million to $28.5 million, but only changes the average 
ln(size) from 1.67 to 1.65.  This slight change does not affect my results in any significant way. 
A second concern is that two bankruptcy districts, Delaware and the Southern District of New 
York (SDNY), might be altering my results.  Delaware and SDNY are well-known as major bankruptcy 
centers, attracting a disproportionate share of the largest bankruptcy cases (LoPucki, 2005).  Because of 
their focus on Chapter 11 cases, these two districts have extremely low non-business caseloads.  In 2003, 
Delaware’s non-business share of caseload was 19%, while SDNY’s was 30%.  The next lowest was 
Alaska, with 54% (see Figure 1.4).  While my main results include district fixed effects, the concern is 
that  these  two  districts’  exceptionally  low  non-business  caseload  share  might  alter  the  coefficient 
estimates of busy court, defined as Post-BAPCPA*-Non-Business Share of Caseload.  The district fixed 
effect takes care of any constant effect that might be present in these two districts, but any changes that 
occurred  in  these  two  districts  after  BAPCPA  would  be  magnified  by  their  exceptionally  low  non-
business share of caseload.  To account for this, I ―winsorize‖ these two districts by setting their 2003 
non-business share of caseload to Alaska’s figure of 54%.  This affects 321 firms in my sample, or 9.6%.  
When I alter the non-business share of caseload for Delaware and SDNY in this way, I continue to find 
that firms that restructure in busy courts are significantly more likely to reorganize, and that large firms 
are less likely to be converted to Chapter 7 liquidation.  Coefficient estimates on the impact of caseload 
on dismissal are nearly identical in magnitude, but no longer statistically significant.  All other results are 
unchanged or even stronger after adjusting Delaware’s and SDNY’s non-business caseload share.  Also,  
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results that commercial banks located in busier courts experience higher charge-off rates are robust to this 
altered specification. 
Aside from possible issues relating to outliers, an additional concern regarding my results relates 
to the exclusion restriction: did bankruptcies in consumer-centric districts change in some systematic way 
after 2005 that is unrelated to court caseload?  I address this concern by allowing the time fixed effects to 
vary across industries, firm sizes, and geographic regions.  These more flexible specifications allow me to 
rule out alternate channels that could be biasing my estimates.  For example, if firms of a particular 
industry tend to be located in bankruptcy districts with high non-business caseload and there was a shift in 
bankruptcy outcomes for that industry after BAPCPA that is unrelated to the workload of judges, this 
could bias my estimates of the impact of caseload.  Including separate time fixed effects for each industry 
accounts for these trends, but at the cost of estimating far more coefficients in each model.  I find that 
including industry-by-time fixed effects in this way does not affect my results.  Similarly, I also allow the 
coefficient on ln(size) to vary in each quarter and find no difference in the estimates.   Lastly, I test 
whether regional time effects might be driving my results by including separate time fixed effects for each 
of the nine census divisions: New England, Middle Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central, 
South Atlantic, East South Central, West South Central, Mountain, and Pacific.  These specifications 
control for the fact that the most consumer-centric bankruptcy districts are concentrated in the South, 
while the western U.S. tends to be more business-centric (see Figure 1.5).  Again, I find the same results 
in this more flexible specification.  For the bank charge-off regressions in Table 1.11, I also run the 
analysis with separate time fixed effects by bank size and bank region.  The results are stronger with the 
inclusion of these additional controls.
45 
Lastly, in the reported regressions standard errors are clustered either by ban kruptcy district 
(Tables 1.5, 1.7, 1.9, and 1.12) or by commercial bank (Table 1.11).  All estimates remain significant if I 
                                                                 
45 The results of these robustness checks are available in the appendix.  
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double-cluster standard errors both by bankruptcy district (or bank) and time, thereby taking into account 
mutual dependence within district (or bank) and within time period. 
1.6.  Conclusions  
This essay has shown that time constraints on bankruptcy judges alter the outcomes of firms that 
restructure  in  busy  courts.    Busy  bankruptcy  judges  are  more  likely  to  allow  distressed  firms  to 
reorganize.  This is especially true for larger firms, which are both more complex and better able to lobby 
bankruptcy judges.  I interpret these findings as suggesting that busy judges tend to be more pro-debtor in 
their decision-making.  Firms that are dismissed from busy courts are significantly more likely to re-file 
for bankruptcy, thereby incurring additional costs of financial distress.  Meanwhile, busy courts impose 
additional costs on reorganizing firms by lengthening bankruptcy stays and increasing the need to sell 
assets via section 363 auctions.  I show that these higher costs of financial distress are borne principally 
by the creditors of the firm.  
While my evidence shows that the costs of financial distress are higher in busy bankruptcy courts, 
the overall welfare implications are less clear.  In particular, it is unclear whether more social value would 
be created if the marginal firms that are reorganized in busy courts were liquidated instead.  In theory, 
somewhere between the extremes of liquidating all firms or none of them, there is some optimal level of 
―pro-debtor-ness‖ for a bankruptcy judge (Aghion et al., 1992; Bernhardt & Nosal, 2004; Gennaioli & 
Rossi, 2010; Hart, 2000).  The location of Chapter 11 on this spectrum remains an open question due to 
difficulties in finding clean empirical identification, thus making it impossible to determine whether pro-
debtor shifts are welfare-reducing or not.  However, two recent papers suggest that pro-creditor shifts may 
enhance firm values.  Chang & Schoar (2007) show that Chapter 11 debtors that were randomly assigned 
to more pro-debtor judges have lower sales and fail at higher rates post-bankruptcy.  This suggests that 
pro-creditor judges enhance the value of firms that survive bankruptcy relative to pro-debtor judges, but it 
still leaves open the possibility that pro-creditor judges liquidate some firms that would have had more 
value as going concerns.  Becker & Strömberg (2012) examine a Delaware bankruptcy court ruling that 
shifted corporate directors’ fiduciary duties towards creditors.  They find that this pro-creditor ruling  
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increased equity values of Delaware firms relative to non-Delaware firms.  Taken together, these two 
papers  provide  evidence  that  pro-creditor  shifts  can  enhance  firm  value.    If  this  is  the  case,  busy 
bankruptcy courts, which tend to be more pro-debtor, are likely to reduce overall firm value.  
This essay uses the passage of BAPCPA as an exogenous shock to bankruptcy caseloads.  While 
this identification allows me to make causal estimates of the impact of changes in court caseload, it 
ignores knock-on effects that might occur when caseloads change due to general economic conditions.  In 
particular, bankruptcy filings spike during economic recessions, increasing the average annual workload 
of bankruptcy judges by 32%.  Thus, the bankruptcy system is busiest exactly when many firms are trying 
to restructure.  Further, during recessions financially distressed firms  have less ability to obtain DIP 
financing or sell assets at reasonable (not fire sale) prices—actions which would help these firms to 
handle longer stays in bankruptcy.  As these costs are passed on to banks and other creditors, it could also 
further constrict the credit supply.  If bankruptcy is an insurance system that allows firms to work out 
financial distress in a formal and equitable forum, my results indicate that the insurance system functions 
worst exactly when financial disasters strike. 
This is true both nationwide and on a more local level.  It is important to note that court caseloads 
vary more cross-sectionally than they do over time.  While I have couched most of my results in terms of 
nationwide economic recessions, it is also true that local economic conditions can be quite different 
across the United States.  Localized economic malaise will have the same impact on caseloads in affected 
bankruptcy districts as nation-wide recessions will.  The effects of busy bankruptcy courts matter for not 
only when but also where a case is filed.  
Overall, my results matter the most for high-beta firms, which are most likely to need bankruptcy 
protection when courts are busy.  Because the legal infrastructure does not adjust to aggregate economic 
shocks, firms that are most sensitive to those shocks experience higher costs of financial distress, a fact 












   
This chapter is co-authored with Victoria Ivashina and David Smith 
2.1.  Introduction 
Potential  bankruptcy  costs  are  widely  recognized  in  corporate  finance  as  one  of  the  key 
determinants of the choice between debt and equity financing.  However, efforts to study these costs 
empirically have been hampered by data limitations. Furthermore, growing anecdotal evidence suggests 
that several developments in the financial market—in particular, the emergence of an active market for 
the trading of bankrupt claims—has dramatically transformed the ownership structure of bankrupt firms 
and the bankruptcy process with it. Using novel data covering 136 Chapter 11 bankruptcies filed between 
1998 and 2009, we study the overall ownership structure of defaulted firms, how this ownership evolves 
through bankruptcy as a result of the trading
 of debt claims and, ultimately, how it influences Chapter 11 
outcomes.  
The  level  of  detail  in  the  data  that  we  put  together  enables  us  to  overcome  some  basic 
measurement problems. Specifically, we directly observe the ownership stakes and identity of virtually all 
claimholders  in  the  capital  structure  via  two  snapshots  of  holdings  recorded  during  the  Chapter  11 55 
 
proceedings: at the filing of ―schedules‖ of assets and liabilities near the beginning of the case, and at 
tabulation  of  votes  on  the  debtor’s  plan  of  reorganization.
1  This allows us to compute ownership 
concentration across the entire capital structure and through bankruptcy, thus, significantly improving 
measurement over the existing literature, which has relied primarily on the presence of different types of 
debt to proxy for ownership concentration.  In total, we cover 71,358  different investors. Although the 
court documents only record the names and addresses of these investors, using several data sources, we 
identify these investors by institutional type. This allows us to further gauge the strategic importance of 
different investor groups.  
Our study is also the first to provide insight into the claims trading that occurs in a bankrupt firm 
and to show how this trading impacts ownership and, subsequently, bankruptc y outcomes. Specifically, 
we observe  within  bankruptcy  transfers  of  bilateral  claims  (trades  filed  as  ―Rule  3001(e)  proofs  of 
transfer‖), which—as we show—is dominated by trade credit.
2 Over the course of the 136 bankruptcy 
cases, we observe $1.86 billion of face value traded. Although growth in trading of bankrupt claims has 
not gone unnoticed (both Gilson (1995) and  Baird and Rasmussen   (2010)  emphasize its potential 
important for the bankruptcy process), as Levitin (2010) points out, the existing evidence has been only 
anecdotal.
3 Our study changes that. In that sense, the set of novel facts shown in this essay seeks to be 
informative to the theoretical literature and to the understanding of the bankruptcy process more broadly. 
The findings in this chapter can be summarized as follows:
 4   
                                                                 
1 Note that the term  ―bankruptcy claim‖ is a broader concept than  ―security,‖ as it includes  any of the  firms’ 
liabilities/right-to-payment. In what follows, we will use indistinctively the terms ―claim holders‖ and ―creditors‖.  
2 Bankruptcy Rule 3001(e) covers the disclosure requirements with respect to bankruptcy claims trading. In 1991 
this rule was amended to make clear that it is  not the court’s role to determine the validity of the transfer, unless 
there is an objection by the transferor. It is often argued that the reduction in court’s oversight on claims trading 
facilitated the development of this market. 
3 ―The debate over claims trading (in Chapter 11) operates on a limited evidentiary base. Arguments about claims 
trading are based on theory, common sense, and anecdote, but not data.‖ (Levitin, 2010.) 
4  In  presenting  our  results,  we  focus  on   four  key  types:  (i)  banks,  (ii)  ―bond  custodians‖,  which  include 
administrative  agents,  indenture  trustees,  or  financial  institution  brokers  that  report  debt  holdings  on  behalf  of 
private investors, (iii) non-financial corporations, and (iv) ―active investors‖,  which  we define  to include asset 
management firms and hedge funds. 56 
 
While we confirm the importance of bank ownership in the cross-section and throughout the 
bankruptcy process, we find that non-financial corporations are equally important creditors, accounting 
for 22.5% of all claims and present in nearly all bankrupt cases. As one would expect, at the onset of 
bankruptcy, non-financial corporations’ holdings are dispersed. However, we show that, through trade, 
ownership in a substantial fraction of claims held by non-financial corporations is sold, contributing to 
increased ownership concentration at the time the plan of reorganization is voted upon. Moreover, a large 
fraction of these claims is purchased by ―active‖ investors, which we define to be hedge funds, private 
equity funds, and investment management companies. We also establish that active investors hold only 
9.8% of debt claims at the onset of bankruptcy, but hedge funds—and active investors more broadly—
appear  to  significantly  increase  their  stake  by  the  stage  at  which  claimants  vote  on  the  plan  of 
reorganization, thus accounting for a combined 15.0% of all claims. Their stakes are also concentrated in 
the voting classes. So, to the degree that hedge funds influence that bankruptcy outcomes they do so with 
relatively small, but strategic stakes.   
  We also find that ownership concentration across the capital structure matters for restructuring 
outcomes. The likelihood of observing a prearranged bankruptcy increases with the concentration of the 
capital structure, measured at the outset of the bankruptcy case. Subsequently, the bankruptcy process 
moves more quickly than in cases not filed as a prearranged process.
5  But a concentrated capital structure 
also improves the speed at which a non-prearranged restructuring occurs, and increases the likelihood that 
a firm reorganizes as an independent entity, as opposed to being sold or liquidated.  We also show that the 
level of debt ownership concentration at the beginning of a bankruptcy case is positively associated with 
trading in bank loans and bonds prior to the bankruptcy filing, suggesting that trading prior to bankruptcy 
concentrates the capital structure. To the extent that a quicker bankruptcy, and survival as an independent 
                                                                 
5  Although  this  result  is  intuitive,  strictly  speaking,  we  cannot  establish  a  causal  link  between  ownership 
concentration and prearranged filing because our identification is based on trading during bankruptcy, whereas the 
existence of a prearranged reorganization plan is something that is already set at the bankruptcy filing. 57 
 
going concern are indicators of a more efficient outcome, our results suggest that more concentrated 
capital structures lead to better restructuring outcomes. 
  We  observe  that  capital  structures  with  large  amounts  of  claims  held  by  non-financial 
corporations—a  good  indicator  of  high  levels  of  trade  credit  and  other  bilateral  claims—are  less 
concentrated at the outset of the case, and it is the capital structures of these same firms that become more 
concentrated through trading during the case. We show that, holding concentration at the start of the case 
constant, in-bankruptcy ownership consolidation through the trade of bilateral claims is associated with 
bankruptcy  outcomes  that  are  different  from  those  associated  with  pre-bankruptcy  consolidation  of 
ownership.  Higher  observed  in-bankruptcy  trading,  at  the  margin,  leads  to  an  increased  time  to  the 
completion of a restructuring, a higher likelihood of the restructuring ending in the liquidation of the firm, 
and  lower  aggregate  recovery  rates.  In  connection  with  this  last  result,  we  also  show  that  more 
concentrated classes of creditors receive higher recovery rates, conditional on their seniority in the capital 
structure. We do not have direct evidence for the underlying mechanism, but our results are consistent 
with the idea that concentrated classes of creditors are able to bargain for higher recovery rates for 
themselves, but that this bargaining diminishes the estimated value of the firm at exit. Our results also 
suggest that the types of investors who enter (and consolidate) the capital structure through in-bankruptcy 
trading have different objectives than concentrated investors prior to bankruptcy. These results are robust 
to an instrumental variables approach that uses characteristics of trade credit—a proxy for propensity to 
trade bilateral claims—to instrument for ownership concentration at bankruptcy exit. 
Our essay contributes to a large literature relating capital structure to the cost of financial distress. 
Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) argue that a major impediment to efficient reorganizations is the inability 
for dispersed creditors to coordinate bargaining among themselves and with the managers of the bankrupt 
firm. The underlying assumption in Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) is that the ex-ante capital structure of 
the  distressed  firm  is  fixed,  thus,  coordination  within  Chapter  11  can  improve  efficient  bargaining. 
Likewise, Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) argue that complex capital structures can deter efficient ex-post 
renegotiation of defaulted contracts, which in turn influences the structure of the ex-ante contract and 58 
 
capital structure of the borrowing firm. Our findings are largely consistent with the inferences in both of 
these papers, and even can be thought of as a direct test of their implications. However, these studies 
abstract from the possibility that investors can trade to a more concentrated capital structure prior to 
bargaining, a point that we show is important for understanding distressed negotiations.  
On the empirical side, Gilson (1990) and Gilson, John, and Lang (1990) examine restructurings 
of bank debt during the period 1978-1987 and show that the presence of large bank claims eases the 
restructuring process, and that banks often end up with a substantial share of equity in the reorganized 
firm. Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein (1994), Brown, James, and Mooradian (1993), and James (1995, 
1996) extend this work by showing that the impact of bank debt on restructuring depends on the financial 
condition  of the  firm  and  the  presence  of  public  debt.  As  mentioned  earlier,  our  essay  significantly 
improves on the measurement of ownership structure and tracks claim ownership through bankruptcy. We 
test this statement in a ―horse race‖ comparison of  our ownership-concentration measure against the 
earlier proxies.  
More recent studies have focused on the role of strategic investors in distressed debt. Bharath, 
Panchapegesan, and Werner (2010)  and Ayotte and Morrison (2009), show that the speed and efficiency 
of Chapter 11 restructurings increased significantly from the 1980s through the early 2000s, a period that 
coincides  with  both  an  increase  in  the sophistication  of  Chapter  11  players  and  the  development  of 
distressed debt trading markets. But, unlike our essay, neither of these studies observes the identities of 
the creditors and the extent to which investors affect the Chapter 11 process and outcome. Our essay also 
relates to Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1997), who examine the role of active investors (defined from a list 
of 75 distressed debt investors) in distressed companies, and Jiang, Li, and Wang (2012), who track hedge 
fund participation in firms that file for Chapter 11. These papers find evidence consistent with increases 
in the efficiency of Chapter 11 outcomes when strategic financial investors are involved. Our findings 
complement these studies by directly showing that active investors increase their ownership strategically 
though bankruptcy. However, we also focus on a much broader set of investors—virtually the entire 
capital structure of the distressed firms—and show that while more concentrated capital structures at the 59 
 
outset of the case appear to improve the efficiency of the restructuring, trading by active investors during 
the bankruptcy process could contribute to outcomes that are adverse to an efficient restructuring.  
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 describes the data. Section 2.3 presents 
the distribution of institutional debt ownership across the bankrupt firms in our sample and analyzes the 
observed trading activity in the bankruptcy cases. Section 2.4 analyses effects of ownership concentration 
on  bankruptcy  outcomes,  and  how  in-bankruptcy  trading  affects  both  concentration  and  outcomes.  
Section 2.5 concludes. 
2.2.  Data 
To understand the ownership structure of bankrupt claims, we require a complete set of creditors 
holding  claims  in  a  representative  sample  of  U.S.  corporations  filing  for  Chapter  11  bankruptcy 
protection. Because the bulk of debt claims against U.S. companies are unregistered instruments traded 
over-the-counter, no one reliable source exists for observing the identity and holdings of creditors.  Even 
holders of Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) registered debt securities, such as publicly traded 
bonds, are required to identify themselves in only limited circumstances.
6  
To overcome these obstacles, we rely on  reports of creditor holdings  that are filed during the 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy process.  We obtain our holdings data from  the four leading providers of  claims 
administrative services: BMC Group, EPIQ Bankruptcy Solutions,   Donlin Recano & Compan y,  and 
Kurtzman Carson Consultants (KCC) . These professional service  firms are retained by the debtor to 
collect, record, and manage claimant databases during the course of the bankruptcy case .  In addition to 
the holdings data, the claims administrators also supply us with information on claims trades that occur 
during the bankruptcy process. These trades are in a special subset of claims  that includes trade claims, 
lease  claims,  and  other  ―bilateral  claims‖.  (The  first  section  of  the  Appendix  provides  a  detailed 
description of the format in which we received the data from the claims administrators.) 
                                                                 
6 Unlike public equity holdings, which require holdings disclosures by all insiders and owners of more than 5% of 
outstanding shares, public bondholders are typically not required to disclose their holdings or trades.  The exceptions 
to this rule are the bondholdings of insurers, which must be disclosed to the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners, and the bondholdings of registered investment managers, which must be disclosed to the SEC. 60 
 
TABLE 2.1 
DESCRIPTION OF FIRMS FILING FOR CHAPTER 11 BANKRUPTCY 
This table summarizes the characteristics of  the 136 firms  in our sample that  filed  for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
protection. Panel A reports summary statistics on the filing, evolution, and outcome of the bankruptcies, based on 
data collected from the Deal Pipeline and Chapter 11 disclosure statements.  Panel B reports financial characteristics 
of the sample firms prior to filing for bankruptcy, based on data collected from Deal Pipeline, Capital IQ, SDC, and 
Compustat. 
Panel A: Bankruptcy characteristics (136 filings) 
 
Filing 
year  1998  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
Obs.   1  1  8  13  17  10  16  19  12  32  7 
  0.7%  0.7%  5.9%  9.6%  12.5%  7.4%  11.8%  14.0%  8.8%  23.5%  5.1% 
 
Filing court  % Obs. 
 
Filing type  % Obs. 
Delaware  40.4% 
 
Traditional ―free-fall‖ Ch. 11  78.4% 
Southern District NY  22.1% 
 
Prearranged Ch. 11  18.7% 
Other  37.5% 
 
Tort-related Ch. 11  3.0% 
 
 
Median  Mean  Std Dev 
Time in bankruptcy (days)  377  439.5  309.0 
Overall recovery rate 
         Value at exit/Liabilities at filing  50.8%  54.0%  51.1% 




Claimant group with controlling equity interest at exit, the 
fulcrum class (reorganizations only): 
   Reorganized  45.2%     DIP Lenders  8.6% 
   Sold to a financial buyer  9.7%     Prepetition Lenders  29.3% 
   Sold to a strategic buyer  12.7%     Notes/Bondholders  24.1% 
   Liquidated piecemeal  32.1%     General Unsecured  19.0% 
Identity of owner at exit: 
 
   Subordinated Debt  3.5% 
   Financial  64.8%     Equity  15.5% 
   Strategic  35.2%     
 
Panel B: Pre-bankruptcy firm characteristics 
 
  Source  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Median 
Total assets (million $US)  Deal Pipeline  133  $1,915.2   $4,844.7   $250.4  
Revenue  (million $US)  Compustat  64  $3,858.7   $13,018.4   $705.2  
Employees  SDC  71  6,731  11,780  1,994 
Cash  (million $US)  Capital IQ  66  $233.1   $574.4   $27.5  
Pre-bankruptcy EBITDA (million $US)  Deal Pipeline  59  $170.4   $615.9   $20.7  
Total liabilities (million $US)  Deal Pipeline  133  $1,805.4   $4,299.6   $372.1  
Total liabilities/Total assets   Deal Pipeline  132  3.52  18.2  1.07 
Total liabilities/Total assets  (no outliers)  Deal Pipeline  130  1.52  1.49  1.06 
Total debt (million $US)  Capital IQ  66  $1,895.1   $3,686.6   $393.4  
% Bank debt  Capital IQ  51  46.54%  31.27%  39.91% 
% Secured debt  Capital IQ  55  59.16%  37.89%  59.05% 
% Long term debt  Capital IQ  51  66.38%  35.42%  84.13% 61 
 
Our sample covers a total of 136 relatively large firms that file for Chapter 11 during the period 
1998  to  2009.  (The  full  list  of  bankruptcies  in  our  sample  is  reported  in  the  Appendix  Table  B.4.)   
Bankruptcy and debtor characteristics are summarized in Table 2.1. Our sample is weighted more heavily 
towards the latter part of our sample period. This is due to the fact that the electronic archiving of data by 
claims administrators is a relatively new phenomenon.
7  The mean asset size of our sample firms, as 
reported on the filing of the bankruptcy petition, is over $1.9 billion.  But this distribution is skewed; the 
median firm reports assets of $250 million. The median-sized firm reports liabilities that are slightly 
larger than assets (1.07 time assets). Meanwhile, the median firm for which we can gather additional 
financial information enters Chapter 11 reporting $20.7 million in EBITDA and with cash of $27 million 
on their balance sheets, both indicating that sample firms are filing for bankruptcy financially, but not 
necessarily economically, distressed.  
To gather information on the evolution of each bankruptcy case, we rely primarily on The Deal 
Pipeline’s Bankruptcy Insider archive and the bankruptcy ―disclosure statements‖ filed in court with each 
debtor’s plan of reorganization.  Consistent with the practice of many large firms that file for bankruptcy, 
our sample firms primarily file for Chapter 11 protection in Delaware (40% of cases) and the Southern 
District of New York in Manhattan (23% of cases). The remaining 37% file in 28 separate courts across 
U.S. federal court districts. Similar to Bharath, Panchapegesan, and Werner (2012), who show that time in 
bankruptcy has fallen drastically since the 1990s, the median firm in our sample remain in bankruptcy for 
just over a year.  
We  categorize  each  bankruptcy  outcome  into  one  of  three  categories:    (1)  a  traditional 
―reorganization,‖  in  which  a  firm  exits  Chapter  11  intact  as  free-standing  entity  with  a  new  capital 
structure; the new capital structure includes new debt and equity that has been exchanged for the pre-
bankruptcy debt claims, (2) a sale of the firm as an independent going-concern to a financial or strategic 
                                                                 
7 For instance, during the period 1998-2003 our sample contains about 10% of the number of large bankruptcies 
tracked by Lynn Lopucki (http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/), but 64% of the Lopucki number from 2004-2009.  Despite 
the early-period underrepresentation, the cross-sectional characteristics of our sample as reported in Table 2.1 are 
very similar to the Lopucki sample.  62 
 
buyer, typically through a ―Section 363‖ sale, and (3) a liquidation of the firm’s assets so that no primary 
going concern remains at the end of the case; liquidations occur through conversions to Chapter  7, via a 
Chapter 11 liquidating plan, or through a series of separate Section 363 sales.
8 Just under half (45%) of 
our sample firms exist via a traditional reorganization. Another 23% are sold as a going concern (10% to 
financial buyers and 13% to strategic buyers), and 32% are liquidated piecemeal.  
Across  reorganizations  and  going -concern sales,  financial  investors —essentially  banks  plus 
hedge  funds,  private  equity  sponsors,  and  other  asset  management  companies—are  the  dominant 
controlling owner of firms that emerge from bankruptcy, accounting for ownership of almost two-thirds 
of the exiting firms. Among reorganizations, the ―fulcrum‖ class of voting claims—that is, the class of 
claimholders that receives the controlling interest in equity at bankruptcy exit—is most often the class 
holding senior lender claims (29%), followed by bondholders and noteholders (24%). But, in successful 
Chapter 11 reorganizations, controlling equity also goes to general unsecured creditors a fair amount of 
time (19%), as well as the original equity holders (16%). Note that these incidences measure the class that 
retains control in reorganizations only; across all bankruptcy outcomes, old equity holders exit bankruptcy 
as the controlling owners in only 7% of the cases. 
We calculate firm-level recovery rates two ways: (1) by dividing the estimated enterprise value 
(in the case of a reorganization) or the total sale proceeds (in the case of a 363 sale or liquidation) by the 
value of liabilities reported at filing, and (2) by calculating the weighted average recovery rate of the 
claim classes reported in the bankruptcy case disclosure statement, where the weights correspond to the 
pre-filing face value of the claims in that class. Both measures produce a similar distribution that shows 
average  and  median  recovery  rates  to  be  around  50%  of  the  original  claim  values,  with  standard 
deviations also of the same order of magnitude. 
 
                                                                 
8 At times, distinguishing between a going-concern sale and a liquidation can be difficult, as a company may split up 
into a series of small concerns by division or plant, or may have its sold assets redeployed in totem to a strategic 
buyer, but cease to exist as a separate business.  We take the general view that a sale as a going-concern occurs if 
one part of the business remains as a surviving business entity. 63 
 
2.2.1.  Claims ownership and trading data 
We observe the holdings of claims against the bankrupt firms in our sample at two points in time. 
Figure 2.1 provides a timeline representation of when these snapshots are recorded, and the period over 
which we can observe the trading of claims. The first snapshot occurs at t1, soon after the company files 
its petition for bankruptcy protection, at the filing of the schedules of assets and liabilities.  The second 
snapshot occurs at t2, the point at which votes from claimants are tabulated for purposes of accepting or 
rejecting the debtor’s plan of reorganization.  We also observe trading between t1 and t2 among a subset of 
claims in the capital structure, a grouping we term ―bilateral claims‖.  In the following subsections, we 
provide more detail on the holdings and trade data. 
 
FIGURE 2.1 – BANKRUPTCY TIMELINE 
2.2.1.1.  Snapshot 1: Schedule of Assets and Liabilities and Credit Register (t1) 
Shortly after entering Chapter 11, the debtor is required to file its ―schedules‖ of assets and 
liabilities, which—as the name suggests—contain a detailed description of the bankrupt company’s assets 
and liabilities. The description of the debtor’s liabilities includes a full listing of all known creditors and 
other claimants, together with the amount and nature of their claims. Parties missed by the schedules who 
believe they have a valid claim against the debtor can submit their proof of claim to a central claims 
register, managed by the claims administrator. Together, the schedules and credit register serve as a 
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of the claimholder, as of the start of the bankruptcy case. For ease of exposition, we denote the point in 
time at which the filing of the schedules and claims register occurs as t1. 
  There is one group of investors whose identifies we cannot observe directly from the schedules 
and register: investors in bonds and notes held through the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation 
(DTCC). This group, which comprises holders of most SEC-registered bonds and notes, stands behind a 
curtain of DTCC members and participants, who play a custodial role in reporting holdings on behalf of 
the beneficial holders.
9  The original holders of these claims are nearly impossible to identify directly. In 
their place, we observe the identity of the custodian, which is often a large financial institution. As 
discussed below, we use a variety of techniques to separate custodial bond holdings reported by financial 
institutions  from  the  direct  holdings  of bankrupt claims  by  financial institutions. This  enables  to 
distinguish bond and note holdings from other financial claims, and to measure the influence of the 
censoring of these observations on our results.  
2.2.1.2.  Snapshot 2: Plan vote tabulations (t2) 
An important part of a bankruptcy restructuring is the plan of reorganization, which details how a 
bankrupt firm plans to restructure its operations and capital structure, and exit bankruptcy as a viable 
entity. In order for this plan to be confirmed by the bankruptcy judge, the plan must be approved by all 
claimant classes that are entitled to vote for the plan. Voting for the plan takes place via a balloting agent, 
which is often one of the four claims administrators providing us with data. Our second snapshot comes 
from the record of the votes by all claimants entitled to vote. The tabulations include the identity of the 
voting claimant, the number of claims being voted, the amount of the claim, and the vote to approve or 
reject the plan.
10  As shown in Figure 2.1, we denote the point in time when votes are tabulated as t2. 
                                                                 
9 In fact, to reach out to bondholders for the purposes of collecting holder specific votes, the DTCC sends out a 
master ballot to DTCC member institutions which hold interests in the DTCC note on behalf of broker/dealers who 
act as ―prime brokers‖ to the beneficial holders, and in turn hold the interests on behalf of the beneficial holder. 
Reporting on behalf of the beneficial holder feeds back through the prime broker to the DTCC member, who then 
reports directly to the claims administration service for purpose of recording holdings in the schedules and votes at 
tabulation. We thank one of our referees for clarifying this process.  
10 Several plans for reorganization of the failed company can be submitted. With each plan, the court must approve 
the disclosure statement before a vote is cast. If the vote fails, the plan can be crammed down, but often it is 
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From a data quality perspective, the vote tabulations are superior to the schedules and register in 
two important ways. First, vote tabulations are clean of errors and duplication.  Only creditors certified by 
the judge as valid, or ―allowed‖ in bankruptcy parlance, are permitted to vote.  All duplicate, false, and 
disallowed claims that could appear in the schedules and register are eliminated at the time of the vote.
11 
Second, because the vote tabulations are grouped according to creditor class, we gain specific information 
on the type and priority of claims held by voting claimants. This level of detail is unavailable at the filing 
of the schedules. As in the case of the holdings reported at the schedules and register,  we cannot identify 
the beneficial owner of the debt for DTCC notes and bonds. 
Not  all  allowed  claimants  are  entitled  to  vote  on  the  plan  of  reorganization.    Claimants 
unimpaired under the plan, i.e., those that will receive 100% of the value of their original claim at the end 
of the case, are deemed automatically to accept the plan and do not vote.  In addition, impaired claimants 
that receive no recovery under the plan, i.e., those claims and equity interests that are ―out of the money‖ 
according to the plan valuation, are deemed automatically to reject the plan and are excluded from voting. 
Classes entitled to vote are impaired claimants that receive a nonzero distribution under the plan. These 
are the classes for which we observe holdings at t2. Figure 2.2 illustrates how the snapshots of the capital 
structure differ between t1 and t2.
12 
2.2.1.3.  Observed claims trading between t1 and t2 
In addition to the data observed in these two snapshots, we also observe trading in a subset of the 
claims in our sample. The subset consists of all claims that are required to submit proofs of transfer under 
Rule 3001(e) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure whenever the claims are traded (―assigned‖) 
during the bankruptcy case.  According to Rule 3001(e), any traded bankruptcy claim that is not ―based  
                                                                                                                                                                                                               
converted to the Chapter 7 liquidation. So, for each case there is only one vote and one point in time when the votes 
are tabulated.  
11 We have carefully searched for duplicate and disallowed claims in the  t1 data using flags in the data that denote 
denied claims, computer algorithms that identify probable duplicate claims, and identifying large duplicate claims 
by hand.  Even so, we cannot be sure that we have removed all invalid claims. 
12 Often, senior secured classes will be deemed impaired and get a vote even though they are expected to receive  a 
100% recovery. They are deemed impaired when they may not receive their distribution immediately following the 
exit, and instead they may receive new debt claims with different terms than their original debt.  66 
 
 







FIGURE 2.2 - EXAMPLE OF DATA AVAILABILITY AT t1 AND t2 
on a publicly traded note, bond, or debenture‖ is required to file proof of the transfer with the court. In 
practice, trades in syndicated bank loans are also excluded from Rule 3001(e) because the trades are 
tracked by the administrative agent on the loan.  Beyond public debt securities and bank loans, all other 
claims against the debtor that trade during the case are required to file a 3001(e) proof of transfer. These 
include all trade and vendor claims, derivative instruments and swaps, intercompany claims, rejected 
lease and lease cure claims, and tax claims. The filed proof of transfer includes the identity of the claim, 
the seller, and the buyer, as well as the asserted face value of the claim. For convenience, we refer to 
claims reporting under Rule 3001(e) as ―bilateral claims‖ because trades occur directly between the buyer 
and seller without a third-party agent or custodian. 
The bulk of bilateral claims are traded during the bankruptcy case, so our data captures most (if 
not all) of the bilateral claims transfers.  This is because holders of bilateral claims are hard to identify 
and locate prior to the filing of the schedules of assets and liabilities. Furthermore, the individual holdings 
tend to be relatively small. The schedules (and claims register) are the primary source that claims traders 
use to locate potential sellers.  
We use the bilateral claims trade data to draw connections between claims trading in bankruptcy 
and changes in the ownership and concentration between t1 and t2. All claims within a class are treated 
exactly  the  same  from  the  perspective  of  the  plan  of  reorganization,  regardless  of  whether  they  are 
bilateral or not. Thus, general interest in a firm’s bilateral claims should signal interest in other claims of 
Secured debt 
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Subordinated debt 
Common stock 
Claims (in order of seniority): 
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     0% 
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the same priority in the capital structure, since such claims receive the same recovery and have the same 
creditor  rights.  Furthermore,  bilateral  claims  are  typically  general  unsecured  claims  that  lie  in  the 
―middle‖ of the capital structure; they are often impaired but entitled to some distribution under the plan, 
so they fall within the group of classes entitled to vote (we will confirm this in the data).   
The negotiation and subsequent vote on the reorganization plan is one of the central mechanisms 
for influencing the course of bankruptcy. So if there is strategic trading—that is, trading with the intention 
of influencing the bankruptcy outcome—it is likely to be in claims of the same priority as bilateral claims, 
including bilateral claims themselves. That said, anecdotal evidence from market participants, as well as 
regression results that we present below, suggest that substantial strategic trading in the capital structure 
of a bankrupt firm takes place prior to the Chapter 11 filing, in loan and bond claims.  Even during the 
case, large positions in bilateral claims are also costly to amass due to the dispersed nature of the claims 
and lack of standardized trading practices.  Because of this,  the observed trading  volume of  bilateral 
claims should be thought of as the lower bound for the overall trading volume in bankruptcy claims. 
There is an additional point that one should keep in mind. The reorganization plan—the payoff to 
different classes of claimholders—is structured to be approved and, in this sense, it is endogenous. To 
avoid prolonged bargaining more senior classes could agree to payment in violation of absolute priority to 
the concentrated junior classes. So we look at concentration at t2 we only capture the effects of trade on 
consolidation of ownership in voting classes, and miss those classes that are paid at par as the result of 
concentration. To the degree that this is true, we could be understating the importance of trading in 
bankruptcy.  
2.2.2.  Identifying and categorizing creditor types 
Our  initial  sample,  compiled  from  the  four  claims  administration  firms,  contains  a  total  of 
1,461,967 claims across the 136 bankruptcies in our study. Before attempting to identify the institutional 
type of each creditor, we first reduce the data to a more manageable size by excluding all claims of less 
than $50,000, most of which are held by individuals, or are small trade and tax claims. This restriction 
reduces the sample of claims to 122,530, but on a value-weighted basis amounts to a loss of only 2.4% of 68 
 
the original sample. The sample is further reduced by eliminating, to as great extent as possible, all entries 
of duplicate and erroneous claims.  This results in a final database of 79,527 claims held by 71,358 unique 
creditors at t1 or t2.  
Among  the  71,358  unique  creditors,  we  are  able  to  identify  96.8%  by  institutional  type, 
representing 98.3% of the total value of claims. We categorize creditors by matching their names to 
descriptions provided by Standard and Poor’s Capital IQ database, as well as other data sources, such as 
the BarclayHedge database of hedge fund managers, and The Deal Pipeline. We employ a variety of 
electronic text search and matching algorithms to aid in linking the creditor names to institutions, but all 
matches are checked by hand for accuracy. For each matched creditor name, we create a parent identifier 
and assign a parent institutional type to the creditor record. At the parent level, we identify thirteen 
institutional types, but in presenting most of our results, we focus on four key institutional types: (i) 
―banks‖,  including  commercial  and  investment  banks,  and  their  subsidiaries;  (ii)  ―bond  custodians,‖ 
which are institutions reporting on behalf of the beneficial holders of bonds and notes, (iii) ―non-financial 
corporations‖, and (iv) ―active investors‖, which is subcategorized into hedge fund holdings and asset 
management holdings.
13 The first column of Table  2.2 contains a complete list of the 13 institutional 
investors.   
Note that the bond custodian category is the only grouping of holdings in which we do not 
observe the identity of the actual holder of the claims. At the filing of the schedules, we identify 
custodians by (1) name, for example, holdings reported by Bank of  New York or State Street Bank are 
almost always custodial holdings; (2) searching for institutions identified as a ―trustee‖ or ―agent‖ in the 
claimant  name  field,  for  example,  ―J.P.  Morgan  as  trustee‖;  (3)  examining  bankruptcy  disclosure 
statements, which often identify trustees, custodians, and agents as part of the disclosure; (4) flagging 
institutions  that  report  voting  for  more  than  once  investor  in  the  vote  tabulation. 
                                                                 
13 Following Jiang, Li, and Wang (2012), we count private equity (PE) sponsors as hedge funds. We identify 90 
different investors under ―hedge funds‖ across the 136 cases at t1 and 74 different hedge funds across the 116 vote 
tabulations at t2.  By comparison, Jiang, Li, and Wang (2012) identify 484 unique hedge funds across their sample of 






DISTRIBUTION OF CLAIM OWNERSHIP BY INSTITUTIONAL TYPE 
This table reports the distribution of Chapter 11 claim ownership sorted by the institutional type of the claimholder at two points in time: The filing of the Schedule of Assets and 
Liabilities (t1) and at the tabulation of votes on a Plan of Reorganization (t2). We measure institutional type at the parent level. All numbers are value-weighted. The level of 
creditor concentration is measured using a dollar-weighted Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), with a maximum of one.  Panel A reports the distribution of ownership across the 
sample of 136 debtor firms, where an absent institutional type receives a zero weight in the calculation. Panel B shows how ownership by different institutional types varies within 
a given type of credit claim (secured, unsecured, etc.). Panel C reports how ownership by a given institutional type is distributed across identified types of credit in the capital 
structure.  Identification of credit types at t2 comes from description of credit classes described contained in the plan of reorganization.  The class of general unsecured claims often 
contains notes and trade claims, while in some cases these classes separated out from other unsecured claims and can thus be identified separately. 
 
Panel A: General distribution by institutional type 
 
  At filing of Schedule of Assets and Liabilities (t1), all creditors    At vote tabulation (t2), voting creditors only 

















(0 to 1) 
















(0 to 1) 
Banks   88.72  21.65  24.75  13.52  76.46  0.67    72.41  21.69  27.29  10.73  82.86  0.56 
Corporations  96.99  22.47  22.14  14.57  71.84  0.28    94.83  24.07  25.99  17.20  90.56  0.42 
Bonds custodians   44.36  12.25  21.99  0.00  62.56  0.84    39.66  5.92  15.07  0.00  33.27  0.85 
Active investors:  76.69  9.80  21.28  0.45  69.32  0.68    76.72  14.95  23.43  2.82  81.21  0.64 
  Asset managers  64.66  6.97  17.86  0.13  47.05  0.71    62.93  9.10  17.66  0.86  47.65  0.66 
  Hedge funds  42.86  2.83  12.44  0.00  16.56  0.71    51.72  5.85  16.60  0.07  37.01  0.74 
Sub-total:  --  66.17  --  --  --  --    --  66.64  --  --  --  -- 
  The following investor categories are dropped from the later tables. 
Other financial creditors:                           
  Insurance  63.91  1.98  8.81  0.04  6.90  0.72    34.48  1.89  7.87  0.00  10.87  0.75 
  Real estate  64.66  1.47  3.49  0.05  7.67  0.62    31.90  1.06  3.45  0.00  5.41  0.78 
  Other financial  42.11  1.54  6.24  0.00  8.59  0.75    22.41  1.78  10.07  0.00  5.70  0.91 
  Potentially financial  94.74  3.57  6.89  1.08  16.53  0.32    87.07  7.53  11.58  1.91  32.29  0.46 
Other non-financial creditors:                           
  Government  87.22  5.53  11.25  1.37  18.98  0.54    39.66  4.36  14.81  0.00  39.24  0.80 
  Person  93.23  11.57  18.82  3.48  60.24  0.33    82.76  12.21  22.46  2.39  73.52  0.44 
  Intra-company  36.09  4.60  10.28  0.00  25.45  0.80    12.07  2.19  9.80  0.00  20.04  0.82 
  Unknown  89.47  3.57  8.38  0.55  24.03  0.47    65.52  2.34  6.42  0.09  12.33  0.59 






TABLE 2.2 – continued 
 
Panel B: Creditors’ ownership by credit class 
 
  At filing of Schedule of Assets and 
Liabilities (t1), all creditors    At votes tabulation (t2), voting creditors only 








Pension  Tort  Equity  Other  Total: 
Banks   43.39  52.94  3.66  100     38.62  16.19  42.32  0.61  0.00  0.00  1.07  1.19  100  
Corporations  9.50  84.76  5.74  100     13.72  5.80  69.51  3.61  0.68  3.91  2.51  0.27  100  
Bond custodians   21.00  74.55  4.45  100     24.07  31.20  37.85  2.17  0.00  2.17  2.53  0.00  100  
Active investors:                             
  Asset managers  17.75  76.80  5.45  100     36.65  10.76  47.36  0.62  1.37  1.37  1.87  0.00  100  
  Hedge funds  11.03  84.77  4.20  100     35.19  9.34  53.29  1.68  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.50  100  
Panel C: Distribution of creditors within credit class 
 
Banks   42.91  11.70  4.45  --     34.52  39.20  12.96  15.37  0.00  0.00  13.45  4.55  --  
Corporations  16.69  29.77  19.50  --     17.64  6.15  38.92  58.40  4.92  32.01  34.74  18.67  --  
Bond custodians   9.01  13.69  3.00  --     1.58  17.32  4.01  0.03  0.00  3.40  20.87  0.00  --  
Active investors:                             
  Asset managers  7.93  6.11  2.42  --     12.91  3.63  5.73  0.28  12.50  0.22  4.08  0.00  --  
  Hedge funds  1.75  2.28  0.46  --     8.46  4.49  2.98  1.73  0.00  0.00  0.00  4.14  --  




2.3.  Firm Ownership through the Bankruptcy 
2.3.1.  Ownership concentration at bankruptcy and beyond 
The goal of this essay is to understand the distribution of debt ownership in bankrupt firms, how 
trading impacts ownership concentration, and, ultimately, how ownership concentration and trading relate 
to the evolution of the bankruptcy restructuring.  We start in Table 2.2 by analyzing the distribution of 
claims ownership at t1 and t2, across institutional types and the capital structure of the bankrupt firms.  
The first observation to emerge from Panel A of Table 2.2 is that banks are a substantial and 
concentrated holder of bankrupt claims throughout the bankruptcy case. At the onset of bankruptcy, they 
are present in 88.9% of the cases (Column 1) and own an average of 21.7% of the claims in the sample 
firms (Column 2).  (Conditional on at least one bank holding claims at bankruptcy, banks account for 
21.7% / 88.7% = 24.5% of the ownership of Chapter 11 claims in a bankrupt firm). At the time of the plan 
vote  tabulation,  banks  hold  a  similar  stake  of  the  voting  claims.    As  measured  by  the  Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI), bank ownership is also highly concentrated, both at t1 (Column 6) and at t2 
(Column 12). Overall, these findings are supportive of earlier studies—such as Gilson (1990) and Gilson, 
John, and Lang (1990)—that argue that the presence of banks proxies for a more concentrated set of 
creditors in the capital structure.
14   
What has  been missed by the  existing  literature  is the fact that non -financial corporations 
represent at least as much as of the capital structure of the bankrupt firms as loans  or bonds. In our 
sample, non-financial corporations are present in nearly all cases  and account for an average of 22.5% 
(median of 14.6%) of  the claims of the sample firms. A large portion of claims held by non -financial 
corporations are in the form of trade credit and related claims for services and products purchased by the 
                                                                 
14 Also consistent with the assumptions in the literature, bond custodians on average hold 27.6% of the bankrupt 
claims, conditional on being present in the capital structure. However, at t1, ―bond custodians‖ also captures some 
syndicated loans holdings because agent banks will sometimes report holdings for the entire syndicate. At t2, owners 
of syndicate claims vote on their own behalf (rather than through the agent bank) and subsequently show up in their 




15  Indeed, the observed average  22.5% of claims owned  by non-financial corporations 
corresponds closely to the findings in  Rajan and Zingales (1995), who show that trade credit represents 
22.8% of the liabilities of private U.S. firms.  Compared to banks,  ownership concentration within the 
group of non-financial corporations is dispersed, which could justify it is exclusion from the analysis of 
ownership concentration in previous studies. However, as we will show in in the next section, claims held 
by  non-financial corporations  make  up  a substantial fraction  of  the  bilateral  claims  purchased  in 
bankruptcy, which concentrates these claims between  t1 and t2.
16 Given that all claims  can be traded in 
bankruptcy, large blocks of ownership—like claims held by non-financial corporations—become pivotal 
to understanding the ownership of a bankrupt firm, regardless of the concentration of these holdings at the 
start of the case.  
The recent study by Jiang, Li, and Wang (2012) emphasizes the role that active investors play in 
Chapter 11 restructurings, and argues that active investors participate in some fashion in 87% of all large 
bankruptcy cases. Consistent with their study, the overall incidence of active investors in our sample is 
high. Roughly 77% of firms filing for Chapter 11 have an active investor holding some of the claims 
throughout the bankruptcy process, and 60% of the cases have a hedge fund positively identified at either 
the filing of schedules, the vote tabulation, or at both points. However, we find that at the onset of 
bankruptcy, active investors hold only 9.8% of the claims (12.8% conditional on cases where active 
investors are present), and hedge funds account for specifically 2.8% of the all holdings (6.5% conditional 
                                                                 
15  For  example,  for  Kmart  the  largest  claimants  classified  as  corporations  are:  Fleming  Companies,  a  food 
distributor; D&J Limited Partnership, a clothing manufacturer; Handleman, a media distributor; Universal Music 
and Video, another media distributor; Premier Retail Networks, a marketing firm. For Pierre Foods, a prepackaged 
food producer,  largest corporate claims are: Zartic, a meat processor; Clovervale farms, food producer; Chef’s 
Pantry, another food producer; Interstate Warehousing, refrigerating warehousing firm; Archer Daniels Midland, 
food  distributor  and  merchandiser.  We  also  mapped  firms  classified  as  Corporations  to  Compustat.  Using  this 
mapping we are able to compare the industry distribution of trade partners in our sample to input-output tables 
(www.bea.gov/industry/) that provides information on the flow of goods and services that make up the production 
processes of industries. Industry distribution of claims held by Corporations in our sample is very close to the BEA 
data. 
16 Although the average holding of non-financial corporations between t1 and t2 does not change much, we must keep 
in mind that these fractions have different denominators (all claims vs. voting claims). So for claims concentrated in 
voting  classes,  like  the  holdings  of  non-financial  corporations,  this  seeming  lack  of  change  actually  entails  a 
significant drop in ownership.   
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on cases where hedge funds are present). The distribution of hedge funds ownership is highly skewed, 
such that for the five cases with the largest hedge fund ownership at the filing for bankruptcy, the average 
holding at t1 is 54.4%, while the remainder of the cases has very little hedge fund ownership.  
What stands out is that hedge funds—and active investors more broadly—appear to significantly 
increase their involvement by the time claimants vote on the plan of reorganization. Conditional on hedge 
fund presence, their ownership at t2 is more than double of that at t1. Part of the observed increase arises 
mechanically from loan holdings that were hidden at t1 behind an agent bank. But, as we show in Section 
2.3.2 below, active investors play a significant role in the purchases of bankruptcy claims during the case, 
which increases their stake in bankrupt firms over the course of the bankruptcy. 
Active investors are also strategically positioned in the capital structure of bankrupt firms. For 
instance, among the subset of firms that reorganize in Chapter 11 and report tabulations, active investors 
are present in 76% of the fulcrum classes (the classes which convert to the largest ownership stake in  the 
reorganized firm).  When active investors are present in the fulcrum class, they own an average of 32% of 
the  entire  class,  close  to  the  strategically  important  1/3  required  to  block  approval  of  a  plan  of 
reorganization.
17 So, to the degree that hedge funds assert their power in bankruptcy, they d o so with 
relatively small, but strategic stakes. This stresses the importance of trading in distress claims (including 
transfer of claims in bankruptcy) for the evolution of the bankruptcy process.
18 
Panels  B  and C  of Table  2.2  provide insight into the types of claims held by the different 
institutional groups.  At t1, we observe only a coarse division into secured claims, unsecured claims, and 
―other‖ claims, which include unpaid wages and taxes, and administrative claims. At t2, we observe a 
finer breakdown by classes entitled to vote, including loans, senior notes, a catch-all class of ―general 
                                                                 
17 In 64% of the cases, we observe holders identified specifically as hedge funds, on average, they hold 24% of the 
fulcrum amount when they are present in the class. 
18 From the claims data we do not observer the extent to which claimholders play important roles in the Chapter 11 
process outside of acquiring, holding, and voting the claims themselves. One concern therefore is that the fate of the 
Chapter 11 restructuring is swayed by strategic players that are  not claimholders and therefore stand outside of our 
sample. In the Appendix, Table B.5, we evaluate this statement by looking at the frequency with which investors in 
our claims data also act as players in relevant financing and control events that occur d uring the Chapter 11 case, 
and find that our approach captures a significant fraction of those cases.      
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unsecured claims‖ (―GUCs‖), and specific classes—used from time to time—of bilateral claims for trade, 
tort, and employee/pension claims. The specific bilateral claims classes should be interpreted cautiously 
because, for the bulk of the bankruptcy cases, these claims are not segregated out from the GUCs class. 
We also observe holdings by investors in a firm’s ―old‖ equity when equity interests are entitled to vote, 
i.e., when there is enough estimated value in the assets for there to be some residual for the firm’s original 
equityholders. 
Panel B reports the distribution of claim holdings by institutional type across claims, and Panel C 
reports the distribution of claims held by each institutional type within a particular claim. Panel B shows 
that, on a value-weighted basis, unsecured claims dominate the portfolios of the main institutional types at 
t1, including banks.  The predominant holdings at t2 are GUCs, where most bilateral claims reside. This is 
particularly the case for non-financial corporations, which hold 69.5% of their claims in the form of 
GUCs.  Note that on a value-weighted basis, holdings in the classes of old equity interests are relatively 
small.   
Panel C shows that, in line with their role as senior secured lenders, banks are the dominant 
holders of secured claims (42.9%) at t1 and the largest holder of loan claims (34.5%) at t2. But banks are 
also substantial owners of senior unsecured notes (39.2%), and they take nontrivial positions in GUCs 
(13.0%), trade claims (15.4%), and equity (13.5%), although as noted above, Panel B indicates that these 
equity positions are small on a value-weighted basis. Non-loan claims owned by banks are held primarily 
through their proprietary trading desks and subsidiary investment funds, and could reflect distressed debt 
purchases by these subsidiaries.  Consistent with the interpretation that they are  predominantly trade 
claimants, non-financial corporations hold the largest stakes in GUCs (38.9%) and trade claims (58.4%). 
But non-financial corporations also hold a substantial portion of the equity that gets to vote (34.7%). 
Bond custodial holdings are more often unsecured and represent significant positions in senior unsecured 
notes (17.3%) and equity (20.3%).  Active investors split their holdings evenly across both secured and  
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unsecured claims, holding 21.4% of all loan claims, 12.5% of employee/pension claims, 8.1% of senior 
notes, and 8.7% of GUCs.  Active investors hold very little (4.1%) of the equity available for voting. 
An important takeaway from Panels B and C is that holdings by institutional types cluster in the 
―top‖  (secured claims  and  loans) and  ―middle‖ (senior  notes  and  GUCs)  of the  priority  structure  of 
bankrupt firms.  It is in these areas of the capital structure, where much of the value of the company 
remains, that most of the restructuring negotiations and battles take place.  One of the advantages of our 
study is that we observe trading in the strategically important middle region of the capital structure during 
the time between t1 and t2.  We now turn to examining this trading more closely. 
2.3.2.  Claims trading during Chapter 11  
As mentioned earlier, our data contains in-bankruptcy transfers of bilateral claims. While nearly 
all institutional types own some amount of bilateral claims, a large fraction of these claims are held by 
non-financial corporations, which we have shown to be economically important and concentrated within 
strategically relevant voting classes in in the middle of the capital structure. We should also reemphasize 
that within a given class all claims are treated the same under the reorganization plan. So while transfers 
of bilateral claims are a subset of trading in bankruptcy, they are likely a representative subset of trading 
in strategic classes during the bankruptcy case. However, in examining the trade behavior, two caveats are 
in order.  First, the trading we observe takes place during the bankruptcy case, between t1 and t2, and 
much of the strategic trading in the capital structure of a financially distressed firm is likely to takes place 
before the bankruptcy filing.  Second, as discussed in Section 2.3, the costs of acquiring bilateral claims is 
likely higher than the costs of purchasing loans or bonds. 
Table 2.3 summarizes patterns in claims trading across institutional types. Panel A reports the 
value-weighted proportion of total claims traded that are bought and sold by each institutional type. The 
first three columns look at the full sample. We then examine these numbers on a mean basis across the 
sample firms. The first thing to note is that active investors (asset management firms and hedge funds) are 







ANALYSIS OF CLAIMS TRADING IN BANKRUPTCY 
The focus of this table is on the trade of bilateral creditor claims observed after the bankruptcy filing but before the voting on the plan of reorganization.  In Panel 
A, the first three columns report the institutional type of buyers and sellers as a percentage of all transfers (value-weighted). To compute these numbers we 
condition the sample on those cases in which we have record of at least one transfer. In the ―who sells‖ and ―who buys‖ analysis, the mean corresponds to the 
unconditional mean, that is, we use zeros if there is no sell or buy information for a given type.  For example, if in the typical case $100 of claims were traded, 
we would expect $7.11 of those to be sold by banks, and $61.12 sold by corporations.  Conditional means (conditional on a given institutional type engaging in 
trading) can be easily computed using percentage of cases with seller/buyer of a given type. Panel B separates trades by institutional types into claims that are 
eventually used to vote on a plan, and those claims that are non-voting. This panel uses a subset of 36 bankruptcies for which we observe trading and can 
unambiguously link claims between the register and voting tabulations. All figures are value-weighted. 
 








% of all  
net 
buyers 
  Who sells:    Who buys: 
Creditor institutional type: 
 






(%)   







Banks   41.41  41.41  0.01    23.94  7.11  21.24    21.13  9.08  25.36 
Corporations  34.49  3.71  -30.78    85.92  61.12  38.49    35.21  10.43  25.44 
Bonds custodians   7.37  1.83  -5.54    4.23  0.94  7.41    8.45  2.23  10.95 
Active investors:                       
  Asset managers  1.06  17.73  16.67    14.08  3.07  16.52    39.44  13.02  27.93 
  Hedge funds  0.21  20.06  19.84    15.49  0.97  4.97    73.24  42.35  38.19 
Total:  84.54  84.74  0.20    --  73.21  --    --  77.10  -- 
 
 
Panel B: Claims trading by class (BMC cases only) 
  Non-voting claims:    Voting claims: 
Creditor institutional type:  % of all 
sellers  
% of all 
buyers  
% of all  
net buyers    % of all 
sellers  
% of all 
buyers  
% of all  
net buyers 
Banks  6.60  9.53  2.92    0.00  19.12  19.12 
Corporations  65.82  8.76  -57.06    70.32  0.38  -69.94 
Bonds custodians  0.97  0.79  -0.18    0.00  0.00  0.00 
Active investors:               
  Asset managers  0.47  26.59  26.12    0.00  29.88  29.88 
  Hedge funds  0.19  28.62  28.43    0.66  40.04  39.37 
Total:  74.04  74.28  0.24    70.99  89.42  18.43  
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traded and sellers in almost none of the trades; they also engage in buying claims in a staggering 73% of 
the  bankruptcy  cases.    Although  the  selling  of  claims  should  be  interpreted  cautiously  since  only 
institutions that own bilateral claims can sell them, it is unlikely that active investors are selling their 
other holdings while buying claims from corporations. This means that overall holdings of the active 
investors increase through bankruptcy. The second important finding is that non-financial corporations 
are important net sellers of bilateral claims, representing 34.5% of all bilateral claims sold and only 3.8% 
of claims acquired during the cases. Corporations appear as sellers in 86% of the bankruptcy cases. In 
unreported results we directly track how claims transfer across institutional types and show that active 
investors are the largest buyers of claims held by non-financial corporations. Specifically, we find that 
42.6%  of  claims  held  by  non-financial  corporations  that  end  up  being  sold  are  purchased  by  active 
investors. (The second largest buyer is banks with 25.2% purchased from corporations.) 
While  non-financial  corporations  appear  as sellers in  nearly  all  cases,  much  of  the  observed 
trading is concentrated in a small number of cases.  For example, on average across our sample, 5.2% of 
all claims held by corporations are sold during bankruptcy, but in the top ten most actively traded cases, 
an average of 23% of all corporate claims are sold.  This skewed pattern is consistent with observed 
trading overall, in which we see some trading in many cases, but significant amounts of trading in a 
smaller number.
19 
Banks proprietary trading desks often facilitate markets making for bilateral claims. As a result, 
banks are large buyers and sellers of bilateral claims, exchanging roughly 41% of all claims, but taking a 
net zero position. Meanwhile, bond custodians are also shown as net sellers, albeit in relatively small 
amounts.  A sale (purchase) by a bond custodian implies that the buyer elects to identify (hide)  himself 
directly as beneficial holder.  Bond custodian sales account for 7.4% of all sales and 1.8% of purchases. 
                                                                 
19 It should be noted, however, that it is not necessary to purchase a large overall share of the capital structure to 
influence the outcome of a bankruptcy case.  For example, owning a 33% of just one voting class gives a creditor a 
blocking position which could potentially hold up the entire plan of reorganization.  
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For  the  36  bankruptcies  administered  by  the  claims  administrator  BMC  Group,  there  is  an 
extensive accounting of the Chapter 11 claims, from the time they are entered in the schedules or register 
through to the time of the vote tabulation. This detailed record-keeping allows us to track whether traded 
claims are eventually entitled to vote on the plan of reorganization; in other words, we can check whether 
trading volume is higher in claims that have strategic importance to the vote on the plan of reorganization.  
The results are reported in in Panel B of Table 2.3. We find that a disproportionally large amount of 
traded claims are for voting purposes. A traded claim is roughly 38% more likely to be a voting claim 
than a non-voting claim. Weighted by the face value of the claim, claims that are entitled to vote are more 
than two and a half times more likely to trade than a claim that does not vote.
20  
In Panel B of Table 2.3, we can also see that banks and active investors (particularly hedge funds) 
account for a substantially larger portion of net purchases of voting claims than non -voting claims. 
Combined, banks and active investors comprise 88.4% of all net purchases of voting claims, but 57.4% of 
all net buyers of non-voting claims. (Although, a large fraction of traded claims is non-voting, and based 
on some anecdotal accounts this might be endogenous. Claims are paid at par, so they do not get t o vote, 
and do not get equity in the restructured firm.)  This suggests that purchases of Chapter 11 claims by 
banks and active investors are strategic in the sense that they concentrate on claims that will allow them to 
influence the voting on the reorganization plan.  
An additional interesting fact is trade timing is bimodal.  The first large block of trading occurs 
shortly after the filing of the case (t1). Towards the end of the case, there is another, significantly smaller, 
period of high trading intensity. Very little trading occurs in the middle of cases.  On a volume-weighted 
basis, 91% of all trades happen in the first half of a bankruptcy case.  Given that the complete and 
comprehensive  distribution  of  claims’  holdings,  with  names  and  addresses  (the  new  information)  is 
released at  t1, the fact that most of the trading takes place immediately following the bankruptcy is 
consistent with a competitive market for claims in bankruptcy.  
                                                                 
20 
                 
             -         
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2.4.  Creditor Concentration and Bankruptcy Outcomes 
In what follows, we measure the concentration of ownership as the aggregate share of bankruptcy 
claims owned by the ten largest creditors in the firm.
21  Throughout the regression analysis we include 
firm-specific controls that have been found to affect bankruptcy outcomes. Moulton and Thomas (1993) 
and Campbell (1996) identify the size of the firm and profitability as key variables influencing bankruptcy 
outcomes. To account for this, we control for the logarithm of asset size, based on the assets reported by 
firms in their original Chapter 11 petitions. (In general, our results are robust to exclusion of the 10 largest 
or 10 smallest firms from the analysis.) Profitability is measured using an indicator variable equal to one 
if the firm had positive EBITDA prior to filing and zero otherwise. As shown in Table 2.1, only limited 
information is available for pre-bankruptcy EBITDA. To account for this, we control for the level effect 
for those firms that have EBITDA data available. Motivated by Acharya, Bharath and Srinivasan (2007), 
each regression also includes industry fixed effects, for which we aggregate firms into (i) mining and 
construction;  (ii)  manufacturing;  (iii)  services;  (iv)  transportation,  communication,  and  utilities;  (v) 
wholesale and retail trade; and (vi) finance, insurance, and real estate.  
Finally, we include a dummy variable equal to one when a firm files for bankruptcy during a 
recession, as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). Controlling for economic 
downturns is important because the bankruptcy experience is likely to be different for firms that file 
during a recession. For instance, as shown in Chapter 1, bankruptcy caseloads are much heavier during 
recessions, giving judges and attorneys less time to devote to each case.  Also, negotiations between 
creditors likely differ because outside options are worse during these times or because it is more difficult 
                                                                 
21 In an earlier version of the essay, we used the dollar-weighted Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to measure 
ownership concentration across the entire capital structure. Our current measure is more conservative, since it only 
counts the largest claimholders. However, the two measures are highly correlated, and by either measure we find 
that trading leads to higher concentration.   
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to obtain in-bankruptcy financing. It is also possible that firms filing for bankruptcy in a recession are 
intrinsically different from firms that default in normal times.
22 
In the subsequent tables our sample size decreases from 136 to 119 observations. For 14 firms  in 
our sample the claims administrators that provided data for this study  were hired only to perform the 
voting tabulation at t2, so we did not receive ownership data at the filing of schedules and registers (t1). 
For an additional three firms we were unable to obtain data on total assets.     
2.4.1.  Creditor concentration at the onset of bankruptcy  
2.4.1.1.  Determinants of creditor concentration at t1 
Our focus is on trading in bankruptcy. But strategic consolidation of ownership often takes place 
before the bankruptcy filing.  So, we start by exploring factors that relate to creditor concentration at the 
bankruptcy filing, with a specific focus on potentially strategic trading.  The goal of this analysis is 
twofold.  As  discussed  above,  claims  held  by  non-financial  corporations  cannot  be  easily  traded  in 
advance of the bankruptcy filing.  So, first, we want to confirm that a large presence of such corporate 
claims  leads  to  lower  pre-bankruptcy  ownership  concentration.  Second,  we  want  to  see  if  there  is 
evidence that pre-bankruptcy trading is related to ownership consolidation.  The results are reported in 
Table 2.4.  
The first set of explanatory variables (―Capital structure‖) includes the share of claims owned by 
non-financial corporations and by active investors,  and three dummy variables equal to one when bank 
debt, public debt, or either bank or public debt represent more than 5% of the debt structure of the 
bankrupt firm. Amounts less than 5% of the capital structure are unlikely to have a large effect on the  
 
                                                                 
22  We  also  verify  (unreported)  that  our  results—including  the  effect  of  trade  on  ownership  and  the  effect  of 
ownership on the bankruptcy outcomes—are not driven by cases filed in Delaware or Southern New York, cases 
filed in 2008 and 2009, or cases filed after 2005 amendments to the U.S. bankruptcy law. Regarding this last point, 
there  seems  to  be  a  common  belief  that  2005  changes  might  have  increased  the  frequency  of  prearranged 
bankruptcies; so, when looking at bankruptcy outcomes we will explicitly control for prearranged bankruptcies. 
Finally, Dahiya. John, Puri and Ramirez (2003) show that firms obtaining DIP financing are more likely to emerge 





DETERMINANTS OF CREDITOR CONCENTRATION AT BANKRUPTCY 
This table looks at the determinants of the creditor concentration at bankruptcy. The dependent variable is Creditor 
concentration (t1) measured as the share of claims held by 10 largest creditors at filing of Schedule of Assets and 
Liabilities (i.e., at bankruptcy filing). Share of claims owned by corporation and active investors are defined exactly 
as in Table 2.2. Bank debt is a dummy equal to 1if the share of bank debt as fraction of total debt is at least 5% and 0 
otherwise. Public debt is defined similarly. Bank debt or public debt is a dummy equal to 1 if either Bank debt or 
Public debt is equal to 1 and 0 otherwise. Traded loan is a dummy equal to 1if a firms’ loan is quoted prior to 
bankruptcy filing in Markit secondary market database and 0 otherwise. Loan traded within 1 year of bankruptcy is 
defined similarly but restricts to loan quotes that are within 1 year of the bankruptcy filing. Bond traded within 1 
year of bankruptcy is a dummy variable equal to 1if firm’s bond is quoted within 1 year prior to bankruptcy filing in 
TRACE bond transactions database and 0 otherwise. Loan or bond traded within 1 year of bankruptcy is a dummy 
equal to 1 if either of the previous two dummies is equal to 1 and 0 otherwise. Assets are measured in millions and 
were compiled from each firms’ Chapter 11 petition. Positive EBITDA is a dummy variable indicating if the firm 
had positive EBITDA prior to filing. Only limited information is available for pre-bankruptcy EBITDA. To account 
for this, we control for the level effect for those firms that have EBITDA data available.  Economic recession is a 
dummy equal to 1 if the firm files for bankruptcy during a recession period, as defined by National Bureau of 
Economic Research.  All models are estimated using linear least squares. Standard errors are clustered by industry 
and reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at   1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
Dependent variable:  Creditor concentration (t1) 
Capital structure:               
   Share of claims owned by corporation  -0.166***  -0.146***  -0.174***  -0.164***  -0.149** 
 
(0.034)  (0.032)  (0.030)  (0.029)  (0.038) 
   Share of claims owned by active investors  0.064  0.087  0.065  0.064  0.068 
 
(0.063)  (0.069)  (0.065)  (0.061)  (0.075) 
   Bank debt (dummy)  0.004  0.025  0.032   --  -- 
 
(0.051)  (0.051)  (0.049)    
     Public debt (dummy)  0.074**  --  --  0.073  -- 
 
(0.021) 
   
(0.049)    




      (0.063) 
Pre-bankruptcy trading:               
   Traded loan   --  0.070*   --  --   --  
 
   (0.033)          
   Loan traded within 1 year of bankruptcy   --   --  0.032   --  --  
 
      (0.020)       
   Bond traded within 1 year of bankruptcy   --   --  --   0.023   -- 
 
         (0.061)    




      (0.024) 
Ln(Assets)  -0.013  -0.016*  -0.014  -0.013  -0.016* 
 
(0.007)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
EBITDA data available   -0.067  -0.044  -0.043  -0.066  -0.058 
 
(0.045)  (0.027)  (0.032)  (0.047)  (0.040) 
Positive EBITDA  0.053  0.047  0.051  0.051*  0.043 
 
(0.028)  (0.035)  (0.032)  (0.023)  (0.034) 
Economic recession  0.011  0.001  0.009  0.011  0.006 
 




        
Observations  119  119  119  119  119 
R-squared  0.133  0.139  0.120  0.134  0.143  
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overall capital structure at t1, nor are they likely to be of strategic importance to traders interested in 
taking positions in the capital structure using loans and bonds.  
While we cannot observe out-and-out pre-bankruptcy trading, we can have proxies for trading 
activity in loans and bonds. Four such proxies are grouped under ―Pre-bankruptcy trading‖. Following 
Drucker and Puri (2009), we use the existence of pre-filing secondary market price quotes for loans in our 
sample firms as a proxy for whether a firm’s loans are traded prior to filing. The price quotes are collected 
via dealer surveys conducted by Markit. We look at whether a given firm had loans traded within a year 
of bankruptcy. We also examine a more open-ended measure of loan trading that equals one when a quote 
for the loan appears within five years of bankruptcy filing. Following Goldstein, Hotchkiss, and Sirri 
(2007)  and  Bessembinder  and  Maxwell  (2008),  using  the  FINRA  Trade  Reporting  and  Compliance 
Engine (TRACE) dataset, we track whether there were trades in the bonds and notes of our sample firms 
in the one year leading to the bankruptcy. We define separate dummy variables that equal one when there 
is evidence of loan trading, bond trading, and loan or bond trading within one year prior to the bankruptcy 
filing.   
Several notable patterns emerge from the regressions in Table  2.4.  Most distinctly, creditor 
concentration at t1 is decreasing in the share of corporate claims owned by corporations, implying that 
firms in which trade claims represent a large part of the capital structure enter Chapter 11 with a less 
concentrated  ownership  than  firms  with  fewer  trade  claims.    The  magnitude  of  the  estimates  are 
economically large: a one standard deviation increase in the share of claims owned by corporations (22%) 
reduces the proportion of holdings by the top ten creditors by 3 to 4 percentage points.  Meanwhile, the 
share of claims held by active investors appears to have no discernible impact on t1 concentration, the 
estimates are statistically insignificant in each case. 
  The estimates associated with the pre-bankruptcy trading variables show that debt ownership 
structures are more concentrated at t1 when there was trading in a firm’s debt prior to the filing, consistent 
with the idea that pre-filing trading increases creditor concentration.  The top ten largest creditors own 7  
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percentage  points  more  of  the  debt  in  firms  that  experienced  a  loan  trade  prior  to  filing,  and  6.4 
percentage points more of the debt in firms that experience a loan or bond trade within one year of filing. 
Importantly, these results are conditional on the presence of a bank loan or public bond, so they are not 
just picking up the fact that firms with these debt instruments have more concentrated capital structures, 
but  instead  indicate  that  trading  prior  to  bankruptcy  is  indicative  of  a  more  concentrated  ownership 
structure. While the pre-bankruptcy trading variables are rough indicators of actual trading in a firm’s 
instruments, they suggest that investors acquiring claims in a distressed firm prior to filing concentrate the 
ownership structure of firms prior to filing for Chapter 11. 
2.4.1.2.  Creditor concentration at t1 and bankruptcy outcomes 
The takeaway from Table 2.4 is that creditor concentration at t1 is lower in debt structures that 
contain a high share of corporate claims, and higher in structures in which loan and bond trading is 
observed  prior  to  filing.  We  now  turn to  examining  the  extent to  which  creditor  concentration  at  t1 
explains outcomes of the Chapter 11 restructuring.   
Table 2.5 reports results in which characteristics of the Chapter 11 restructuring are regressed on 
creditor concentration at t1 and other control variables.  We focus on four dependent variables in the 
regressions:  (i)  an  indicator  variable  equal  to  one  if  the  bankruptcy  filing  was  prearranged  or 
―prepackaged‖, so that much of the restructuring negotiations occur out of court prior to filing; (ii) the  
number  of  months  the  firm  remains  in  bankruptcy;  (iii)  a  set  of  dummy  variables  identifying  the 
bankruptcy outcome according to whether a firm exits Chapter 11 through a traditional reorganization, a 
going-concern 363 sale, or through a piecemeal liquidation; and (iv) the overall recovery rate.   
The results in Table 2.5 show a distinct pattern.  Firms are significantly more likely to restructure 
through a pre-arranged filing, spend a shorter time in bankruptcy, and emerge via a reorganization of the 
existing entity when debt ownership is more concentrated at t1.  The estimates in the first column of Table 
2.5, Panel A imply that for every one standard deviation (17%) increase in creditor concentration, the 




CREDITOR CONCENTRATION AT BANKRUPTCY FILING AND BANKRUPTCY OUTCOME  
This table examines the relation between the concentration of creditors in a bankrupt firm and variables measuring 
the outcome of the bankruptcy. The central explanatory variable is Creditor concentration (t1) measured as the share 
of claims held by 10 largest creditors at filing of Schedule of Assets and Liabilities (i.e., at bankruptcy filing). Panel 
B extends results in Panel A by adding proxies of ownership concentration used in the previous literature. Bank 
debt/Total debt and Public debt/Total debt are measured at the end of the fiscal year prior to filing. Bank debt or 
public debt is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has either bank or public debt and 0 otherwise. Note that, given the 
objective of the tables, these additional controls are defined differently from the controls used in Table 2.4. Assets 
are measured in millions and were compiled from each firms’ Chapter 11 petition. Positive EBITDA is a dummy 
variable indicating if the firm had positive EBITDA prior to filing. Only limited information is available for pre-
bankruptcy EBITDA. To account for this, we control for the level effect for those firms that have EBITDA data 
available.  Economic recession is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm files for bankruptcy during a recession period, as 
defined by National Bureau of Economic Research.  All models are estimated using linear least squares. Standard 
errors are clustered by industry and reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at   1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
Panel A: Creditor concentration at filing of Schedule of Assets and Liabilities (t1), all creditors 
 







rate  Reorganization  Sale  Liquidation 
Creditor concentration (t1)  0.371***  -6.671**  0.389**  0.073  -0.465  -1.096 
 
(0.089)  (2.240)  (0.135)  (0.297)  (0.353)  (0.616) 
Prearranged bankruptcy  --  -8.171***  0.153*  0.146  -0.279**  0.052 
   
(1.092)  (0.062)  (0.088)  (0.072)  (0.052) 
Ln(Assets)  0.001  0.955***  0.069**  -0.031  -0.033  -0.040 
 
(0.019)  (0.228)  (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.026)  (0.026) 
EBITDA data available  -0.017  -2.375  -0.190*  0.082  0.106  -0.106* 
 
(0.091)  (1.789)  (0.093)  (0.096)  (0.094)  (0.045) 
Positive EBITDA  0.049  0.987  0.314**  -0.138  -0.203  0.322*** 
 
(0.097)  (1.342)  (0.102)  (0.146)  (0.178)  (0.060) 
Economic recession  0.109  -4.935*  0.198*  -0.243***  0.027  -0.073 
 
(0.147)  (2.119)  (0.094)  (0.054)  (0.101)  (0.045) 
              Industry Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  119  115  119  119  119  108 
R-squared  0.10  0.35  0.22  0.12  0.14  0.07 
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TABLE 2.5 – continued 
 
Panel B: “Horse race” comparison of ownership concentration measures 
 







rate  Reorganization  Sale  Liquidation 
Creditor concentration (t1)  0.355***  -7.339**  0.390**  0.062  -0.480  -1.017 
 
(0.087)  (2.506)  (0.125)  (0.308)  (0.407)  (0.545) 
Bank debt/Total debt  0.104  1.643  -0.060  -0.020  0.209  -0.136** 
  (0.108)  (2.313)  (0.268)  (0.256)  (0.176)  (0.037) 
Public debt/Total debt  0.138  4.919  -0.036  0.043  0.137  -0.049 
  (0.171)  (3.760)  (0.130)  (0.097)  (0.139)  (0.041) 
Bank or public debt (dummy)  -0.119  -2.883  0.054  -0.020  -0.140  -0.075 
  (0.077)  (2.742)  (0.107)  (0.134)  (0.083)  (0.099) 
Prearranged bankruptcy  --  -8.278***  0.155*  0.146  -0.287**  0.047 
   
(1.066)  (0.062)  (0.097)  (0.074)  (0.043) 
Ln(Assets)  0.005  1.030***  0.067***  -0.030  -0.030  -0.033 
 
(0.021)  (0.240)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.026)  (0.027) 
EBITDA data available  -0.026  -3.061  -0.193**  0.078  0.092  -0.047* 
 
(0.134)  (2.439)  (0.067)  (0.128)  (0.115)  (0.022) 
Positive EBITDA  0.054  1.192  0.315**  -0.133  -0.204  0.321*** 
 
(0.091)  (1.680)  (0.092)  (0.161)  (0.182)  (0.052) 
Economic recession  0.110  -4.873*  0.198  -0.239**  0.022  -0.055 
 
(0.165)  (2.311)  (0.098)  (0.060)  (0.107)  (0.049) 
              Industry Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  119  115  119  119  119  108 
R-squared  0.055  0.368  0.226  0.121  0.173  0.188 
 
points.  While pre-arranged deals are likely also to move much faster through Chapter 11, the second 
column of Table 2.5, Panel A shows that when the incidence of a pre-arranged filings is held constant, the 
time spent restructuring in Chapter 11 declines by 1.13 months for every one standard deviation increase 
in creditor concentration.  In other words, a more concentrated debt structure is associated with a shorter 
time in a bankruptcy even after controlling for the effect of prearranged filings.  Meanwhile, the estimates 
in the middle columns of Table 2.5, Panel A imply that likelihood of emerging from bankruptcy via a 
reorganization  increases  6.6  percentage  points  for  every  one  standard  deviation  increase  in  creditor 
concentration.  The  large  negative  coefficient  on  creditor  concentration  in  the  liquidation  regression         
(-0.465)  also  suggests  that  more  concentrated  debt  structures  are  less  likely  to  end  in  a  piecemeal  
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liquidation,  although  the  implied  t-statistic  of  -1.31  (-0.465/0.353)  is  not  statistically  significant  at 
conventional levels. 
Taken together, the results in Table 2.5, Panel A suggest that Chapter 11 restructurings move 
more quickly when the debt ownership is concentrated at t1, in the sense that they are more likely to 
complete their bargaining out of court prior to filing, and even when filing through a traditional ―free fall‖ 
bankruptcy,  restructure  more  quickly  in  bankruptcy.  Moreover,  more  concentrated  structures  are 
associated with a higher likelihood of successfully emerging as a reorganized firm, and possibly, a lower 
likelihood of liquidating piecemeal. If we couple the results from Table 2.5 with the inferences from 
Table 2.4, our findings thus far suggest that debt ownership structures with lower levels of corporate 
claims and higher levels of pre-filing trading are associated with quicker restructurings. 
  One of the contributions of our essay is improvement over ownership concentration measures 
used in the previous literature. Correlations between our measures of creditor concentration and proxies 
used in earlier papers are quite low, highlighting the improvement in measurement provided by our study. 
In particular, the correlation between the share of claims owned by the ten largest claimholders at t1 and 
bank debt as a fraction of total debt—used by Gilson (1990), Gilson, John, and Lang (1990) among other 
studies—is  0.18  and  statistically  insignificant  at  conventional  levels.    The  correlation  between  our 
concentration variable and public debt as a fraction of total debt—used by Brown, James, and Mooradian 
(1993), Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein (1994), and James (1995, 1996)—is 0.21 and only marginally 
statistically significant. Consistent with these low correlations, the results in Panel B (where we include 
all  of  these  proxies  together  with  our  creditor  concentration  measure)  indicate  that  our  finding  are 
unaffected by this ―horse race‖ analysis. Moreover, none of the raw proxies of ownership concentration 






2.4.2.  Creditor concentration at the end of bankruptcy  
2.4.2.1.  Claims trading and creditor concentration 
The evidence presented in Table 2.3 establishes the existence of an active market for claims 
trading during bankruptcy. This is an important and novel fact because the concentration of ownership, 
and heterogeneity in this concentration across firms, is believed to influence bankruptcy costs (Gertner 
and  Scharfstein,  1991;  Bolton  and  Scharfstein,  1996).  If  we  take  as  a  given  that  debt  ownership 
concentration impacts bankruptcy restructurings, then trading that leads to significant consolidation in 
ownership could have an effect on bankruptcy outcomes.  In this sub-section, we assess the effect of 
trading on ownership concentration.  
The evidence in Table 2.4 already suggests that consolidation of ownership takes place before 
bankruptcy through trading in loans and bonds, so the fact that there are changes in ownership during the 
bankruptcy  process  might  not  be  that  surprising.    But  there  is  an  additional  insight  from  observing 
bilateral claims trading directly during the bankruptcy process.  As we discuss in Section 2.3.2, bilateral 
claims often lie in the strategically important middle of the capital structure, where claimholders likely are 
entitled to vote on a plan, and often end up in the fulcrum voting class. Given that there is almost no 
market for bilateral claims before the bankruptcy filing, these claims are transacted only in bankruptcy 
and we observe virtually all of these trades. And while many traders will take positions in the capital 
structure prior to filing to attempt to influence the restructuring (both before and during the bankruptcy 
filing), there is a lot of room during bankruptcy to take strategic positions, particularly in the set of 
corporate claims that are difficult to trade before the filing.   Moreover, the Chapter 11 process reveals a 
lot  of  new  information  about  the  bankrupt  firm  that  could  provide  incentives  to  trade.  In  short,  the 
possibility of trading in bilateral claims, and trading in bankruptcy more broadly, has the potential to 
influence the control of ownership and, hence, bankruptcy outcomes. The fact that claims are actively 
transacted in bankruptcy is a relevant insight for understanding the efficiency of the bankruptcy process.  
88 
 
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 suggest a positive association between claims trading during the case and 
ownership concentration at the end of the case. Table 2.6 examines this relation directly by regression 
debt ownership concentration at t2 on Claims trading intensity, which is a discrete variable that takes the 
values of 0, 1, 2, or 3 based on the amount of bilateral claims trading observed in a sample firm during the 
bankruptcy.  The variable equals 0 when no trading is observed. The remaining firms are coded with a 1, 
2, or 3 to correspond to the tercile of the share of traded claims that occur in the firm.   
The first two columns of Panel A of Table 2.6 report regressions using the level of ownership 
concentration at t2, measured as the holdings of the 10 largest investors, while the last two columns report 
similar regressions but with a measure of the change in ownership concentration between t1 and t2. When 
the dependent variable is the t2 level of concentration, we also control for ownership concentration at t1 
since  trading  in  bankruptcy  can  only  affect  changes  in  ownership  concentration  after  t1.  For  the 
regressions deploying the change in concentration as the dependent variable, we implicitly assume that 
the distribution of ownership across the capital structure at t1 is a good proxy for the distribution of 
ownership among voting classes at t2.
23  
The regression results indicate a strong positive relation between intensity of bilateral claims 
trading and both the level of creditor concentration at the end of the case and the change in creditor 
concentration over the course of the case. The ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates imply that moving 
from having no recorded bilateral claims to being in the third tercile of trading (i.e. an increase of 3 in 
claims trading intensity)  results in a  0.43 standard deviation increase in the overall level of creditor 
concentration, and a 0.80 standard deviation increase in the change in concentration between the register 
and tabulation. As mentioned earlier, the trading of bilateral claims probably reflects a lower bound on 
general trading in bankruptcy.  Based on these results, we conclude that trading in bankruptcy leads to 
                                                                 
23 Using the 36 cases from BMC group, we can construct a direct measure of the change in ownership concentration 
among claims at t1 that are eventually eligible to vote. While the sample size is small, estimates produced by limiting 
the regressions to these 36 exactly-measured cases are similar to the results using the larger sample. In this sub-
sample, we also find that the correlation between the unconditional share of claims owned by the 10 largest 
claimholders and just voting claims is 0.68, significant at the 1% level.   
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significant consolidation of ownership. Assuming that t1 overall concentration is a good proxy for t1 
concentration of voting classes (fact that we verify in the BMC sample), the causal relation between 
trading and ownership concentration during bankruptcy is unambiguous because trading is the only way 
of changing the ownership during the bankruptcy process. 
TABLE 2.6 
CLAIMS TRADING AND CREDITOR CONCENTRATION  
This  table  explores  the  relation  between  trading  of  claims  in  bankruptcy  and  changes  in  the  level  of  creditor 
concentration  during  a  Chapter  11  case.    Panel  A  presents  estimates  of  the  impact  of  claims  trading  on  the 
concentration of creditors. The explanatory variable of interest Claims trading intensity is equal 0 if there is no 
trading in bilateral claims (56 out of 119 cases).  For the remaining firms, the share of traded bilateral claims is 
sorted in terciles; Claims trading intensity is equal to 1 for firms in the first tercile (20 firms), 2 for firms in the 
second tercile (24 firms), and 3 for the firms the third tercile (19 firms). Panel B reports results of the first-stage 
regressions. Share of mid-size claims owned by corporation is defined as total amount of claims between $100,000 
and $300,000 that is owned by corporations scaled by the firm’s total amount of all claims at bankruptcy. Share of 
claims owned by corporations is defined as the total amount of claims owned by corporations scaled by the firm’s 
total amount of all claims at bankruptcy. Assets are measured in millions and were compiled from each firms’ 
Chapter 11 petition. Positive EBITDA is a dummy variable indicating if the firm had positive EBITDA prior to 
filing. Only limited information is available for pre-bankruptcy EBITDA. To account for this, we control for the 
level effect for those firms that have EBITDA data available.  Economic recession is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm 
files for bankruptcy during a recession period, as defined by National Bureau of Economic Research. All models are 
estimated using linear least squares. Standard errors are clustered by industry and reported in parenthesis. ***, ** 
and * indicate statistical significance at   1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Claims trading and creditor concentration 
 
Dependent variable:  Creditor concentration at 
voting tabulation (t2) 
  Change in creditor 
concentration (t2 –t1) 
  OLS  2SLS    OLS  2SLS 
Claims trading intensity  0.025**  0.078**    0.044***  0.116*** 
  (0.011)  (0.036)    (0.014)  (0.027) 
Creditor concentration (t1)  0.626***  0.750***    --  -- 
  (0.113)  (0.155)       
Ln(Assets)  -0.030***  -0.036***    -0.031***  -0.040*** 
 
(0.006)  (0.007)    (0.006)  (0.007) 
EBITDA data available   0.059*  0.068*    0.074**  0.081* 
  (0.030)  (0.039)    (0.036)  (0.048) 
Positive EBITDA  -0.112***  -0.124***    -0.138***  -0.142*** 
  (0.038)  (0.043)    (0.043)  (0.050) 
Economic recession  -0.064**  -0.034    -0.064**  -0.017 
 
(0.026)  (0.036)    (0.028)  (0.038) 
    Yes       
Industry fixed effects  Yes      Yes  Yes 
Observations  119  119    119  119 
R-squared  0.51  --    0.35  --  
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TABLE 2.6 – continued 
 
Panel B: First stage (for 2SLS) 
 
Dependent variable:  Claims trading intensity 
Instruments:     
 
   Share of mid-size claims owned by corporation  11.027***  12.023***  -- 
  (3.091)  (3.327)   
   Share of claims owned by corporation  0.939**  --  1.082** 
  (0.471) 
 
(0.484) 
Creditor concentration (t1)  -1.373*  -1.639**  -1.986*** 
  (0.735)  (0.713)  (0.720) 
Ln(Assets)  0.184***  0.158***  0.152*** 
 
(0.047)  (0.052)  (0.044) 
EBITDA data available   -0.249  -0.219  -0.218 
 
(0.341)  -0.343  (0.338) 
Positive EBITDA  0.355  0.314  0.267 
 
(0.350)  (0.354)  (0.355) 
Economic recession  -0.438**  -0.503**  -0.485** 
 
(0.190)  (0.195)  (0.190) 
       
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
       
F-stat   10.25  13.06  5.01 
p-value  0.00  0.00  0.03 
       
Observations  119  119  119 
R-squared  0.34  0.32  0.30 
 
2.4.2.2.  Creditor concentration at t2 and bankruptcy outcomes 
As  a  final  point  of  this  chapter  we  want  to  connect  changes  in  ownership  concentration  in 
bankruptcy  to  restructuring  outcomes.  Observed  claims  transfers  could  be  related  to  debt  ownership 
concentration through mechanisms that could be related to the bankruptcy. For instance, trading activity 
could be higher in the middle of the capital structure when firms have lower valuations (because the 
potential  upside  on  a  fixed  debt  instrument  is  higher),  and  these  firms  could  be  more  difficult  to 
restructure.    In  this  case,  the  relation  between  trade  and  outcomes,  and  changes  in  ownership  and 
outcomes would not be causal. To address this issue, we use an instrumental variables approach. Because 
trading is central to the changes in the ownership concentration, we look for a variable that influences 
trading activity but is likely to be independent of the fact that the firm is in bankruptcy.  Specifically, we  
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use two variables: Share of claims owned by corporations defined as the total amount of claims owned by 
corporations scaled by the firm’s total amount of all claims at bankruptcy, and Share of mid-size claims 
owned by corporation, defined as  the total amount of claims  whose value is  between $100,000 and 
$300,000 that are owned by corporations, scaled by the firm’s total amount of all claims at bankruptcy. 
The first variable reflects the structure of corporate (non-financial) credit; the cut-offs correspond to the 
bounds  of  the second,  medium  tercile  of  the  cross-sectional  distribution  claims  size.
24  We explicitly 
control for firm size in the regressions, but w e obtain similar results if we  construct the cutoffs after 
scaling claims by firm size, instead of using absolute cutoffs. 
The central reason why we choose instruments based on the amount and characteristics of the 
corporate non-financial claims is that corporations that are trade suppliers—most of the corporate non-
financial claims—are among the least likely to hold on to their claims through bankruptcy. The level of a 
firm’s non-corporate claims are likely to be set well in advance of the firm’s financial distress, and are 
determined by factors related to the firm’s operating and sales strategies. As we have shown, corporations 
represent a significant part of the filing firms’ ownership structure (present in 97% of bankruptcy cases), 
and they tend to be concentrated in classes of ―general unsecured‖ voting claims. We have also shown 
that corporations are large net sellers of claims.  Because of this, firms with more trade credit are expected 
to have more claims available for sale; in other words, the basic idea behind using trade credit as an 
instrument  for  ownership  concentration  is  that  a  bigger  supply  of  claims  for  sale  leads  to  more 
opportunities to consolidate such claims. Our second instrument focuses on the structure of these claims.  
Specifically, small claims are costly to transact, whereas large claims often carry a strategic interest for 
the supplier in that a large supplier might be interested in retaining its trade claim to preserve a good 
relationship with the bankrupt firm. Thus, mid-size claims are most likely to be available for sale. In the 
                                                                 
24                            
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appendix, we use to details of our claims data to show that, indeed, medium size claims are more likely to 
be sold than large or small clams.  
The composition of trade credit is unlikely to change dramatically in anticipation of bankruptcy 
through claims sales to third parties.  Prior to bankruptcy, investors looking to purchase distressed trade 
credit lack a market in which they can identify trade creditors who are looking to reduce their exposure to 
distressed firms.  Once the bankruptcy occurs and the schedules and claims register are created, trading is 
much easier because the identities of trade creditors become available.  Consistent with this, we find in 
unreported results that the vast majority of trading in bankruptcy happens in the first few months after the 
bankruptcy filing, just after the list of creditors becomes publically available.  So, because most trading of 
trade credit claims occurs in bankruptcy, even if the bankruptcy is anticipated, we can accurately assess 
change in ownership resulting from transfers of trade claims during the bankruptcy process.  It is possible 
that trade partners could understand better the nature of the assets (Petersen and Rajan, 1997), —and 
potential outcome of the bankruptcy process—and change their trade credit policy in anticipation of 
financial distress, but the possibility of suppliers ―investing‖ in soon-to-be bankrupt firms because they 
understand a firm’s future is inconsistent with the relatively small economic value of such investments for 
any given supplier, and the fact that most of the trade claims are sold in bankruptcy at presumably a large 
discount.  In addition, the size of each individual trade claim is determined mostly by the economic size 
of the transaction between the parties, not the potential outcome of the bankruptcy case.  Because of this, 
the mid-sized claims instrument is also likely exogenous to eventual bankruptcy outcomes. 
In light of these arguments, our instruments are likely to satisfy the exclusion restriction that the 
composition of corporate credit does not change in anticipation of bankruptcy outcomes.  In addition, the 
instruments should not be correlated with third factors that are likely to affect the bankruptcy outcomes, 
conditional on the observables. As mentioned previously, we control for the set of firm characteristics 
that  previous  researchers  have  found  to  influence  bankruptcy  outcomes.    Consistent  with  Acharya, 
Bharath and Srinivasan (2007), our analysis includes industry fixed effects. Moulton & Thomas (1993)  
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and Campbell (1996) identify the size of the firm and profitability as key variables; we control for both in 
all regressions.
25 Thus, while our instruments are not fundamentally exogenous (they are not a result of a 
natural experiment), they satisfy the conditional independence assumption if they are unrelated   to 
bankruptcy outcomes conditional on firm size, profitability, and industry. 
Panel B in Table  2.6  reports results of the first -stage regressions. The table shows  a  strong 
positive relation between share of mid -size claims owned by corporations and trade  intensity. The F-
statistic for the exclusion of the instrumental variables is 10.25 with p-values close to zero.  Each of the 
variables is also individually significant. The correlation between mid-size claims and share of claims 
owned by corporations is 0.31, so there is a fair amount of unexplained variation that each variable picks 
up  separately.    In  the  first-stage  regressions,  adjusted  R-squared  without  the  instruments  included 
(unreported) is 0.27.  The inclusion of the instruments increases the R-squared to 0.32 for mid-size claims 
alone, 0.30 for share of total claims alone, and 0.34 with when both variables are present.  
The two stage least squares (2SLS) estimates of the impact of claims trading on the creditors 
concentration of creditors are reported in columns two and four of Panel A, Table 2.6. The 2SLS results 
are  largely  consistent  with  the  OLS  estimates.  This  result  is  also  robust  to  estimation  using  limited 
information maximum likelihood (LIML), which is more robust to weak instruments than two-stage least 
squares (2SLS).  
As mentioned earlier, the instrumental variable approach is relevant for our understanding of the 
impact of ownership concentration on the bankruptcy restructuring.  In Table 2.7, we present the results 
of regressions relating bankruptcy restructuring characteristics to ownership concentration measured at 
the vote tabulation (t2).  The table includes results using both OLS and 2SLS. As in Table 2.5, the results 
are  a  cross-sectional  comparison  at the firm  level.  Throughout,  we control  for  the  initial  (t1) claims 
                                                                 
25 Dahiya. John, Puri and Ramirez (2003) show that firms obtaining DIP financing are more likely to emerge from 
the Chapter 11 process and in a shorter time. In unreported regressions we control for DIP financing but do not find 
that it alters our results in any substantial way.    
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concentration  in  order  to  focus  on  the  effect  that  claims  trading  has  on  concentration  during  the 
bankruptcy process.    
TABLE 2.7 
CREDITOR CONCENTRATION AT PLAN VOTING AND BANKRUPTCY OUTCOME  
This table examines the relation between the concentration of creditors at voting on the Plan of Reorganization (t2) 
and the bankruptcy outcomes. The central explanatory variable is Creditor concentration (t2) measured as share of 
claims held by 10 largest creditors at voting on the Plan of Reorganization. We control for the creditor concentration 
at filing of the Schedule of Assets and Liabilities, Creditor concentration (t1). Panel A presents OLS results and 
Panel B presents 2SLS results. In Panel B creditor concentration is instrumented using variables discussed in Table 
2.6. Assets are measured in millions and were compiled from each firms’ Chapter 11 petition. Positive EBITDA is a 
dummy variable indicating if the firm had positive EBITDA prior to filing. Only limited information is available for 
pre-bankruptcy EBITDA. To account for this, we control for the level effect for those firms that have EBITDA data 
available.  Economic recession is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm files for bankruptcy during a recession period, as 
defined by National Bureau of Economic Research. All models are estimated using linear least squares. Standard 
errors are clustered by industry and reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at   1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively.   








rate  Reorganization  Sale  Liquidation 
Creditor concentration (t2)  -1.937  -0.515  0.059  0.345  -0.504* 
  (5.118)  (0.314)  (0.269)  (0.430)  (0.239) 
Creditor concentration (t1)  -5.719  0.692**  0.027  -0.657*  -0.768 
 
(4.227)  (0.200)  (0.257)  (0.304)  (0.708) 
Prearranged bankruptcy  -8.258***  0.125  0.150  -0.261***  0.016 
 
(1.054)  (0.085)  (0.097)  (0.054)  (0.060) 
Ln(Assets)  0.894***  0.056*  -0.029  -0.024  -0.055* 
 
(0.128)  (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.029)  (0.022) 
EBITDA data available  -2.282  -0.161  0.079  0.087  -0.079 
 
(1.999)  (0.100)  (0.102)  (0.093)  (0.046) 
Positive EBITDA  0.793  0.260**  -0.131  -0.168  0.267** 
 
(1.558)  (0.080)  (0.162)  (0.155)  (0.080) 
Economic recession  -5.081**  0.160  -0.239***  0.052  -0.111 
 
(1.828)  (0.103)  (0.054)  (0.118)  (0.065) 
            Industry Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  115  119  119  119  108 
R-squared  0.40  0.33  0.17  0.30  0.20 
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TABLE 2.7 – continued 
 
 








rate  Reorganization  Sale  Liquidation 
Creditor concentration (t2)  48.896  -4.887  0.604  3.192*  -3.655*** 
 
(60.035)  (3.112)  (2.406)  (1.704)  (1.089) 
Creditor concentration (t1)  -34.042  3.259**  -0.282  -2.339**  1.140*** 
  (33.817)  (1.342)  (1.444)  (1.000)  (0.381) 
Prearranged bankruptcy  -5.712*  -0.114  0.179  -0.105  -0.200* 
 
(3.333)  (0.270)  (0.153)  (0.129)  (0.113) 
Ln(Assets)  2.351  -0.062  -0.015  0.052  -0.144*** 
 
(1.911)  (0.080)  (0.064)  (0.049)  (0.049) 
EBITDA data available  -5.067  0.070  0.050  -0.064  0.100 
 
(3.910)  (0.123)  (0.149)  (0.079)  (0.087) 
Positive EBITDA  6.083  -0.197  -0.075  0.130  -0.062 
 
(7.552)  (0.345)  (0.328)  (0.130)  (0.119) 
Economic recession  -1.050  -0.154  -0.200  0.257  -0.346*** 
 
(3.404)  (0.269)  (0.147)  (0.174)  (0.045) 
 
         
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  115  119  119  119  108 
 
The most notable takeaway of this analysis is that ownership concentration at voting (regardless 
of  the  methodology)  has  largely  a  different  effect  on  the  bankruptcy  outcome  than  ownership 
concentration at the time of filing for Chapter 11. The concentration of claimants at t2 especially seems to 
impact the likelihood of liquidation and overall recovery rates. Based on OLS estimates, a one standard 
deviation increase in creditor concentration at exit increases the probability of being liquidated by 6.0 
percentage points, which represents a 18.3% increase from the unconditional likelihood of liquidation.  
The same increase in t2 concentration is also associated with an 8.8 percentage point reduction in recovery 
rates, a 16% reduction from the unconditional mean of 54.8%.  The magnitude and statistical significance 
of these results are even higher based on 2SLS estimates. The explanatory power of the regressions (as 
measured  by  R-squared)  in  Table  2.7  increase  substantially  with  the  inclusion  of  t2  concentration, 
compared to the regressions in Table 2.5, suggesting that changes to concentration during bankruptcy are 
statistically important at the margin.   
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So  why  does  trading-related  concentration  impact  bankruptcy  outcomes  by  increasing  the 
likelihood of liquidation and lowering recovery rates? These effects seem counterintuitive in light of the 
Table 2.5 results and that higher levels of concentration should lower ex-post costs of coordination, which 
should in turn lead to easier workouts and, possibly, higher recovery rates.  In answering this question, we 
should keep two things in mind.  First, claims trading in bankruptcy both consolidates claims ownership 
and allows new investors to enter the capital structure of the debtor.  The findings in Table 2.7 describe 
the marginal impact of t2 concentration, holding the impact of t1 concentration constant.  The results 
suggest that investors who ―double-down‖ on their existing stake or acquire claims for the first time in 
bankruptcy  might  be  pursuing  a  strategy  that  is  contrarian  to  the  investors  that  hold  their  pre-filing 
positions constant. Second, as the case itself evolves, investors’ strategy for how they want to affect 
outcomes could change. For instance, as a case proceeds forward in bankruptcy, some claimants may 
acquire positions to push for a liquidation when the value of a reorganization appears to diminish.  In 
other cases, investors may still view a reorganization as being the best alternative, but work to reorganize 
under  a  lower  valuation,  so  as  to  exclude  from  participation  creditors  that  are  junior  in  the  capital 
structure. In other words, investors who buy-in during the bankruptcy process might very well have a 
different skill set and, hence, different objective than investors who buy-in prior to bankruptcy.   
It is  perhaps most difficult to explain the finding that higher  t2 concentration leads to  lower 
recovery rates.  We consider several potential explanations for this finding. First, we look at whether 
claims traders concentrate their holdings in firms that are more severely distressed with low expected 
recoveries. One rationale for sophisticated investors to focus on such companies would be that deeply-
discounted debt claims have more upside potential, or perhaps that less sophisticated investors are more 
willing to sell their claims in cases where bankruptcy negotiations are not going well. If this were the 
case, then the low recovery rates we observe could merely reflect lower ex-ante valuations, and the 
recovery rates in firms with high levels of concentration could actually be large relative to their pre-filing 
expected  values.  However,  the  results  using  the  instrumented  claims  trading  amount  should  not  be  
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susceptible to this form of endogeneity.  Moreover, when we control for pre-filing estimated recoveries 
using observable bond prices of bankrupt firms, our result persists.  
Second, we examine whether the low recovery rates can be explained by the high concentration 
of holdings in claims in the fulcrum class, the class of claims that receive the bulk of new equity in 
restructured firms.  Investors in the fulcrum class may have incentives to accept a recovery rate that 
undervalues their position if in return they obtain larger amounts of new equity in the restructured firm.  
More broadly, Gilson, Hotchkiss, and Ruback (2000) show that senior creditors have a bias towards lower 
valuations in restructurings, because the lower valuation ―squeezes out‖ more junior claimants, rendering 
a larger claim for senior creditors in the restructured firm. In particular, investors in the fulcrum class may 
have incentives to accept a lower estimated recovery rate if in return they obtain larger amounts of new 
equity in the restructured firm. (Note that the actual value of claims is fixed, so understated estimated 
recovery  rates  would  lead  to  larger  allocations  toward  more  senior  classes.)  However,  adding  the 
concentration within the fulcrum class of securities to our regressions does not ameliorate the negative 
relation between claims concentration and overall recovery rates. 
To examine more closely the extent to which concentration influences strategic plays on the 
valuation of the firm, and therefore expected recovery rates, in Table  2.8 we explore recovery rates 
disaggregated at the voting-class level. Put differently, we measure the relation between recovery rates 
received by an individual voting creditor class and the concentration of ownership within the class. All 
the regressions are value-weighted by class so that small classes do not have a large bearing on the 
results. We use two alternative ways of computing weights. First we weight each class by the total value 
of claims in the class divided by the overall value of voting claims. However, using only voting claims as 
a denominator could miss claims that do not vote on the plan, but nonetheless could be large and have 
influence on the outcomes of negotiations. Thus, we also report the results using each class total value 
scaled by total assets (a proxy for the total firm value). Because recovery rates generally follow absolute 
priority, it is important to control for the relative seniority of each voting class. We do so by including a  
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dummy for secured claimants, as well as administrative and priority classes that are senior to unsecured 
creditors. We also include a dummy for the fulcrum class, as this class typically has special importance in 
negotiations.
26 We use the disclosure statement filed with the bankruptcy court to collect  information on 
the expected recovery rate, relative seniority, and type of distribution rece ived (cash, new debt, or new 
equity) for each class.  
TABLE 2.8 
CREDITOR CONCENTRATION AND RECOVERY RATES AT THE VOTING-CLASS LEVEL 
The focus of this table is to look at the class level recovery rates.  Each observation now corresponds to a voting 
class; each bankruptcy has more than one class of claimants. Class-level concentration is measured as a dollar-
weighted Herfindahl-Hirschman Index with a maximum of one, for each voting class.  Note that this concentration 
measure differs from the share of claims owned by the 10 largest creditors (the concentration measure used in 
Tables 2.5 – 2.7), since there are many voting classes that have less than 10 total creditors.  In addition to the 
reported variables, each regression includes benchmark control variables defined in Table 2.6.  For compactness of 
reporting, we omit other control variables. All models are estimated using linear least squares.  Standard errors are 
clustered by bankruptcy and reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at   1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively.  
 
Weight: 
Class amount / Total firm assets 
  Weight: 
Class amount / Total voting claims 
Class-level concentration  0.355***  0.416***    0.186  0.268* 
 
(0.128)  (0.136)    (0.127)  (0.139) 
Administrative/Priority class  0.509**  0.217    0.568***  0.363 
  (0.194)  (0.302)    (0.177)  (0.265) 
Secured class  0.506***  0.496***    0.492***  0.449*** 
  (0.085)  (0.081)    (0.078)  (0.085) 
Fulcrum class   --  0.821***     --  0.689*** 
 
   (0.125)       (0.133) 
Fulcrum class*Class concentration   --  -1.115***     --  -1.033*** 
 
   (0.294)       (0.285) 
           
Benchmark controls  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes 
Observations  404  404    404  404 
R-squared  0.83  0.86    0.69  0.76 
 
Results in Table 2.8 indicate that higher concentration within a voting class has a positive impact 
on class-level recovery rates. The impact is economically meaningful: a one standard deviation increase 
in  voting  class  concentration  increases  class-level  recovery  rates  by  13  percentage  points.  When 
                                                                 
26 The identity of the fulcrum class depends on the overall valuation of the  firm relative to the total value of 
outstanding claims.  Thus, the fulcrum dummy does not identify seniority, as in some cases senior secured claimants 
constitute the fulcrum class, while in others it could be the original equity holders.  
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combined with the fact that higher t2 concentration is negatively related to overall recovery rates, these 
findings are consistent with the idea that concentrated voting classes bargain for higher recovery rates for 
themselves at the cost of reducing overall returns for other investors.   
In addition, we find that more concentrated fulcrum classes receive significantly lower estimated 
recovery rates.  This is further evidence that highly concentrated classes are able to push negotiations in 
their favor, as the strategic incentive for investors in the fulcrum class is to push for lower estimated 
recoveries, since this allows them to squeeze out more junior classes and retain all of the equity value of 
the firm (Gilson Hotchkiss, and Ruback, 2000).  Increasing the concentration of the fulcrum class by one 
standard deviation decreases recovery rates by 20.1 percentage points on net, a 36.4% reduction from the 
mean recovery received by fulcrum classes.  However, as noted above, the concentration of the fulcrum 
class does not explain the overall negative relationship between ownership concentration and debtor-level 
recovery rates. 
2.5.  Conclusions 
Using a novel dataset covering 136 Chapter 11 bankruptcies, our essay offers a comprehensive 
view  into  the  concentration  of  the  ownership  structure  of  bankrupt  firms,  its  evolution  through 
bankruptcy,  and  its  influence  on  Chapter  11  outcomes.  In  particular,  we  significantly  improve  the 
measurement of ownership concentration, and we are the first to provide empirical insight on trading in 
bankruptcy,  including  the role  of  different  institutional  types  and  the  fact  that  in-bankruptcy  trading 
contributes to the consolidation of ownership. We also examine how in-bankruptcy trading ultimately 
impacts the evolution of the restructuring (through ownership consolidation).  
We find that, at the onset of bankruptcy, active investors—asset management firms, hedge funds, 
and private-equity-affiliated funds—own a relatively small portion of the debt claims of a bankrupt firm 
as compared to banks and non-financial corporations. Yet, by the time that claimants vote on the Plan of 
reorganization, active investors (by far, the largest net buyers of claims in bankruptcy) more than double 
their representation in the firm’s capital structure. Furthermore, in bankruptcy, active investors primarily  
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acquire voting claims. Purchasing trade claims in bankruptcy is an important vehicle for the entry of new 
creditors in bankruptcy, most of which are active investors. 
Consistent  with  Bolton  and  Scharfstein  (1996),  we  find  that  firms  with  more  concentrated 
ownership  at  the  bankruptcy  filing  are  more  likely  to  file  with  a  prearranged  bankruptcy  plan,  pass 
through bankruptcy more quickly, and are more likely survive bankruptcy as a reorganized entity rather 
than  beng  sold  or  liquidated  piecemeal.   Firms  with  more  actively  traded  loans  and  bonds  prior  to 
bankruptcy tend to have more concentrated ownership, while the ownership of firms with more trade debt 
is typically more dispersed. Finally, using trade as an important source of variation in ownership, we find 
that increases in the concentration of voting creditors during bankruptcy reduce the speed of restructuring, 
increase the probability of liquidation, increase class-level recovery rates and decrease overall recovery 
rates. 
The existence of an active market for claims trading during bankruptcy is an important and novel 
fact to document because ownership concentration is believed to influence bankruptcy costs.  In general, a 
lot of new information is released in bankruptcy. For example, the Schedule of Assets and Liabilities 
makes  public  individual  holdings  of  all  claimants  against  the  borrower.  Ability  to  transact  on  this 
information—i.e., existence of the market in bankruptcy—is therefore likely to enhance efficiency of the 
bankruptcy  process.  Furthermore,  we  establish  that  trading  in  bankruptcy  significantly  increases  the 
concentration of ownership at the time of the vote on the plan of reorganization. Current theoretical 
literature treats the ownership of a bankrupt firm, and, therefore, negotiations that follow default as static. 
This is perhaps consistent with the way the bankruptcy process looked through the mid-1990s; however, 
the dynamics of the bankruptcy process since have changed. The novel facts presented in our essay and 
evidence of their effect on bankruptcy outcomes change the way we think about ownership as it relates to 
the restructuring process and highlights the need for further theoretical research on this subject.  
 






Can Gambling Increase Savings?   
Empirical Evidence on Prize-linked Savings Accounts 
 
This chapter is co-authored with Shawn Cole and Peter Tufano 
3.1. Introduction 
    Personal savings serve as the first available buffer for households when faced with job loss, 
healthcare  costs,  or  other  financial  shocks.    However,  recent  survey  evidence  suggests  that  a  large 
percentage of households maintain low emergency savings, resulting in high financial fragility.  For 
example, Lusardi, Schneider, & Tufano, (2011) find that nearly half of U.S. households are probably or 
certainly  unable  to  come  up  with  $2,000  in  30  days,  while  the  FDIC  finds  that  that  29%  of  U.S. 
households do not even have a savings account (FDIC, 2012).  High financial fragility is not confined to 
the U.S.; Lusardi et al., (2011) also show that financial fragility is similarly high in the U.K., Germany, 
and France.
1  Meanwhile, in less-developed countries large portions of the population remain completely 
unbanked, instead relying on cash and informal groups to provide financial services  (Cole, Tufano, 
Schneider, & Collins, 2008).   
                                                                 
1 Even in the Netherlands, which exhibited the greatest ability to cope with financial shocks of any country in their 
data, 27% of individuals were certainly or probably unable to come up with €1,500 in 30 days. 102 
 
Considering  these  facts,  economists  and  policymakers  have  investigated  many  proposals  and 
products aimed at encouraging higher savings rates (see Tufano & Schneider, 2008, for an overview of 
policy proposals).  One such proposal is the usage of prize-linked savings (PLS) products, which provide 
added excitement to savings by giving participants the chance to win prizes by saving money, typically in 
a lottery-like setting.  While PLS programs have existed for hundreds of years and are prevalent around 
the world, they have received relatively little academic attention.  This essay gives a first look at micro-
level data on the usage of PLS accounts, providing evidence on the types of individuals who use PLS and 
how it affects their overall saving behavior using data from a PLS program run by First National Bank, 
the third largest banks in South Africa. 
PLS  accounts  differ  from  standard  savings  accounts  in  that  they  offer  a  stochastic,  heavily-
skewed return as opposed to a risk-free flat interest rate.  In particular, depositors in a PLS account 
periodically are entered into a drawing in which their chance at winning a (potentially large) prize is a 
function of the amount of deposits.  This lottery-like system essentially changes the payoff structure for 
saving, adding an element of risk and, possibly, excitement to holding money in the account.   
On the other hand, PLS differs from regular lottery gambling by protecting all principal invested.  
When a consumer places funds in a PLS account, she has access to those funds either on demand or at a 
future date, and so in this sense she is gambling only with the potential interest payments.  Meanwhile, an 
investment in a lottery ticket can only be regained if the buyer happens to win.  Because of this, nearly all 
lotteries have a negative expected return, while PLS maintains a positive (nominal) expected return.   
Given the widespread demand for lottery gambling, it has been hypothesized that the lottery-like 
incentive structure of PLS could be attractive to large numbers of participants (Kearney, Tufano, Guryan, 
& Hurst, 2010).  Indeed, participation rates in the UK‘s Premium Bond program, a PLS product, are 
estimated to be between 22 and 40 percent of UK citizens (Tufano, 2008).  The uptake of the PLS account 
at First National Bank was similarly robust: within 18 months of the start date of the program there were 
more PLS accounts than regular savings accounts at the bank, and within 3 years PLS deposits amounted 103 
 
to R1.4 billion at the bank, as compared to total savings of R4.5 billion in  the comparable standard 
savings account (Figure 3.1). 
In addition to attracting more deposits, the lottery-like structure of PLS also appeals to a different 
type of saver.  Indeed, understanding how PLS users differ from typical savers can shed light on why 
some individuals struggle to maintain a sufficient level of precautionary savings in standard savings 
vehicles.  Using survey data from individuals that live near First National Bank branches, we find that 
usage of PLS was especially strong in low- and medium-income areas, and in areas where individuals 
reported being more severely financially constrained.  Corroborating this, we also use account-level data 
on employees of First National Bank and find that individuals who were the largest net borrowers from 
the bank were most likely to open a PLS account, while those with moderate savings amounts were least 
likely.  Further, we also find that employees who had no standard deposit accounts previously were 4.9% 
more likely to open a PLS account than those with accounts.  This evidence suggests that PLS could be 
particularly successful in attracting savings from the set of individuals who are more cash constrained or 
are completely unbanked, i.e. those individuals who are least likely to maintain emergency savings. 
There  are  at  least  two  reasons  why  poor  and  financially  constrained  individuals  might  be 
particularly attracted to PLS.  First, it has been hypothesized that lottery gamblers are willing to accept 
the negative expected return because they are ―buying a dream,‖ and they thus gain utility from holding 
the lottery ticket and dreaming of winning the jackpot (Thaler & Ziemba, 1988).  If one supposes that the 
marginal value of a dream is greater for poorer individuals, or for those individuals with larger debts, then 
one would predict that these individuals should be more likely to purchase the dream by investing funds 
in PLS rather than a standard savings account.  We find further support for this theory based on self-
reported  levels  of  optimism  by  individuals  that  live  near  bank  branches.    Our  evidence  shows  that 
branches in areas where a high percentage of individuals report feeling pessimistic and hopeless  had 
especially high uptake of PLS accounts, even after accounting for other socio-economic factors in the 
area.  This suggests that users of PLS are not putting money into their accounts due to over-optimism, but 
rather because the value of the fantasy of winning the prize money is greater for depressed individuals. 104 
 
 
Panel A: Total number of 32-day and MaMa accounts, bank-wide (thousands of accounts) 
 
 
Panel B: Total deposits in 32-day and MaMa accounts, bank-wide (Rand billions) 
 
FIGURE 3.1 - GROWTH OF THE MAMA PROGRAM 
Panel  A  shows  the  total  number  of  standard  32-day  notice  accounts  and  MaMa  prize-linked  accounts  at  First 
National Bank from January 2003 – July 2008, while Panel B shows the total balances held in these accounts (in 
Rand billions).  In both charts, the vertical lines identify the beginning and end of the MaMa program, in January 
2005 and March 2008, respectively. 
 
A second theory of lottery demand is that some consumption is indivisible and therefore an 
individual might need a large prize in order to materially improve his socioeconomic position or make 
some large, needed purchase.  For example, one cannot purchase half of a car or TV.  For an individual 
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amounts of risk-free interest in a standard savings accounts may not be nearly as attractive as the prospect 
of winning a large prize in a PLS.  Our findings are also consistent with this idea.
2 
An important issue in evaluating PLS is whether these types of accounts can actually attract new 
savings or if they just cannibalize regular savings.  Using account -level data, we show that employees 
who open a PLS account tend to increase their net savings at First National Bank by about 1% of their 
income.  Splitting bank employees by their net financial position prior to opening a PLS account, we find 
that both savers and borrowers who use a PLS account increase their total savings at the bank relative to 
those who do not open a PLS account, with net borrowers increasing their savings the most.  Importantly, 
individuals who opened PLS accounts also tended to increase savings in the bank‘s standard savings 
account, suggesting that the funds placed in PLS were not simply shifted from regular savings.  Further, 
we show that demand for the PLS program nationwide was especially strong in periods when the jackpot 
of  the  South  Africa  National  Lottery  was  small,  suggesting  that  PLS  and  lottery  gambling  acted  as 
substitutes.  Taken together, these findings show no evidence that PLS cannibalizes regular savings, and 
instead establish that at least some of the increases in savings comes as result of reduced expenditure on 
lottery gambling. 
A unique feature of PLS is the fact that certain lucky account holders periodically win prizes.  In 
the PLS program run by First National Bank, each month a total of 113 prizes were awarded, including a 
grand prize of R1,000,000 and R500,000 in smaller prizes.  We track the accounts of these randomly 
selected prize-winners and test whether they are more likely to close their accounts after winning, or 
whether winning a prize induces them to invest more in PLS.  Relative to non-winners, winners of small 
R1,000 prizes are 4.2% more likely to close their accounts within one year of winning their prize, while 
winners of larger prizes are no more likely to close their accounts.  Conditional on keeping the PLS 
account open, however, prize winners keep substantially more in their accounts than those who did not 
                                                                 
2 While our data do not allow us to separate these two hypotheses of demand for PLS, it is important to note that 
Blalock, Just, & Simon, (2007) find evidence that the poor view lottery play more as an investment and less as 
entertainment.  If this is the case, PLS should be particularly attractive to those poorer individuals as it provides the 
same skewed returns without the loss of principal. 106 
 
win prizes.  In many cases, prize winners increase their account balances in PLS by more than the amount 
won, indicating that this increased investment in PLS is more than just a wealth effect.  This increased 
savings is persistent for at least year after winning. 
We also find that large prize winners create a ―buzz‖ that generates more demand for PLS in the 
local area.  In particular, bank branches which have a R1,000,000 prize winner experience 11.6% excess 
growth  in  PLS  deposits  in  the  month  after  the  win,  relative  to  all  other  bank  branches.    Thus,  the 
excitement of winning a prize has spillover effects that also serve to increase savings by other individuals. 
This  essay  connects  to  a  broad  literature  that  investigates  financial  innovations  that  help 
individuals  save  more,  such  as  default  options  (Carroll,  Choi,  Laibson,  Madrian,  &  Metrick,  2009), 
commitment  devices  (Ashraf,  Karlan,  &  Yin,  2006;  Thaler  &  Benartzi,  2004),  or  simply  reminding 
individuals to save (Karlan, McConnell, Mullainathan, & Zinman, 2012).  Our essay adds to this research 
by providing a first micro-level look at the usage and consequences of prize-linked savings.  In particular, 
our findings provide insight into a number of questions raised by previous research on PLS.  In their 
overview of PLS, Kearney et al., (2010) state that, ―the key question yet to be answered is whether the 
availability of prize-linked savings would generate new savers and new saving, and if so by whom.‖  Our 
evidence suggests that PLS can indeed attract new savers and new saving, and that, relative to typical 
savings accounts, PLS is particularly attractive to cash constrained and poorer individuals.  This confirms 
anecdotal evidence that PLS is especially successful with low-income depositors (Guillén & Tschoegl, 
2002) and is in line with previous research that has shown that lottery demand is particularly strong for 
disadvantaged members of society (for an overview of this research, see Herring & Bledsoe, 1994).  Our 
findings also build on Atalay, Bakhtiar, Cheung, & Slonim (2012) who use an online experiment to show 
that PLS tends to reduce lottery expenditure while increasing total savings.  Our findings are directly in 
line with this evidence.  This suggests that, while PLS likely has both savings and gambling elements 
(Tufano, 2008), most participants reduce lottery spending rather than regular savings in order to invest in 
PLS.  Finally, our findings are relevant to Lusardi et al. (2011), who find that gamblers are particularly 107 
 
prone to lack precautionary savings.  By combining a gambling element with savings, PLS provides a 
natural way for these individuals become less financially fragile.  
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows.  Section 3.2 gives background information 
on First National Bank‘s PLS product and the data available for analysis.  Section 3.3 provides results on 
the characteristics of PLS participants, while Section 3.4 presents evidence on whether PLS reduces 
deposits in regular savings products or in the amount of lottery gambling.  Section 3.5 then discusses how 
winning a prize affects both the prize winner and others nearby.  Section 3.6 concludes. 
3.2.  Background and Data 
3.2.1.  First National Bank’s Prize-Linked Savings Product 
There are relatively few banks serving South Africa's population of 44.8 million.
3  The South 
African Reserve Bank (2008) lists only 17 total banks functioning in South Africa in 2008, of which the 
four largest (the " big four") account for 91% of total assets.  First National Bank is the retail and 
commercial bank subsidiary of FirstRand Bank Limited, the third largest bank in the country.   
First National Bank introduced a PLS account in January, 2005 in an effort to  expand its deposit 
base among low-income and unbanked individuals (see Cole et al., 2008, who also discuss the informal 
savings programs that exist in South Africa).  First National called its PLS account the "Million-a-Month 
Account," or MaMa, and awarded a grand prize of R1,000,000 to one random account-holder each month.  
In addition to the grand prize, the bank  initially also awarded  two prizes of R100,000, 1 0 prizes of 
R20,000, and 100 prizes of R1,000 each month.  In September, 2007, the bank doubled the number of 
smaller prizes given each month, awarding four R100,00 0 prizes, 20 R20,000 prizes, and 200 R1,000 
prizes.
4  Throughout the program, each account-holder received one entry into the lottery for each R100 
                                                                 
3 South Africa Census, 2001. 
4 For reference, on January 1, 2005, the exchange rate was R6.36 South African Rand to $1 U.S. dollar, and the 
median annual income in 2008 was R45,002. 108 
 
held in his account.
5  MaMa accounts were 32-day notice accounts, meaning that if a customer wished to 
withdraw some of her funds she must notify the bank 32 days in advance of the withdrawal.
6  The most 
comparable account at First National to MaMa was a standard 32-day notice account, which paid interest 
on a variable scale depending on the customer's balance i n the account.  As of November, 2004, for 
balances below R10,000 the 32-day account paid 4% annual interest, for balances between R10,000 and 
R25,000 it paid 4.25% APR, and for balances from R25,000 to R250,000 the APR ranged from 4.5% to 
4.75% (Cole, et al., 2008).
7 
In contrast to the regular 32 -day account, the implied interest rate paid on MaMa balances 
depended completely on the amount of deposits held in the accounts.  As the number of participants 
increased, the expected interest rate decreased because each account-holder then had a lower chance of 
winning  a  prize .    The  new  MaMa  accounts  proved  to  be  quite  popular,  and  deposits  increased 
dramatically in the first months (Figure 3.1).  Indeed, although the total amount held in MaMa accounts 
never approached the aggregate balance of the regular 32 -day accounts, the number of MaMa accounts 
exceeded that of regular 32-day accounts by June 2006, a mere 18 months after the product was launched.  
Because of this growth, the expected interest rate on MaMa accou nts declined rapidly.   When the first 
drawing was held, in March 2005 (three months after the start date of the program),  the expected 
annualized interest rate for holding R100 in a MaMa account was about 12.2% due to the relatively small 
number of accounts.   However,  as the popularity of the program grew the expected return quickly 
dropped  and by  November 2005  the rate was 3. 81%, lower than that offered by the regular 32 -day 
account.  At its lowest, the expected interest rate on MaMa accounts was  1.33%, in August 2007, just 
before the number of prizes was doubled.
8   
                                                                 
5 Initially, the accounts paid no interest at all, but at a later date the bank began paying a 0.25% interest rate on 
deposits in addition to the random prizes. 
6 32-day notice accounts are common in South Africa and are offered by all of the major banks there. 
7 The inflation rate in South Africa in November 2004 was 3.3%, implying that the real interest rates for the various 
balance levels were 0.7%, 0.95%, and 1.2% - 1.45%. 
8 The average inflation rate in South Africa during the sample period was 5.4%, meaning that in expected terms 
MaMa participants were earning negative real returns. 109 
 
The MaMa program only lasted until March 2008, when it was deemed a violation of the Lottery 
Act of 1997 by the Supreme Court of Appeals (FirstRand Bank v. National Lotteries Board, 2008).  In 
South  Africa,  as  in  the  U.S.,  the  government  holds  a  monopoly  on  lotteries  that  are  run  for  profit.  
Although  First  National  argued  that  its  program  wasn't  technically  a  lottery,  since  all  principal  was 
preserved, it failed to convince the courts and was forced to end the program.  At the end of March, all 
MaMa  accounts  were  converted  to  regular  32-day  accounts,  and  account  holders  were  allowed  to 
withdraw their deposits if they chose to do so.  The data provided by First National ends in July 2008, 
four months after the program ended.  During that time period, aggregate MaMa balances fell 16.2% in 
April 2008, and an additional 11.8% in May.  However, balances held steady in June and July, at which 
point our data end.  Thus, while some participants in the program did withdraw their funds, over 77% of 
all PLS deposits remained in the bank for at least four months after the accounts converted to standard 
savings products. 
3.2.2.  Data 
Most of the data for this chapter comes directly from First National Bank, who provided us with 
three main datasets: branch-level data for all bank branches, account-level data for all bank employees, 
and account-level data for all prize winners.  In addition, we use data from the 2005 FinScope financial 
survey of South Africa, provided by FinMark Trust.  Details of each dataset are described below. 
3.2.2.1.  First National Bank Data 
First National provided both branch-level and account-level data for this chapter.  At the branch 
level, we have monthly observations for each of 661 bank branches from January 2003 through July 2008.  
For each month, we observe the total number of accounts and total Rand balance held at the branch in 
both standard 32-day accounts and MaMa accounts.  Table 3.1 provides summary statistics of the total 
number of accounts and total deposits at each branch as of March 2008, when the MaMa program ended. 
In  addition  to  branch-level  time  series  data,  we  also  observe  branch-level  demographic 
characteristics of depositors in both 32-day and MaMa products for one snapshot taken in June 2008, 3 
months after the MaMa program ended.  This allows us to compare the characteristics of MaMa  110 
 
TABLE 3.1 
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF FIRST NATIONAL BANK DATA 
This  table  reports  summary  statistics  for  data  obtained  from  First  National  Bank.    Panel  A  presents  summary 
statistics on the total number of accounts and total deposits in standard 32-day and MaMa accounts at 604 bank 
branches as of March 2008, when the MaMa program ended.  Panel B compares the share of balances owned by 
race  and  gender  for  32-day  and  MaMa  accounts.    Panel  C  contains  account-level  summary  statistics  for  bank 
employees. 
 
Panel A: Branch-level summary statistics as of March 2008 




percentile  Median 
90th 
percentile 
Total No. of Accounts 
32-day   604  1,097   1,064  148   826  2,273 
MaMa  604  1,863  2,505  211  1,408  3,797 
Total balance (Rand millions) 
32-day  604  R 7.81  R 8.08  R 0.89  R 5.29  R 18.00 
MaMa  604  R 2.35  R 3.25  R 0.23  R 1.70  R 5.00 
 
 
Panel B: Share of balances owned by race and gender 
   MaMa  32-day 
Race: 
       Black  0.45  0.45 
   White  0.37  0.41 
   Asian  0.09  0.07 
   Mixed race  0.08  0.07 
   
  
Males  0.52  0.46 
 
 
Panel C: Account-level summary statistics of bank employees as of March 2008 















Total balance:                 
   32-day saving  38,301  872.11  9,989  0  0  322  9.9%  15.4% 
   Money market  38,301  3,285.32  31,091  0  0  841  --  22.9% 
   Cheque  38,301  206.12  17,507  -5,833  0  2,703  39.0%  62.6% 
   MaMa  38,301  566.81  5,510  0  0  723  5.5%  45.5% 
   Combined  38,301  4,930.35  39,921  -5,065  0  10,043  41.4%  77.9% 
Income Estimate  38,301  175,920  203,408  60,000  112,297  360,000  --  -- 
Combined bal. (% income)  38,301  0.035  0.67  -0.04  0  0.07  --  -- 
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participants to those of typical savers, which we do in Table 3.1.  Separating by race, MaMa depositors 
are less likely to be white, and more likely to be Asian or of mixed race.
9  Looking at gender, men 
account for a total of 52% of MaMa deposits, as compared to only 46% o f regular 32-day deposits, 
suggesting that the lottery payoff structure might be more attractive to men than women, perhaps due to 
lower risk aversion  (Eckel & Grossman, 2008)   or overconfidence  (Barber & Odean, 2001) .  MaMa 
participants also tended to be younger than standard 32-day account holders (Figure 3.2, Panel A).  This is 
important, as younger individuals also tend to be those who maintain less precautionary savings  (Lusardi 
et al., 2011).
10  
The income profile of MaMa savers appears to be quite similar to that of regular savers (Figure 
3.2, Panel B).  In fact, those in the lowest income bracket account for  a slightly larger share of total 32-
day balances (45%) than of MaMa balances (42%).  While some of the evidence in Section 3.3 suggests 
that the MaMa product had more demand in lower-income areas, it should be kept in mind that overall it 
does not appear that MaMa savings came disproportionately from low-income households. 
In addition to the relatively coars e branch-level data, we also analyze  account-level data for 
employees of First National Bank .  This  dataset contains  month-by-month information on account 
balances of 38,256 employees of First National Bank  for the time period from January 2005  - March 
2008.  For each employee, we observe the month -end balance of their 32-day savings, cheque, money 
market
11, and MaMa accounts.  In addition, we also have a snapshot of the employee's race, gender, age, 
income estimate
12, and the region of South Africa in which they work.   Summary statistics of employee 
account balances are provided in Table 3.1, Panel C. 
 
 
                                                                 
9 Black persons are those of native African descent.  Asian persons include those of Indian descent. 
10 In addition, if PLS products can be used to develop a habit of saving earlier in life, the long-term benefits could be 
multiplied through compound interest. 
11 The money market account was a special account available only to staff of the bank that was launched in July 
2007, towards the end of the sample period. 
12 Income data was not directly available from First National and was instead estimated by the bank according to an 
internal model. 112 
 
Panel A: Share of deposits held, by age bracket 
 
 
Panel B: Share of deposits held, by income bracket 
 
FIGURE 3.2 - SHARE OF DEPOSITS HELD IN STANDARD SAVINGS AND PLS, BY AGE AND INCOME 
Panel A of this figure displays share of total deposits held by individuals in different age brackets for both standard 
32-day and MaMa accounts.  Panel B shows the share of total balances held by individuals across income brackets.  
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Of the 38,256 employees, 12,237 were terminated as of December 2008, when the data was 
gathered.  In all regressions, we include an ex-staff dummy to control for these individuals, but our results 
are unchanged if these individuals are removed completely. 
      There are both advantages and disadvantages to working with staff data.  It is most likely true that 
the  majority  of  First  National  employees  do  most  or  all  of  their  banking  at  First  National  due  to 
familiarity with the products, the ease of banking where you work, and possible pressure from managers 
to use the products.  Thus, by focusing on staff data, we can observe a more comprehensive view of 
MaMa participants' saving and borrowing behavior after opening a MaMa account.  However, to the 
extent that the staff of the bank is not a representative sample of the South African population, it is 
possible that our results are not externally valid.  For example, only 41% of bank employees are black as 
compared to 73% in the population at large.  Of more particular concern is the fact that bank employees 
are likely better educated and earn more than the population in general.   The average First National 
employee  earns  R175,963  per  year,  while  in  2006  average  household  income  in  South  Africa  was 
estimated to be R74,589 (Statistics South Africa, 2008).  Finally, just over 20% of the staff in our sample 
have no cheque, money market, 32-day, or PLS account.  Nationwide, about 47% of individuals were 
completely unbanked in South Africa in 2005.  To the extent possible, we control for staff characteristics 
in our analysis, but we do note that there are large differences between the staff sample and the general 
population.  
    An important aspect of the staff data is that it contains information on cheque account balances, 
which are often negative.  The reason for this is that it is easier for staff to obtain permanent overdraft 
facilities through their cheque accounts than to obtain a credit card or personal loan from the bank.  Thus, 
these negative balances can be interpreted as unsecured consumer credit obtained from the bank.  Table 
3.1 shows that a significant number of bank staff have negative balances in their cheque accounts.  Net of 
these negative balances, the average employee had about R4,930 in savings across all accounts at the 
bank in March 2008, or about 3.5% of their annual income.  A total of 29% of employees are net 
borrowers from the bank, while just over 22% have no active accounts at the bank at all.  Further, there 114 
 
are a few employees with extremely large amounts held in their accounts, or extremely high levels of 
borrowing.  In all of our analysis using the staff dataset, we winsorize account balances at the 1% and 
99% levels to prevent undue influence of these outliers. 
Finally, we also have account-level information on prize winners.  In the winners dataset we have 
month-by-month information on MaMa account balances and demographic information only; account 
balances in other products was not provided.  In total there were 4,965 prizes given out to 4,341 account 
holders (some account holders won more than once) between March 2005, when the first drawing was 
held, and March 2008, when the program closed.  By merging the winners data to the branch time series 
data, we can verify that the awarding of prizes was indeed random by comparing the total actual prizes 
awarded by branch to the expected prizes (calculated based on the total value of MaMa accounts held at 
the  branch  compared  to  bank-wide  MaMa  account  holdings).    Figure  3.3  shows  that  the  actual  and 
expected prizes match up very closely. 
 
 
FIGURE 3.3 - EXPECTED VS. ACTUAL NUMBER OF PRIZES AWARDED PER BRANCH  
This figure compares the actual number of prizes awarded to account holders at a particular branch to the expected 
number of prizes.  The expected number of prizes is calculated as the share of total MaMa deposits held at the 
branch in a given month multiplied by the total number of prizes awarded in that month.  The total number of actual 
and expected prizes is then summed across the 36 months of the MaMa program for each branch to get total actual 
and expected prizes.  If all branches had drawn exactly their expected number of prizes, points would line up exactly 
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3.2.2.2.  FinScope Data 
We augment the data obtained from First National Bank with geographic, demographic, and 
socioeconomic  data  collected  in  the  2005  FinScope  Survey.    FinScope  surveys  are  nationally 
representative surveys carried out annually by FinMark Trust, and are designed to measure the use of 
financial  products  by  consumers  in  South  Africa.    The  2005  survey  contains  responses  from  3,885 
individuals, and has in-depth information on each respondent‘s financial sophistication, use of financial 
products,  attitudes  towards  financial  service  providers,  income  and  employment  status,  demographic 
information, and indicators of their general well-being. 
We relate these characteristics to MaMa demand at individual First National Bank branches by 
taking average responses of individuals who live near each branch.  Specifically, we use the latitude and 
longitude of each bank branch and the latitude and longitude of the center of the city or town of each 
FinScope respondent to measure the distance between the two locations using the Haversine formula.  For 
each branch, we average the values for all respondents within a 50km (31.1 miles) radius of the branch, 
thereby giving the general characteristics of individuals who are likely to use that particular bank branch. 
Table 3.2 provides summary statistics of the collapsed survey data at the branch level.  For 62 of 
the bank branches there were no survey responses with 50 km, so the number of observations drops to a 
total of 542 branches.
13  Of particular note is the high share of individuals with no ba nk accounts at all 
(49%) as well as very elevated unemployment rates (25%).   
In the analysis in Section 3.3, we will correlate FinScope‘s Financial Segmentation Model (FSM) 
with demand for MaMa.  The FSM places individuals in one of eight tiers based on answers to a set of 
questions in the survey.  The model is made up of five components, each of which is meant to capture a 
specific aspect of each individual‘s access and use of financial services, along with how people manage 
their money and what drives their financial behavior: 
                                                                 
13 Results are similar if  we  use a radius of 30km (18.6 miles) or if  we limit to branches that  had at least 15 
respondents within a 50km radius.  Sample size is reduced to 492 branches in the first case, and 463 branches in the 
second, so statistical significance is reduced somewhat for some estimates in these robustness checks, but estimated 
signs and magnitudes are similar. 116 
 
  Financial penetration: take-up of available financial products 
  Financial access: physical access to financial services 
  Financial discipline 
  Financial knowledge 
  Connectedness  and  optimism:  individual‘s  overall  feeling  of  fulfillment,  of  being 
connected to their community, and of having hope of achieving their lifetime goals
14 
The respondent‘s combined score across these five categories is used to segment the population in eight 
tiers, with higher tiers signifying individuals who have more uptake and access to financial products, 
more financial discipline and knowledge, and feel more connected and optimistic. 
  In addition to FinScope‘s FSM tiers, we also construct our own indices of characteristics that 
might affect demand for PLS.  These indices are based directly on questions that ask about individual‘s 
attitudes  towards  risk,  their  financial  knowledge,  and  how  financially  constrained  the  individual  is.  
Detailed information on how these indices were created is provided in Section 3.3, where we use them to 
analyze demand for the MaMa product. 
3.3.  Uptake of MaMa 
The widespread growth of MaMa was remarkable.  By June 2008, the number of MaMa accounts 
at First National Bank exceeded the number of 32-day savings accounts at First National for every age, 
gender, income, and race subgroup.
15  Among employees of  the bank, just 27% used a regular 32-day 
savings account (defined as having had a positive balance for at least one month) during January 2005  - 
March 2008, while 63% opened a MaMa account during the sample period.  Why was MaMa so popular?  
In this section we analyze the characteristics that are associated with opening a PLS account using both 
FinScope survey data as well as account -level data of First National employees.  Knowledge of what 
drives demand for PLS can help academics and policymakers alike understand how consumers think 
about savings and gambling, as well as assess the potential for PLS to encourage precautionary savings. 
 
 
                                                                 
14 For more information on the FSM and how it is calculated, see the FinScope 2005  brochure at 
http://www.finscope.co.za/documents/2005/SA05_brochure.pdf. 
15 However, average account balances were much lower in MaMa accounts than regular 32-day savings. 117 
 
TABLE 3.2 
FINSCOPE SUMMARY STATISTICS 
This table reports summary statistics of demographic characteristics derived from the FinScope 2005 survey.  Each 
item represents the mean or median of all survey respondents within 50km of each bank branch.  This table reports 
summary statistics across the distribution of the 542 branches which had any respondents within the 50km radius.  
Financial segmentation model (FSM) tier and FSM components are calculated by FinScope based on responses to a 
battery of questions.  Each respondent is segmented for each component separately on a scale from 1 to 8, and then 
the overall tier is a combination of those components (and also ranges from 1 to 8).  For all components a higher tier 
signifies  more,  e.g.  higher  financial  penetration  score  signifies  that  an  individual  has  adopted  more  financial 
products.  The constructed indices are also derived from FinScope survey questions but are constructed by the 








%tile  Median 
90th 
%tile 
Demographics   
          Race:   
             Black  542  68.72%  26.30%  33.72%  72.26%  100.00% 
   White  542  15.25%  13.59%  0.00%  16.24%  25.60% 
   Asian  542  3.10%  7.13%  0.00%  1.01%  8.21% 
   Mixed race  542  12.93%  22.48%  0.00%  4.15%  40.69% 
 
 
          % Male  542  48.74%  3.29%  47.20%  48.83%  50.51% 
% Married  542  42.47%  12.59%  29.19%  45.33%  50.88% 
Median Age  542  33.76  5.60  27  32  37 
Median Household Income  542  29,983  18,313  15,000  27,000  42,000 
% Rural  542  30.75%  33.78%  0.75%  14.39%  90.52% 
% with at least High School 
Education 
 
542  39.73%  15.86%  16.65%  39.91%  55.84% 
% unemployed  542  25.28%  10.58%  16.41%  22.96%  38.92% 
Homeownership rate  542  74.36%  14.86%  64.84%  73.31%  93.40% 
 
 
          Financial Indicators   
          % Banked  542  50.91%  17.04%  28.05%  54.70%  67.63% 
FSM Tier  542  3.45  0.76  2.41  3.54  4.15 
FSM Components:   
             Financial Penetration  542  2.28  0.56  1.61  2.35  2.96 
   Financial Access  542  3.85  0.99  2.51  3.99  4.73 
   Financial Discipline  542  4.94  0.42  4.45  4.99  5.27 
   Financial Knowledge  542  3.47  0.60  2.63  3.53  4.08 
   Connectedness and Optimism  542  6.68  0.32  6.29  6.75  6.98 
Constructed indices:   
             Risk index  542  0.95  0.21  0.65  0.97  1.16 
   Financial knowledge index  542  0.56  0.61  -0.25  0.76  1.07 
   Financial constraint index  542  1.43  0.31  1.11  1.43  1.82 
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3.3.1.  Geographic characteristics and MaMa demand 
Because of its lottery-like payoff, it has been hypothesized that PLS might be attractive to low-
wealth individuals, those with less education, or perhaps to particular racial groups, since it is known that 
individuals  with  these  characteristics  typically  spend  a  larger  percentage  of  their  income  on  lottery 
gambling (Kearney et al., 2010).  We test these intuitions by correlating uptake of the MaMa product at 
each bank branch to demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of individuals who live within 50 km 
of  the  branch,  using  responses  to  the  2005  FinScope  survey.    Panel  A  of  Table  3.3  presents  OLS 
regressions which relate overall MaMa uptake at a particular branch with demographic characteristics of 
individuals who live near the branch.  In these regressions, the dependent variable is either the total 
balance held in MaMa accounts at the branch or the total number of MaMa accounts as of March 2008.  
To determine whether demand for MaMa products differs from the demand for regular 32-day savings, 
we control for the total balance held in 32-day savings accounts as well as the square of this number at 
each branch, or the total number of accounts and its square in the second column.
16  We also control for 
whether the branch is located in a rural area to account for branch size differences. 
Confirming the intuition that large prizes are most attractive for low-income households, we find 
a negative relationship between median income and MaMa demand .  We estimate that a one standard 
deviation decrease in median income (a reduction of R 18,313 per year) would increase total balanc es 
held in MaMa accounts by R 184,658 at a branch, or a 7.6% increase from the mean balance held at each 
branch.   While this finding is in line with intuition of demand for lottery products by low -wealth 
individuals, it is not entirely consistent with the  results presented in Panel B of Figure 3.2, which shows 
that MaMa balances did not come disproportionately from lower -income households.  We return to this 
issue with more evidence below in Section 3.3.2.   
   
                                                                 
16 Similar results are found if the dependent variable is defined as the ratio of MaMa balances to savings balances 
instead of including the total savings balance as a right-hand side variable. 119 
 
TABLE 3.3 
FINSCOPE CHARACTERISTICS AND MAMA DEMAND 
This table presents results of OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the total usage of MaMa in March 
2008 (at the close of the program) for each bank branch.  Panel A shows the relationship between demographic 
characteristics and MaMa usage, as measured both by total MaMa deposits (in Rand thousands) and the number of 
MaMa accounts.  Panel B adds financial characteristics to these demographic controls to test  whether banking 
attitudes have an additional impact on MaMa usage.  To be concise we present only results relating to total MaMa 
deposits in Panel B, but similar results are found using number of MaMa accounts.  Independent variables come 
from the FinScope 2005 survey, and are averages (or medians, if specified) of the variables for all respondents 
withing a 50km radius of the bank branch.  FSM Tier is a classification created by FinScope which categorizes 
respondents by various financial segments, and is based on 5 separate components which are identified separately in 
Panel B.  In Panel B we also create our own indices based on responses to the FinScope survey which focus on three 
possible drivers of MaMa usage: high risk tolerance, a lack of financial knowledge, or the presence of financial 
constraints.  See text for a complete explanation of how the FSM tiers and our constructed indices were created.  In 
all regressions we control for the size of the branch by including the total amount of regular 32-day deposits and the 
square of this value as independent variables.  Standard errors are clustered by 54 district municipalities, and are 
reported in parentheses.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 




No. of MaMa 
accts. 
Race (% mixed race omitted): 
       % Black  -270.150  -363.552 
 
(390.410)  (307.986) 
   % White  493.976  36.268 
 
(646.400)  (518.915) 
   % Asian  1,757.335  3,410.286** 
 
(1,640.562)  (1,501.422) 
% Male  -246.534  462.912 
 
(1,146.687)  (1,185.337) 
% Married  -675.170  -758.057 
 
(592.684)  (628.073) 
Median Age  -23.171**  -6.742 
 
(11.200)  (9.983) 
Median Household Income  -0.121***  -0.069** 
 
(0.039)  (0.034) 
% with at least High School education  553.235  -335.191 
 
(568.926)  (520.268) 
Unemployment rate  -674.844  -114.702 
 
(654.885)  (721.396) 
Homeownership rate  -736.703  -546.040 
 
(449.187)  (358.113) 
Rural Area  -1,035.365***  -706.019** 
 
(268.962)  (284.348) 
      Observations  542  542 
R-squared  0.690  0.590 120 
 
 
TABLE 3.3 - continued 
 
 
Panel B: Financial characteristics 
 
Dependent variable:  MaMa deposits(Rand thousands) 
% banked  305.404 
     
 
(466.952) 
      FSM Tier 
 
-30.997 
   
   
(178.091) 
    FSM Components: 
           Financial Penetration 
   
-138.219 
 
     
(342.816) 
     Financial Access 
   
49.160 
 
     
(137.817) 
     Financial Discipline 
   
40.116 
 
     
(162.557) 
     Financial Knowledge 
   
152.047 
 
     
(217.671) 
 
Connectedness and       
Optimism     
-530.134*** 
 
   
(176.995) 
 
Constructed indices:         
Risk Index 
     
640.898** 
       
(282.530) 
Financial Knowledge Index 
     
-115.163 
       
(153.215) 
Financial Constraint Index 
     
401.560*** 
       
(142.612) 
Demographic controls  Y  Y  Y  Y 
          Observations  542  542  542  542 
R-squared  0.690  0.690  0.695  0.695 
 
In addition to the relationship between income and MaMa demand, we also find that areas with 
younger individuals tend to have higher MaMa demand.  In particular, reducing the median age by one  
standard deviation (5.6 years) is associated with an increase of R 129,644 in MaMa deposits, a 5.3% 
increase from the mean.   Contrary to expectations, we find little to no relationship between race or 
education and MaMa demand.  However, when we measure MaMa demand by the number of accounts 121 
 
rather  than  total  account  balances  (Panel  B  of  Table  3.3),  we  do  find  that  areas  with  higher  Asian 
populations tend to have higher usage of MaMa. 
Panel B of Table 3.3 tests whether additional financial characteristics are associated with MaMa 
demand.  To be concise, here we only present results where the dependent variable is the total amount of 
MaMa deposits, but results are similar if the number of MaMa accounts is used instead.  In this panel, we 
fail to find evidence that uptake of MaMa was higher in areas with more unbanked individuals.  In the 
next two columns, we use FinScope‘s Financial Segmentation Model as an independent variable and test 
its association with PLS demand.  The FSM categorizes individuals according to their financial access, 
knowledge,  discipline,  and  usage  of  financial  products,  as  well  as  their  overall  optimism  and 
connectedness.  When we simply include the average overall FSM tier for the area we again fail to find a 
strong  relationship  between  FSM  and  MaMa  demand.    However,  when  we  split  the  FSM  by  its 
components,  we  find  that  the  only  strong  predictor  of  MaMa  usage  is  low  levels  of  optimism  and 
connectedness. 
The optimism and connectedness FSM score is derived from a set of survey questions that are 
designed to measure an individual‘s satisfaction with their life, how hopeful they are of reaching their life 
dreams, and how connected they feel to others around them.
17  In some ways, it is unsurprising that this is 
the only FSM component that shows a significant relationship to MaMa usage, as all of the other 
components  are  likely  highly  correlated  with  the  demographic  controls  already  included   in  the 
regressions.  However, it is striking that it is areas in which individuals feel  least hopeful that we see the 
highest usage of the MaMa product.  This suggests that demand for PLS is likely not driven by over-
optimism or overweighting of low probabilities, but rather by depressed or pessimistic individuals who 
are ―buying a dream‖ by depositing some funds in the MaMa account.  This finding is also related to 
recent evidence from the Consumer Federation of America & The Financial Planning Association (2006), 
which found that 21% of Americans, and 38% of those with incomes below $25,000, think that winning 
                                                                 
17 For example, respondents are asked whether they agree with statements such as, ―I have many dreams in life but 
will never achieve them,‖ ―My life has meaning and purpose,‖ ―I feel lonely,‖ and ―In many ways, my life is ideal.‖  122 
 
the lottery represents the most practical way for them to accumulate several hundred thousand dollars.  
Individuals who feel that their dreams are extremely difficult to reach may very well feel like the only 
way possible for them to even have a chance at reaching those goals is by winning a large prize.  PLS 
differs from standard savings accounts by providing just such a skewed incentive structure. 
In the final column of Panel B, we construct three indices to directly test three theories of lottery 
demand.  Each index is constructed by adding up the share of individuals who live near a branch that fit 
into particular categories.  First, we create a measure of the attitudes toward risk of individuals near each 
bank branch by adding the share of respondents who: 
  Agreed with the statement, ―To get ahead in life, one needs to take some risks‖ 
  Felt that there were no factors (e.g. flood, theft, or death) that could impact their finances 
  Had money invested in the stock market 
  Had money invested in an entrepreneurial venture
18 
A higher risk index score is designed to indicate areas where individuals are more willing to take on risks, 
or do not perceive as many risks.  Since the random payoff of PLS is substantially more risky than that of 
a standard savings account, one would expect that more risk-tolerant individuals would be more attracted 
to PLS.  Second, we create a financial knowledge index by adding up the share of respondents who: 
  Have any kind of savings account 
  Report having ―a good idea of the interest rate they get on the money they save‖ 
  Feel they ―know quite a bit about money and finance‖ 
  Use a budget 
From this amount, we subtract the share of respondents who: 
  Report that they ―don‘t understand how banks work‖ 
  Would like education on how interest rates work 
  Would like education on how to save more money 
  Feel out of control of their finances 
                                                                 
18 For example, if within a 50km radius of a bank branch 60.5% of individuals agree that to get ahead in life you 
need to take risks, 28.8% do not perceive any factors that could impact their finances, 1.6% invest in the stock 
market and 2.1% invest in entrepreneurship, the total risk index for that branch would equal 0.605 + 0.288 + 0.016 + 
0.021 = 0.930. 123 
 
This index is designed to capture the amount of general financial knowledge that individuals feel they 
have in the area.  Finally, we construct a financial constraint index by adding up the share of respondents 
who: 
  Report being unbanked because they either have no income or no money 
  Report having a hard time keeping up with their debts 
  Have borrowed money to buy food in the past 
  Report that they have often or sometimes go without food in the past 12 months 
To this amount we also add the average share of income that is spent on necessities for respondents near 
the bank. 
  These three indices are designed to test whether PLS demand is correlated with three factors that 
could drive demand for PLS.  Namely, one would predict that individuals who have higher risk tolerance 
would be relatively more attracted to PLS than risk-free savings accounts.  Second, we hypothesize that 
individuals with less financial knowledge might be more attracted to PLS since the chance at winning a 
large prize is easier to comprehend than compound interest (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2007; Stango & Zinman, 
2009).  Lastly, we predict that individuals that report tighter cash constraints will have higher demand for 
PLS, since PLS represents a chance to dramatically change their lives while only needing to deposit a 
small amount of their scarce resources.  This theory has been proposed as an explanation of lottery play 
by poorer individuals (Ng, 1975) and has also been suggested as a possible driver of demand for PLS over 
standard savings products (Kearney et al., 2010).   
The final column of Table 3.3 shows regressions in which all three of these indices are included.  
The sign of the estimated coefficients is in the predicted direction for all three factors, but we only find 
statistical significance for the risk index and the financial constraint index.  From these regressions, we 
estimate  that  increasing  the  risk  index  by  one  standard  deviation  is  associated  with  an  increase  of 
R134,588  in  MaMa  deposits  per  branch,  or  an  increase  of  5.5%  from  the  mean  of  R2.43  million.  
Meanwhile,  a  one standard  deviation  increase  in  the  financial  constraint  index  is  associated  with an 
increase of R 84,328 in total MaMa deposits, a 3.5% increase from the mean. 
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TABLE 3.4 
UPTAKE OF MAMA AMONG BANK STAFF 
This table presents estimates from OLS regressions run on the First National Bank staff dataset.  In each regression, 
the dependent variable equals one if the employee has a positive balance in a particular saving product at any time 
during the sample period (Jan. 2005 - Mar. 2008).  In Panel A we correlate demographic characteristics with the 
propensity to have either a standard 32-day savings account, a money market or standard 32-day account, or a 
MaMa account.  Ex-staff indicate employees whose employment terminated at some point during the sample period. 
In Panel B we test whether previous banking behavior is correlated with the propensity to open a MaMa account, 
after controlling for all demographic characteristics contained in Panel A. High and low savings before MaMa are 
dummy variables indicating employees with above- and below-median savings, respectively, as a percent of income 
prior to opening a MaMa account.  High and low borrowing before MaMa are defined similarly for net borrowers 
(and thus those with no accounts are the omitted group).  All regressions contain 34 bank region fixed effects 
(regions  are  defined  internally  by  First  National  Bank).    Robust  standard  errors  (reported  in  parentheses)  are 
clustered at the region level.  ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 











Age (<30 omitted): 
         30-39  -0.074***  -0.093***  0.056*** 
 
(0.005)  (0.005)  (0.011) 
   40+  -0.096***  -0.104***  0.146*** 
 
(0.009)  (0.007)  (0.017) 
Income decile (1
st omitted):       
2
nd  0.058***  0.095***  0.105*** 
 
(0.011)  (0.010)  (0.013) 
3
rd  0.087***  0.141***  0.153*** 
 
(0.013)  (0.013)  (0.016) 
4
th   0.106***  0.148***  0.190*** 
 
(0.015)  (0.011)  (0.010) 
5
th  0.107***  0.143***  0.203*** 
 
(0.015)  (0.014)  (0.012) 
6
th  0.082***  0.129***  0.182*** 
 
(0.009)  (0.011)  (0.013) 
7
th  0.083***  0.141***  0.178*** 
 
(0.018)  (0.015)  (0.012) 
8
th  0.058***  0.126***  0.174*** 
 
(0.010)  (0.012)  (0.012) 
9
th  0.046***  0.099***  0.168*** 
 
(0.016)  (0.017)  (0.014) 
10
th  0.018  0.064***  0.145*** 
 
(0.015)  (0.017)  (0.019) 
Male  -0.061***  -0.088***  -0.042*** 
 




TABLE 3.4 – continued 
Race (mixed race omitted): 
         Black  0.093***  0.074***  -0.044*** 
 
(0.011)  (0.014)  (0.011) 
   White  0.003  0.022**  -0.042*** 
 
(0.007)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
   Asian  -0.012**  -0.004  -0.044*** 
 
(0.006)  (0.009)  (0.006) 
Ex-staff  -0.018**  -0.145***  -0.104*** 
 
(0.007)  (0.019)  (0.009) 
        Region Fixed Effects  Y  Y  Y 
        Observations  38,262  38,262  38,262 
R-squared  0.036  0.055  0.046 
 
 
Panel B: Previous banking behavior 
 
Dependent Variable:  Opened a MaMa Account 
No saving or cheque acct. before opening MaMa  0.046** 
   
 
(0.022) 




   
(0.008) 




   
(0.021) 
  High savings before MaMa 
   
-0.012 
     
(0.025) 
Low savings before MaMa 
   
-0.124*** 
     
(0.026) 
Low borrowing before MaMa 
   
-0.051*** 
     
(0.017) 
High borrowing before MaMa 
   
0.054*** 
     
(0.019) 
        Demographic controls  Y  Y  Y 
Region Fixed Effects  Y  Y  Y 
        Observations  38,262  38,262  38,262 




3.3.2.  MaMa demand among bank employees 
While  the  FinScope  survey  data  provides  a  representative  sample  of  households  near  bank 
branches, the resulting averages are necessarily blunt measures of general geographic characteristics.  In 
this section we use account-level data on employees of First National Bank employees to associate MaMa 
demand  with  individual characteristics.   Table  3.4 presents  results from  linear  probability  models  in 
which we estimate the relationship between income, age, gender, race, and past saving behavior with the 
propensity to open a MaMa account for 38,262 employees of the bank.
19  In all models we include 34 
region fixed effects to account for geographic differences in MaMa uptake.
20 
    Panel A of Table 3.4 compares demand for standard savings products and demand for MaMa 
across different demographic characteristics.   The dependent variable in the first column is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the employee had a positive balance in a  standard 32-day savings account at any 
time between January 2005 and March 2008, when the MaMa product was available.  The second column 
is similar except it equals one if there was a positive balance in either a standard 32-day savings account 
or a special employee -only money market account that the bank made available  in July 2007.  The 
estimates in these first two columns can then be directly compared to the coefficient reported in the third 
column, in which the dependent variable equals one if the employee at any time had a positive balance in 
a MaMa account. 
Given previous literature suggesting that PLS could be particularly attractive for low -income 
individuals, results on the relationship between income and the propensity to save in a MaMa account are 
of particular interest.  In the regression results in Table 3.4, we estimate the relationship between income 
and MaMa uptake non-parametrically using income deciles.  By comparing coefficient estimates across 
deciles, it is apparent that demand for both regular savings and PLS is hump-shaped in income, such that 
the lowest and highest deciles are least likely to have an account.  This pattern can be more easily seen in 
                                                                 
19 Tables 3.4, 3.5, and 3.7 present linear probability models estimated by OLS, but essentially identical results are 
found if the models are estimated using probit or logit models. 
20 The data obtained from First National contained a region field that identified the region of South Africa in which 
the employee worked.  We use these identifiers as fixed effects in the models in Tables 3.4, 3.5, and 3.7. 127 
 
Figure 3.4, where we divide all employees of the bank by income decile, and plot the share of employees 
that had a standard savings product and the share that had a MaMa account at any point during the sample 
period for each decile.  Although the results in Figure 3.4 are unconditional probabilities of having an 
account, they lead to the same conclusions as the coefficient estimates in Table 3.4.  While the propensity 
to have an account is hump-shaped in income for both regular savings and PLS account, MaMa usage 
appears to be somewhat less sensitive to income than regular savings.  Further, while the lowest-income 
employees were the least likely to use MaMa, a substantially higher portion had MaMa accounts (46%) 
than had standard savings products (31%).  The share with MaMa accounts exceeds the share with regular 
savings across all income deciles. 
 
 
FIGURE 3.4 - SHARE OF EMPLOYEES WITH STANDARD SAVINGS OR PLS ACCOUNTS, BY INCOME 
This figure plots the share of bank employees that have a standard savings account or MaMa account across ten 
income deciles.  Employees are classified has having a standard savings account if they have either a regular 32-day 
notice account or a money market account.  Income deciles divide the 38,262 employees into ten groups of 3,826 
employees each based on estimated income.   
When evaluating the relationship between income and demand for MaMa, it is important to keep 
in mind that the majority of bank employees earn substantially more than the median income in South 
Africa.  Because of this, the 1
st income decile of our sample includes salaries up to R60,000 per year, 
while the average household income in South Africa in 2006 was about R74,600 per year.  However, even 
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R38,000 per year opened a MaMa account, while only 19% had a 32-day or money market account.  
Taken together with the findings in Section 3.3.1 above, it does appear that low income individuals are 
more likely to use a PLS account than a standard savings account, but demand for PLS follows a similar 
pattern across income groups. 
One  striking  difference  between usage  of  standard  savings  products  and  MaMa  is  that  older 
employees are less likely to have a savings account but are more likely to open a MaMa account.
21  
Relative to employees under the age of 30, employees in their 30s are about 9.3% less likely to have a 32-
day savings or money market account, but 5.6% more likely to open a MaMa account.  The differences 
are even larger for employees aged 40 and over.  This runs contra to Figure 3.2, which shows that MaMa 
deposits came disproportionately from younger savers, and the findings in Table 3.3, in which we see that 
branches located in relatively younger areas had stronger MaMa demand.   It is also in opposition to 
survey data collected in  Tufano, Maynard, & Neve   (2008) in which older respon dents (in the U.S.) 
indicated substantially less interest in PLS products than younger individuals.  However, it is consistent 
with Herring & Bledsoe (1994), who find that the aged are more likely to play the lottery.  It is, of course, 
possible that these older individuals are putting their savings in an alternative account (perhaps to save for 
retirement) and that this is the reason why they are less likely to have a regular savings account, but  this 
does not explain why they would be relatively more attracted to the PLS product .  Another possibility is 
that older employees, who likely had a longer tenure at the bank, felt pressured to open MaMa accounts 
when the program was first starting. 
With regards to gender, we find that males are 8.8% less likely to have a standard savings account 
but only 4.2% less likely to have a MaMa account.   Thus, relative to standard savings, MaMa appears 
more attractive to men in particular, which is in line with Donkers, Melenberg, & Soest, (2001) who find 
that males are more risk tolerant than females.  We also find substantial differences in MaMa demand 
across racial groups.  While black employees are substantially more likely to have a savings account than 
                                                                 
21 37.7% of bank employees are under 30, 36.3% are between 30 and 39, and 26% are over 40.   129 
 
the other ethnicities, they are equally likely to have a MaMa account as whites and Asians.  Meanwhile, 
individuals of mixed race are about 4.4% more likely to open a MaMa account than other racial groups.
22 
Panel B of Table 3.4 tests whether previous banking behavior is related to the propensity to open 
a MaMa account after controlling for demographic and geographic characteristics of employees.  We find 
that employees who did not have any saving or cheque accounts at First National Bank were 4.6% more 
likely to open a MaMa account than those who already had active bank accounts.  Assuming that most of 
these employees did not have active accounts at other banks, an assumption which seems reasonable 
given that these are employees of First National and therefore would be likely to bank there, this suggests 
that PLS-type products can indeed attract new savers who were previously sitting outsi de the formal 
banking sector.   
The final two columns of Panel B delve further into this issue.  In the middle column, we control 
separately for whether the employee actively used a savings or cheque account prior to opening a MaMa 
account, finding that  in particular  the use of a  standard savings  account significantly decreases th e 
probability of opening a MaMa account, while employees who only had cheque accounts were equally 
likely as employees without any accounts to open a MaMa account.  In the right-most column we separate 
employees by their net balances at the bank, defined a s the sum of their cheque, 32 -day, and money 
market accounts at the bank.  Because employees were allowed to maintain negative balances in their 
cheque accounts, a significant portion (28%) are net borrowers from the bank , while 42% of employees 
have net positive balances, and the remaining 30% had no accounts at the bank.  We split the group who 
are net savers into ―high savers‖ and ―low savers‖ depending on whether they had above- or below-
median net savings at the bank as percentage of annual income.  Similarly, we split the net borrowers into 
two groups, and thus end up with five groups of employees: above-median savers, below-median savers, 
those with no accounts, below-median borrowers, and above-median borrowers.  Of these five groups, 
                                                                 
22 It is difficult to connect our results on race to previous literature due to cultural differences within race across 
countries.  For example, Stinchfield & Winters (1998) find that Hispanic and African American youths have a 
higher propensity of gamble, but it is by no means clear that native Africans should be expected to have this same 
propensity. 130 
 
employees who have borrowed the most from the bank are the most likely to open a MaMa account, 
followed by those with no accounts or above-median savings.  Staff with small amounts of borrowing or 
small amounts of saving are the least likely to use MaMa.  The differences between the groups are 
substantial; those with high net borrowing are nearly 18% more likely to open a MaMa account that those 
with a small amount of savings.   
Taken together, our findings are indicative that demand for PLS comes from a broad range of 
consumers  across  all  income  levels,  age  brackets,  and  ethnicities.    While  these  demographic 
characteristics  are  important  predictors  of  PLS  demand,  the  financial  position  and  experience  of  an 
individual also affects the propensity to use a PLS account.  In particular, demand for the MaMa product 
was  strongest  among  financially  constrained  individuals,  as  evidenced  both  by  the  FinScope  survey 
results as well as high demand by bank staff who had borrowed heavily from the bank.  In addition, bank 
employees without any deposit accounts at First National exhibited strong demand for MaMa, suggesting 
that PLS can bring new savers into the banking system.   
3.4.  Banking behavior of PLS participants 
3.4.1.  Did MaMa attract new savings? 
While the evidence in Section 3.3 suggests that MaMa attracted new savers into the banking 
system, it is also important to test whether PLS can generate significant new savings.  Specifically, one 
worries that PLS might cannibalize regular savings rather than increasing total deposits.   Because the 
MaMa program was not a randomized experiment, we cannot make explicitly causal inferences between 
usage of MaMa and increases in overall savings.  However, we find no evidence that MaMa account 
holders reduced their savings in standard savings products.   
Figure 3.5 provides a first look at the impact of MaMa on regular 32-day account balances.  In 
this figure, we plot the average monthly growth rate of regular 32-day balances for two sets of bank 
branches: those that had above-median growth in MaMa account balances and those with below-median 
MaMa  growth.   Prior to the  introduction  of  MaMa,  average  savings  growth rates  were  very  similar 
between the two sets of branches.  After the MaMa program became active, those branches that had high 131 
 
average  MaMa  account  growth  also  saw  significantly  higher  growth  in  regular  32-day  balances.    If 
significant cannibalization of standard savings were occurring, one would expect just the opposite pattern. 
 
FIGURE 3.5 - GROWTH RATES OF STANDARD 32-DAY SAVINGS 
This figure displays the average monthly growth rate of standard 32-day savings balances for two groups of First 
National‘s branches.  Branches are divided based on their average monthly MaMa balance growth rate from Jan. 
2005 – Mar. 2008.  Those branches that had below-median MaMa growth are in the low MaMa growth group, while 
the remaining branches are placed in the high MaMa growth group.  The figure shows average growth rates of 
standard 32-day balances both before and after the MaMa program, with the vertical line denoting the start of the 
program.   
Account-level evidence from bank employees presents the same picture.  In Table 3.5, we test 
whether employees who opened MaMa accounts also had higher net savings when the program ended in 
March 2008.  We define net savings as the sum of all deposit accounts, including 32-day, money market, 
cheque, and MaMa, and then scale this amount by the annual income of the employee.  After accounting 
for age, gender, race, income, and geographic fixed effects, we find that employees who opened MaMa 
accounts had on average higher net savings at the bank equal to about 1.1% of their annual income, a 
large difference when considering that the average net savings as a share of annual income is 3.5%.  In 
the second column, we split the effect by whether the employee was a high saver, low saver, had no 
accounts, low borrower, or high borrower prior to opening MaMa, using the same definitions as in Table 
3.4.  For all five categories, employees who opened a MaMa account ended with higher net savings than 
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TABLE 3.5 
MAMA USAGE AND OVERALL SAVINGS 
This table presents OLS estimates of the relationship between opening a MaMa account and saving behavior at the 
end of the sample in March 2008, using data on First National Bank employees.  Opened a MaMa account is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the employee had a MaMa account at any time during the sample period, regardless 
of whether the account was open in March 2008.  High savings, low savings, low borrowing, and high borrowing are 
defined exactly as in Table 3.4, and interaction variables indicate how the effect of  opening a MaMa account 
differed for each group.  Net savings and 32-day balance are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level to avoid outlier 
bias.  The dependent variable in the final column is a dummy variable equal to one if the individual had a regular 
savings account (32-day or money market) or cheque account in March 2008.  In this column, the sample is limited 
to  bank  employees  that  did  not  have  these  accounts  in  January  2005,  when  the  MaMa  program  began.    All 
regressions include  the full set of demographic controls listed in Table 3.4, Panel A, as well as 34 geographic region 
fixed effects.  Robust standard errors are clustered at the region level, and are reported in parentheses.  ***, **, * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
Dependent Variable: 
Net savings in March 
2008  
(% income)    
32-day balance in 
March 2008  
(% income)    
Has saving or 
cheque account in 
March 2008 
              
Sample: Unbanked 
in Jan. '05 
Opened a MaMa account  1.112***  2.113*** 
 




(0.132)  (0.182) 
 
(0.032)  (0.042) 
 
(0.011) 
High savings * opened MaMa 
 
-1.645*** 
   
-0.517*** 
   
   
(0.350) 
   
(0.045) 
    Low savings * opened MaMa 
 
-1.864*** 
   
-0.137*** 
   
   
(0.141) 
   
(0.043) 
    Low borrowing * opened MaMa 
 
-1.133*** 
   
-0.132*** 
   
   
(0.230) 
   
(0.038) 
    High borrowing * opened MaMa 
 
0.163 
   
-0.182*** 
   
   
(0.291) 
   
(0.039) 
    High savings before MaMa 
 
7.267*** 
   
1.280*** 
   
   
(0.239) 
   
(0.099) 
    Low savings before MaMa 
 
1.423*** 
   
0.140*** 
   
   
(0.074) 
   
(0.030) 
    Low borrowing before MaMa 
 
-1.023*** 
   
0.024 
   
   
(0.158) 
   
(0.025) 
    High borrowing before MaMa 
 
-3.462*** 
   
-0.027 
   
   
(0.181) 
   
(0.033) 
    Demographic controls  Y  Y 
 
Y  Y 
 
Y 
Region Fixed Effects  Y  Y 
 
Y  Y 
 
Y 
                Observations  38,262  38,262 
 
38,262  38,262 
 
22,573 
R-squared  0.020  0.105     0.008  0.050     0.214 
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accounts and employees with high levels of borrowing, who had higher net savings of 2.11% of income 
and 2.28% of income respectively.  Meanwhile, employees who already had a small (large) amount of 
savings at the bank and opened a MaMa account increased net savings by 0.25% (0.47%) of income by 
March 2008. 
Even more telling is the fact that individuals who opened MaMa accounts tended to have higher 
balances in their standard 32-day accounts in March 2008 as well.  On average, employees who opened a 
MaMa account had higher 32-day balances equal to 0.15% of income in March 2008.  Thus, employees 
who opened MaMa accounts tended to hold more in their standard savings accounts as well, suggesting 
that cannibalization of savings was not widespread.
23  Further, we find that this is true for nearly all  
groups of employees, whether they were borrowers or savers before opening a MaMa account.  In 
particular, employees who opened a MaMa account and who previously had a low amount of savings or a 
small or large amount of borrowing held between 0.14% and 0.19% more of their annual income in 32-
day savings, an increase of about 35% from the mean of 0.42% of income.  The only group for which we 
find  potential  evidence of cannibalization are those employees who were above -median savers, who 
tended to hold 0.20% less in their 32-day accounts if they opened a MaMa account.  However, as shown 
in column 2 of Table  3.5, even for this group overall savings was higher among those who opened a 
MaMa account. 
The final column of Table 3.5 examines whether usage of MaMa lead to cross-over product usage 
at the bank.  In this regression we limit the sample to employees that had no savings or cheque account in 
January 2005 (the first month of data, and the month in which the MaMa program was first offered) , and 
test whether the employees in this sample who opened MaMa accounts were more likely to have a 
standard 32-days savings, money market, or cheque account in March 2008.  We find that employees who 
                                                                 
23 However, given that the choice to open a MaMa account is endogenous, we cannot ascribe a causal relationship 
between opening a MaMa account and higher 32-day account balances.  Indeed, it is quite possible that many of 
those who chose to open a MaMa account did so because of some external desire to save (e.g. a positive wealth or 
income shock) and thus increased their balances in standard savings accounts as well.  If this is the case, we might 
observe that these individuals have higher 32-day savings balances than those who did not open MaMa accounts, but 
they may have had even higher 32-day balances had MaMa not be available. 134 
 
opened a MaMa account were 19% more likely to have another deposit account at First National than 
employees who did not open an account.  This suggests that, at least in the case of First National Bank, 
previously unbanked individuals who use a PLS product are also more likely to open a standard account 
along with the PLS account. 
3.4.2.  MaMa demand and lottery gambling 
If MaMa did not divert funds from standard savings, where did the additional balances come 
from?  Kearney et al. (2010) hypothesize that ―the introduction of prize-linked savings products could 
provide an alternative to lottery tickets that offers a higher (and certainly less negative) return on one‘s 
‗investment.‘‖    Given  the  similar  payoff  structure, and  previously  documented  substitutions  between 
gambling and saving (Consumer Federation of America & The Financial Planning Association, 2006; 
Lusardi et al., 2011), PLS could act as a natural substitute for lottery gambling.  Indeed, experimental 
evidence  in  Atalay  et  al.  (2012)  shows  that  the  introduction  of  a  PLS  program  can  reduce  lottery 
expenditure. 
The fact that the MaMa program was shut down by a lawsuit pursued by the National Lottery of 
South Africa is indirect evidence that MaMa did indeed reduce demand for lottery gambling.  We use 
random variation in the size of the jackpot of the National Lottery to more directly test whether PLS 
demand and lottery demand are linked.  Lottery prize winners in South Africa are drawn each Wednesday 
and Saturday, and the size of the jackpot is a function of the number of lottery tickets sold in each period.  
However, when a grand prize winner is not drawn, the jackpot rolls over to the next period, creating 
random periods in which jackpots are substantially larger than others.  If MaMa is a substitute for lottery 
gambling, one would expect that MaMa demand should be low in periods when the lottery jackpot is 
particularly high.  We use daily data on both the amount of new deposits placed in MaMa accounts and 
the number of new MaMa accounts created to calculate the total amount of new balances and number of 
new accounts at the bank during each draw period.  We can then use a time series regression to test 
whether MaMa demand (i.e. the number of new accounts created or amount of new funds deposited) was 
lower during draw periods with larger lottery jackpots. 135 
 
Table  3.6  presents  results  from  this  estimation.    The  main  independent  variables  in  these 
regressions are dummies for the estimated size of the jackpot for each particular draw.  These estimates 
were published by the National Lottery at the beginning of each draw period to generate demand for the 
lottery,  and  were  hence  readily  available  for  potential  consumers.
24  We  include  both  the 
contemporaneous jackpot as well as the jackpot from the previous draw to account for possible lags in the 
relationship between lottery jackpots and MaMa demand.
25  We include a number of controls to account 
for other factors that may affect MaMa demand, including an indicator of whether the draw took place on 
a Saturday or a Wednesday and also  an indicator of  draw periods  which were shorter due to bank 
holidays.  Further, we include broad time dummies which split the sample into three time periods: January 
– December 2005, January 2006 – March 2007, and October 2007- March 2008.  Between March and 
October 2007 the National Lottery was shut down due to disputes over the ownership of the license to run 
the lottery, and so there are no jackpot draws for this time period (and these months are not included in 
the regressions).  Including these time dummies helps take account of long-run trends in the growth of 
MaMa accounts.  We also control for the growth in regular 32-day savings balances and accounts at the 
bank, to account for factors that might be driving savings in general at the bank.  Lastly, we include a lag 
of the dependent variable to help remove serial correlation, as well as a time trend for the new funds 
deposited regression, which shows a noticeable trend.  Newey-West standard errors which account for up 
to 2 weeks of remaining serial correlation are reported.  
In support of the hypothesis that PLS can act as a substitute for lottery gambling, we show that 
MaMa  demand  was  lower  in  draw  periods  with  larger  jackpots.    When  the  anticipated  jackpot  was 
between R4 million and R7 million (the third quartile) or over R7 million (fourth quartile), there was a 
reduction in total new deposits in MaMa accounts of 11.9% and 14.6%, respectively.  Similarly, when   
                                                                 
24 Actual jackpots are very close to estimates.  Estimated jackpots are derived from estimates of lottery ticket sales, 
combined with any jackpot which was rolled over from previous periods, or any special promotions (such as a 
guaranteed jackpot). 
25 For example, it possible that excitement from a large jackpot in the previous draw could continue to diminish 
demand for PLS. 136 
 
TABLE 3.6 
MAMA GROWTH AND THE NATIONAL LOTTERY 
This table relates overall MaMa demand to the size of the jackpot available in the South Africa National Lottery.  
Each week, winning lotto numbers are drawn on Wednesday and Saturday.  For each regression, the dependent 
variable is an indicator of growth in MaMa usage over the 3-day period (M-W or Th-S) preceding the draw.  ln(New 
funds deposited) is the log of total Rand deposited in new accounts during the draw period , and # of new accts. 
opened is the total number of new MaMa accounts opened over the draw period  Jackpot sizes were estimated and 
published by the National Lottery prior to the draw.  We non-parametrically divide jackpots into 4 quartiles, where 
the largest jackpots are typically due to rollovers or guaranteed prizes.  Both the contemporaneous jackpot as well as 
the lagged jackpot are included in the model.  Saturday indicates draws that were done on Saturday, and controls for 
time-of-week fixed effects.  2005 dummy and post-shutdown are time fixed effects that control for the initial year of 
the program (2005) and the period after the lottery re-opened (Oct. 2007-Mar. 2008).  Few business days controls 
for draw periods that covered less than 3 business days due to holidays.  Savings growth controls for the growth in 
regular 32-day deposit balances (1
st column) and accounts (2
nd column) at First National during the draw period.  To 
remove serial correlation, we include lagged values of the dependent variable, as well as a time trend for the amount 
of new funds deposited, which shows a noticeable trend.  Newey-West standard errors that account for up to 2 






# of new 
accts. 
opened 
      Estimated Jackpot size (< R3 million omitted): 
       R3 million - R4 million  -0.0311  -137.0 
 
(0.0584)  (144.5) 
   R4 million - R7 million  -0.119***  -389.1*** 
 
(0.0416)  (116.5) 
   > R7 million  -0.146***  -288.7** 
 
(0.0495)  (138.4) 
Last period jackpot: 
       R3 million - R4 million  -0.145***  -275.5* 
 
(0.0496)  (149.4) 
   R4 million - R7 million  -0.121***  -324.8** 
 
(0.0398)  (136.9) 
   > R7 million  -0.0591  -252.1* 
 
(0.0491)  (140.1) 
Saturday  -0.0479  45.76 
 
(0.0387)  (87.72) 
2005 dummy  -0.764***  -854.5*** 
 
(0.117)  (150.2) 
Post-shutdown (Oct. 2007-Mar. 2008)  -0.155*  -1,069*** 
 
(0.0827)  (180.6) 
Few Business days  -0.436***  -1,240*** 
 
(0.0721)  (160.4) 
Savings Growth (%)  -3.431  16,370*** 
 
(3.439)  (5,072) 
Lagged dependent variable  0.394***  0.620*** 
 
(0.0656)  (0.0575) 
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jackpots are in the third (fourth) quartile total new MaMa accounts created decreased by about 389 (289), 
a decrease of 11.2% (8.3%) from the mean of 3,483 new accounts created per draw period.
26   Further, we 
also find evidence that one-period (3 days) lagged large jackpots also have a negative impact on MaMa 
demand relative to small jackpots, suggesting that even the  recent memory of a large prize may entice 
some would-be PLS savers to purchase lottery tickets.
27 
These results strongly suggest that MaMa was indeed acting as a substitute for lottery gambling, 
meaning  that reduced lottery expenditure is likely one of the main sources for additional savings 
deposited in PLS accounts.  However, this evidence must be weighed against the fact that we find no 
noticeable increase in MaMa demand when the National Lottery was shut down in March 2007 nor is 
there a decrease in demand when it re-opened in October of 2007.  While these are only two data points 
and there are other possible factors that could be affecting MaMa uptake during this period, it is 
surprising that there was not a discontinuous or even noticeable  increase in  MaMa usage during this 
period.  Future research that di rectly connects PLS usage with lottery expenditure is needed to fully 
resolve this question.  
3.5.  Prize winning and saving 
3.5.1.  Prize winner’s own behavior 
The very aspect that makes prize-linked savings unique—randomly assigned prizes—also makes 
it an interesting environment to study what individuals will do with a cash windfall.  First National Bank 
held monthly drawings in which each account holder was given one entry into the drawing for each R100 
held in her account.  Each month, a grand prize of R1 million was awarded, along with two prizes of 
                                                                 
26 It is somewhat odd that the relationship between new MaMa accounts created and jackpot size is non-monotonic, 
as the estimated impact of jackpots in the 3
rd quartile is larger than that of the 4
th quartile.  However, standard errors 
are large enough that we cannot statistically rule out that the true coefficient for the 4
th quartile is indeed larger than 
that of the 3
rd quartile, leaving open the possibility that this anomaly is simply due to statistical noise. 
27 We find no evidence of a relationship for lags longer than 1 draw period (3 days). 138 
 
R100,000,  ten  prizes  of  R20,000,  and  one  hundred  prizes  of  R1,000.
28  The random drawing was 
performed by a third party company, and Figure 3.3 shows that the actual number of prizes awarded at 
each branch lines up very cl osely with the number of expected prizes, alleviating concerns that the 
drawing was not truly random.  First National provided us with the monthly time series of MaMa account 
balances (but not other saving or cheque account balances) for each prize winner  from January 2005 
through June 2008.  In addition, we have data on the demographic characteristics of prize winners, as well 
as the total amount of deposits at First National in other accounts in the month of the win. 
Because prizes were awarded randomly,  conditional on the MaMa account balance prior to the 
win, we can view this as an exogenous shock that affects the financial situation of an account holder, and 
test whether that individual continues to invest in PLS and, if so, how much he holds in his acc ount.  Ex 
ante, it is unclear whether winning a prize will increase or decrease an individual‘s demand for PLS.  On 
one  hand,  if  an  individual  has  invested  in  PLS  with  the  hopes  of  dramatically  improving  his 
socioeconomic status, once a large prize has been won he might be expected to close his account and 
invest in more standard investment products, since his goal has been achieved.  This effect should be 
especially prevalent for larger prizes.   On the other hand, it is also possible that lottery play has  an 
addictive aspect to it (Guryan & Kearney, 2010), and that winning a prize serves to strengthen this tie. 
In Table 3.7 we estimate the probability that a prize-winner still has a MaMa account open six 
months or one year after winning, relative to employees of the bank who did not win prizes.  Using bank 
employees as a control group is not ideal, as they are not necessarily directly comparable to prize winners 
who  were  not  employees
29, but this is  the only  account-level data available to us   which contains 
individuals that did not win prizes.  To estimate these regressions, for each month we include all  bank 
employees who had an open account in that month as well as all prize winners in that month, and then test 
whether prize winners had a higher propensity to have an open account six months or one year after that 
                                                                 
28 As discussed in Section 3.2, in September 2007 the bank doubled the number of prizes assigned (such that four R 
100,000 prizes were awarded, twenty R20,000 prizes, etc.), except for the grand prize. 
29 There were only 59 employees who also won prizes, out of a total of 4,965 total prizes awarded, so we lack 
sufficient sample size to limit to only employee winners.   139 
 
point in time.  This means that many employees are included in the sample multiple times.  For example, 
if an employee has a MaMa account in March 2005, we check whether he still has his account active in 
September 2005 (6 months later) and in February 2006 (12 months later), and compare this to  prize 
winners who won prizes in March 2005.  If the same employee also has his MaMa account open in April 
2005, he will be included again in the sample, except now we check if his account remains open in 
October 2005 and March 2006.  Because individuals are repeated in the sample, we cluster standard errors 
at  the individual level to account  for correlation  between repeated  observations.    It  is  vital  in  these 
regressions to include year-month fixed effects so that we are comparing employees and prize winners in 
the same months to each other.  In addition, it is critical to control for the MaMa balance prior to winning, 
since winning a prize is only random conditional on the amount held in the account.  We control for the 
MaMa  balance  prior  to  winning  non-parametrically  by  including  dummies  for  each  decile  of  the 
distribution.  In addition to these controls, we also include all demographic characteristics as in Table 3.4 
in the regression, as well as controls for whether the individual had other accounts at First National Bank, 
the natural log of the total balance held in those accounts, and the number of months the individual had a 
MaMa account prior to winning a prize. 
The main variable of interest in these regressions are dummies indicating the prize won by an 
account holder.  We split prize amounts into four categories: R1,000 to R19,999, R20,000 to R99,999, 
R100,000 to R 999,999, and R1,000,000.  We use these ranges because a few prize winners won multiple 
prizes in a given month, and hence there are a few cases in which the prize amount is not exactly R1,000, 
R20,000, R100,000, or R1 million.  However, the vast majority of winners in each category won only a 
single prize, and hence are exactly at the lower bound of that category. 
We find that R1,000 prize winners are less likely to keep their MaMa accounts open than bank 
employees both six months and one year after winning.  Coefficients for R20,000 and R100,000 prize 





THE EFFECT OF PRIZE WINNING ON MAMA DEMAND 
This table presents OLS regressions which test the effect of winning on MaMa account holders, as compared to bank 
staff.  Data is at the individual-month level.  In each regression, we control non-parametrically for the decile of 
MaMa balances 1 month prior to winning, as well as all demographic controls contained in Table 3.4, thus focusing 
only on the random event of winning a prize.  The first two columns test whether winning a prize affects one's 
propensity to continue to use a MaMa account 6 months or a year after winning.  While each winner is only included 
in the sample once, each month of observation for bank staff is included in the sample if that individual had a MaMa 
account 6 months or 12 months prior to that month.  The second two columns test whether winners who keep their 
MaMa accounts open after winning have higher or lower balances in those accounts than bank employees who did 
not win.  Individuals are included in the sample if they had an active account 6 or 12 months ago and have an active 
account  at  the  snapshot.    All  regressions  include  year-month  fixed  effects.    MaMa  account  balances  used  as 
dependent variables in the last two columns are winsorized at the 95
th percentile to avoid outlier bias.  Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses, and are clustered at the individual level.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
Dependent Variable:  Has MaMa Indicator  MaMa Acct. Balance 
Sample: 
Had MaMa account 
when prize was won 
Had MaMa account when prize 
was won & at snapshot 
Snapshot - No. months after win:  6  12  6  12 
Prize Category 
           R1,000 to R19,999  -0.017**  -0.042***  6,295.784***  4,713.324* 
 
(0.008)  (0.013)  (2,159.515)  (2,857.951) 
   R20,000 to R99,999  -0.021  -0.008  31,911.117***  24,218.909*** 
 
(0.016)  (0.022)  (5,280.390)  (5,873.326) 
   R100,000 to R999,999  -0.037  -0.137**  29,753.159***  29,715.588*** 
 
(0.038)  (0.065)  (6,294.463)  (8,639.597) 
   R1,000,000  0.054***  0.041  95,433.053**  16,588.566* 
 
(0.014)  (0.042)  (44,997.952)  (9,535.495) 
         
Prior MaMa balance decile fixed effect  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Demographic controls  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Year-Month Fixed Effect  Y  Y  Y  Y 
          Observations  439,152  323,714  380,363  257,956 
R-squared  0.152  0.150  0.356  0.228 
 
for R100,000 prize winners at the 12-month horizon.
30  However, the economic magnitudes of these 
estimates are not overly large.  We estimate that winners of the R1,000 prize are 4.2% less likely keep 
their account open one year after winning, a small reduction from the mean of 79.7%.  Even for R100,000 
                                                                 
30 Because there are substantially more R1,000 prize winners, estimates of these coefficients tend to be much more 
precise than estimates for other prize categories. 141 
 
prize winners, which are 13.7% less likely than non-winners to keep their account open for a year, the 
likelihood of keeping their account open remains well above 60%.  Meanwhile, we also find that winners 
of the grand prize are somewhat more likely to keep their account open six months and one year after 
winning  (although  the  one-year  coefficient  is  not  statistically  significant).    The  fact  that  the  finding 
reverses for the largest prize winners suggests that winning the jackpot could have some addictive aspect, 
or perhaps individuals feel that they have enough money that they can afford to gamble a bit.  Regardless, 
the estimated coefficients are again not large: R1 million prize winners are only 5.4% more likely to keep 
their account open for six months, and 4.1% more likely for a full year. 
In the last two columns of Table 3.7, we test whether prize winners keep more in their MaMa 
accounts after winning, conditional on keeping their account open.  These regressions are very similar to 
those in the first two columns, except that here the sample is limited to prize winners and staff who have 
active MaMa accounts both when the prize was awarded and at the snapshot (e.g. 6 or 12 months later).  
The dependent variable is the MaMa account balance at the 6- or 12-month horizon, a figure which we 
winsorize at the 95
th percentile to avoid undue influence of outliers.
31  It should be noted that when prizes 
were awarded the amounts were automatically deposited into the winner‘s MaMa account, so there is an 
immediate increase in a winner‘s MaMa balance in the month following the win.  Thus, we are testing 
whether prize winners leave these amounts in their accounts or even increase their investment, or whether 
they take their winnings out of the accounts for other uses. 
Across all levels of winnings, prize holders keep substantially more in their accounts than non-
winners, even a full year after the prize was awarded.  Given that each prize-holder experienced a wealth 
shock, this is perhaps unsurprising.  What is more surprising, however, is the estimated size of the effect.  
In particular, individuals who won R1,000 hold R6,296 and R4,713 more in their accounts than non-
winners six and twelve months after winning, respectively.  These results are conditional on the amount 
held in the account the month before winning, and thus suggest that small prize winners who keep their 
                                                                 
31 We also obtain similar results if we use ln(MaMa Balance) as the dependent variable. 142 
 
account open on average increase their investment in PLS by substantially more than the value of the 
prize itself.  A similar pattern holds for winners of R20,000, who hold R31,911 more in their accounts six 
months after winning, and R24,219 one year after winning.  These are very large effects, given that the 
median account holder maintains a balance of about R400, while the average account holds R17,800. 
Large  prize  winners  also  maintain  significantly  higher  account  balances.    We  estimate  that 
winners of R100,000 keep nearly R30,000 more in their MaMa accounts on average a full year after 
winning.  Winners of R1 million have just under R100,000 more in their accounts six months after 
winning, but this amount drops to R16,589 a year after their win.   
For most account holders, winning a cash prize leads to increased investment in MaMa.  In the 
case of smaller prizes, we find that the average increase in deposits actually exceeds the amount of the 
prize, suggesting that the increased investment is more than a pure wealth effect.  Rather, this evidence is 
consistent  with  the  idea  that  winning  a  prize  may  add  to  the  excitement  of  PLS  and  hence  lead  to 
increased demand.   
3.5.2.  Effect of prize on other’s behavior 
Large prizes can also have an impact on the behavior of others.  In this section we test whether 
prize winners create a ―buzz‖ at a particular bank branch, leading to increased demand for PLS at that 
branch relative to other bank branches.  To do this, we follow the methodology of Guryan & Kearney 
(2008), who find that in the week following the sale of a winning lottery ticket, lottery ticket sales at the 
winning store increase substantially relative to other sales locations.  Similarly, we test whether bank 
branches where the jackpot winner holds an account experience excess demand for MaMa in the month 
following the win.  To do so, we estimate the following specification: 
                                                                     
where   indexes bank branches,   indexes months,   indexes months since the drawing,            is 
the monthly log growth rate of MaMa balances at the branch,   is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
jackpot winner‘s account was at branch  ,               is the natural log of total MaMa deposits held 143 
 
at the branch, and   is a fixed month effect.  With this setup,    is the estimated effect of having a R1 
million winner at the branch   months after the drawing relative to all other branches.  This specification 
is estimated once for each value of  .  It is crucial in these specifications to condition on the amount of 
MaMa deposits held at the branch, as each branch only has the same chance of having a jackpot winner 
conditional on the amount of MaMa deposits held at the branch that month.  In addition, when calculating 
the growth rate of MaMa balances we remove the jackpot winner‘s account from the total balance since 
the winner receives R1 million in her account in the month following the win, which has a drastic impact 
on growth rates. 
  Panel A of Figure 3.6 plots estimates of    for values of   ranging from 3 months prior to the 
drawing to 3 months after, as well as 95% confidence intervals for the estimate.  As expected, coefficient 
estimates are statistically indistinguishable from zero for all months prior to the drawing, which verifies 
the  identifying  assumption  that the  assignment  of  the  prize  was  truly  random  conditional  on MaMa 
deposits held at the branch.  In the month following the drawing we find that MaMa deposits grow by an 
excess of 11.6% at the branch which had the winning MaMa account.  Note that this is a monthly growth 
rate.  Across the whole sample, the average monthly growth rate of MaMa balances was 13.3%, and so 
having a jackpot-winning account holder increases the growth rate of deposits by 87%.  However, the 
effect does not persist past one month.  In the following month, growth at the winning branch is again 
indistinguishable from that of other branches.  At the same time, the growth rate does not shrink below 
that of non-winning branches, such that this one-time shock results in a permanent level change in the 
amount of MaMa deposits at the branch.
32   
  In Panel B of Figure 3.6 we plot a similar picture except in this case the dependent variable in the 
regression is the change in the number of MaMa accounts in month  .  The estimated effect one month 
after the prize is not quite statistically significant (p-value=0.07), but the point estimate is similarly large. 
                                                                 
32 In unreported results, we also find that branches with a higher than expected number of prizes experience 
abnormally high growth in MaMa balances in the following month.  In addition, our results also hold if we change 
  to be a dummy equal to 1 if any large prize (i.e. greater than R1,000) was won by an account holder at a particular 
branch, although the estimated impact is smaller at 2.9% excess growth in MaMa balances. 144 
 
FIGURE 3.6 - EFFECT OF JACKPOT PRIZE WINNER ON LOCAL MAMA DEMAND 
This figure shows the impact of having a million-Rand prize winner on local MaMa demand.  Each panel displays 
coefficient point estimates and 95% confidence bands from seven separate regressions which test the lead and lag 
effect of a jackpot win.  Panel A shows the effect of having a million-Rand winner on the excess monthly growth 
rate of MaMa balances at the same branch, relative to all other bank branches.  Panel B is similar, except it shows 
the impact of a jackpot win on the change in the number of MaMa accounts at the branch.  Panel C displays the 
spillover effect of a jackpot win on the growth rate of MaMa balances at branches that are within 10km of the 
winning branch.  Regressions are estimated by OLS, and exact specifications are described in detail in the text.  
Confidence intervals are based on robust standard errors which are clustered at the branch level. 145 
 
FIGURE 3.6 - continued 
Panel A: Excess growth of total MaMa deposits at winning branch 
 
Panel B: Change in number of MaMa accounts at winning branch 
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Specifically, having a jackpot winner increases the number of new MaMa accounts at the winning branch 
by about 36 accounts, a 70.5% increase from the mean increase of 51 new accounts. 
  Finally, we also test whether there is a spillover effect to other nearby First National branches.  
Here, we alter the definition of   such that it is a dummy equal to 1 if a branch within 10km (6.2 miles) 
has an account holder that wins the jackpot.  In these regressions we drop the winning branches from the 
sample, so as to focus entirely on estimating the spillover effect by itself.  Results are presented in Figure 
3.6, Panel C.  We find weak evidence that branches experience excess MaMa deposit growth of about 
1.7% in the month after a nearby branch has a jackpot-winning account.  This result is just outside of the 
range of statistical significance (p-value=0.056), which is perhaps unsurprising given that effect is an 
order of magnitude smaller. 
  Our results are consistent with the findings in Guryan & Kearney (2008), who also find strong 
same-store effects for selling a winning lottery ticket and much smaller spillover effects to other nearby 
stores.  In the context of prize-linked savings, our results show that prize-winning can indeed create a 
―buzz‖ that results in significant and permanent increases to savings held in the PLS product even by 
those who did not win a prize.  In this way, the prizes themselves can act as a self-contained mechanism 
to generate savings. 
3.6.  Conclusions  
The raw growth of the MaMa program confirms that, in South Africa at least, there was strong 
―unmet  consumer  demand…for saving  products that  offer  the  (remote)  prospect  of changing  current 
wealth  status,  rather  than  incrementally  building  wealth  with  certainty‖  (Kearney  et  al.,  2010).    By 
relating personal characteristics to PLS usage, we find that demand for MaMa came in particular from 
financially constrained individuals—consumers who had relatively high amounts of debt or who reported 
having to go without necessities because of a lack of funds.  In addition, we find evidence that higher risk 
tolerance and lower levels of optimism are also positively related to PLS demand.  These results are in 
line with the idea that the attraction of ―winning big‖ is strongest for individuals who have the greatest 
desire to obtain a life-changing amount of money, such as low-wealth or depressed individuals.  Further, 147 
 
we did not find a relationship between financial knowledge and PLS uptake, suggesting that the relatively 
low observed levels of precautionary savings and high amounts spent on lottery gambling are not due to a 
lack of financial sophistication such as misunderstanding compound interest.  
Building on this, our evidence suggests that prize-linked savings act more as a substitute for 
lottery gambling rather than standard savings.  In particular, we do not see any evidence that the MaMa 
program cannibalized savings, and instead find the reverse: branches with higher MaMa usage also saw 
expansion  of  regular  savings,  and  individuals  who  opened  MaMa  accounts  typically  increased  their 
balances  in  standard  savings  accounts  (although  these  relationships  are  not  necessarily  causal).  
Meanwhile,  demand  for  MaMa  was  highest  when  the  jackpot  of  the  National  Lottery  was  lowest, 
suggesting that the two were acting as substitutes.  Because principal is preserved in PLS, it offers a huge 
advantage over lottery gambling and thus it is not surprising that it draws funds from lottery play. 
  Finally, we also show that prize-winning has a dramatic effect on the saving behavior of both the 
winner as well as those nearby.  Prize winners are slightly less likely to keep their accounts open, but 
conditional  on  keeping  the  PLS  account  open  tend  to  increase  balances  held  in  PLS  by  substantial 
amounts, in some cases by even more than the amount of the prize won.  Further, large prizes create a 
local ―buzz,‖ leading to dramatically increased demand for PLS at the winning branch in the month 
following the win. 
These findings are important for academic researchers seeking to understand saving and gambling 
behavior, as well as policy makers who are considering alternative policies geared toward  increasing 
savings.  Prize-based incentives such as those offered in PLS products can successfully attract new savers 
and new savings, and would also likely decrease the amount of lottery gambling.  Our evidence shows 
that there is a potentially large group of consumers who have little or no savings because they value the 














Appendix to Chapter 1 
 
 
A.1.  Dismissal from court 
In the text, I argue that dismissal from court is equivalent to liquidation for most firms.  To verify 
this, I randomly selected 100 dismissed firms that filed for Chapter 11 and examined the reasons for their 
dismissal using court documents on the U.S. Court’s Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) 
system.  In general, the reasons for dismissal can be sorted into four categories: (1) the debtor failed to 
follow court procedure, such as failure to file specific documents, failure to hire counsel, or failure to 
show up in court; (2) the debtor is deemed to have abused the system by filing in bad faith, or filing 
repeatedly  without  making  efforts  to  repay  its  debts;  (3)  there  is  no  possibility  that  the  debtor  can 
successfully reorganize; (4) the debtor has reached a settlement with its creditors and therefore no longer 
needs bankruptcy protection.  Unsurprisingly, the reason for dismissal varies considerably depending on 
which party files the motion.  When the trustee or court files the motion for dismissal, it is typically 
because the debtor did not obey a court order of some sort, but in a significant minority of cases it is also 
because there is no hope of reorganization.  When a creditor files a successful motion the reason for 150 
 
dismissal is  often  because  the  debtor  has  abused  the  bankruptcy  system  in some  way.    Debtor-filed 
motions, however, are nearly equally split between debtors who have no hope of reorganizing, and who 
wish to leave bankruptcy and simply liquidate without incurring further legal fees, and debtors who have 
either found a buyer or have reached a settlement with their creditors.  It should be noted that in many 
cases when a debtor sees no hope of reorganization and files for dismissal of the case the court has 
previously granted motions in favor of the creditors, such as lifting the automatic stay or denying the use 
of cash collateral.  Thus, although these cases appear to be voluntary shutdowns, the debtor really had no 
other choice available due to previous actions of the court (Morrison, 2005). 
Overall, dismissal is a close equivalent to conversion in many cases; the firm is dismissed from 
court but will still be liquidated.
1  Based on information in PACER, 53 of the dismissed firms I examined 
expected to liquidate shortly after dismissal.  An additional 33 firms were dismissed from court without 
resolving their financial distress and were likely liquidated as well, although the PACER documents did 
not make that explicit.  Only 10 firms were dismissed because they had reached a settlement with their 
creditors.  Of the remaining 4 firms, 3 were sold as going concerns and one was dismissed because it 
wasn’t actually in financial distress.  By and large, dismissal from Chapter 11 is akin to conversion to 
Chapter 7. 
In the text, I show that firms that are dismissed from busy bankruptcy courts are substantially 
more likely to re-file for bankruptcy.  In particular, the increased recidivism is driven by dismissed firms 
that re-file for Chapter 11 (as opposed to Chapter 7) bankruptcy.  Of the 100 dismissed firms discussed 
above, 10 re-filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy within 3 years of their initial filing, while 6 re-filed for 
Chapter 7.  Nearly all (8 out of 10) of the ―Chapter 22‖ filings were by firms that were dismissed from 
court without resolving their financial distress but for whom court documents do not explicitly show that 
the debtor planned to liquidate out of court.  Meanwhile, 4 out of 6 of the firms that re-entered court in 
Chapter 7 were firms for whom liquidation was expected after dismissal.  Assuming that this random 
sample of 100 firms is representative of the broader set of firms, this would suggest that most ―Chapter 
                                                                 
1 Indeed, many motions for dismissal are joint motions for either dismissal or conversion to Chapter 7. 151 
 
22‖ re-filers are firms that, after dismissal, attempt to continue operations and possibly renegotiate outside 
of court, but failing to do so are forced to re-enter bankruptcy. 
A.2.  Data construction 
A.2.1 LexisNexis’ data coverage 
As stated in the text, LexisNexis has essentially complete coverage of bankruptcy filings in their 
dataset.  This can be verified by examining the aggregate filing statistics available from the U.S. Courts 
system.
2  Specifically, LexisNexis contains a total of 21,833 business Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings in the 
50 states and the District of Columbia between 2004 and 2007.  During the same period, U.S. Courts 
report that a total of 25,095 business Chapter 11 filings.  The discrepancy between the two datasets can be 
fully accounted for by differences in how a ―business‖ bankruptcy filing is defined.  The U.S. Courts 
count a filing as a business filing if the majority of the debt associated with the filing is business-related, 
and thus some of the ―business‖ Chapter 11 filings will include individuals who file for Chapter 11 with 
business debt.  Meanwhile, LexisNexis only counts a filing as a business filing if the debtor declared 
himself a corporation or partnership on the voluntary petition for bankruptcy.  To ensure that LexisNexis’ 
data contains complete coverage, I randomly selected two dates and compared the total number (both 
business and non-business) of Chapter 11 filings in LexisNexis to the U.S. Courts statistics for a random 
subset of 14 bankruptcy districts.  For these groups, LexisNexis had information on 693 Chapter 11 
filings as compared to 700 recorded by the U.S. Courts system.  Hence, LexisNexis has about a 99% 
coverage rate, indicating that the discrepancy in business Chapter 11 filings is due entirely to how a 
―business‖ is defined by the two sources.   
While there were a total of 21,833 business Chapter 11 filings during the sample period, many of 
these filings are made by related entities.  Often, when a company files a Chapter 11 petition, each of its 
subsidiaries will file separate petitions in the same court on the same day, or soon thereafter.  Because 
these cases are typically consolidated and managed jointly, for my purposes they should be treated as a 
single case.  I identify related filings by comparing the company name, address, filing date, and exit date  
                                                                 




This table presents the 30 Fama-French industries and the number of sample firms in each industry.  Definitions of 
the  industries  are  pulled  from  Kenneth  French’s  website  at  http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ 
ken.french/data_library.html.  Where possible, I use the SIC code reported by Capital IQ to classify the firms.  In 
cases where the SIC code is not provided, I use the description of the industry from The Deal Pipeline to classify the 
firm. 
 
Fama-French industry code (30 industries)  No. of firms  % 
Food Products  92  2.77% 
Beer & Liquor  4  0.12% 
Tobacco Products  3  0.09% 
Recreation  144  4.33% 
Printing and Publishing  49  1.47% 
Consumer Goods  60  1.80% 
Apparel  26  0.78% 
Healthcare, Medical Equipment, Pharmaceutical Products  204  6.13% 
Chemicals  13  0.39% 
Textiles  18  0.54% 
Construction and Construction Materials  383  11.51% 
Steel Works Etc  20  0.60% 
Fabricated Products and Machinery  148  4.45% 
Electrical Equipment  12  0.36% 
Automobiles and Trucks  54  1.62% 
Aircraft, ships, and railroad equipment  17  0.51% 
Precious Metals, Non-Metallic, and Industrial Metal Mining  5  0.15% 
Coal  9  0.27% 
Petroleum and Natural Gas  25  0.75% 
Utilities  20  0.60% 
Communication  66  1.98% 
Personal and Business Services  347  10.43% 
Business Equipment  69  2.07% 
Business Supplies and Shipping Containers  29  0.87% 
Transportation  128  3.85% 
Wholesale  172  5.17% 
Retail  308  9.26% 
Restaraunts, Hotels, Motels  263  7.91% 
Banking, Insurance, Real Estate, Trading  516  15.51% 
Everything Else  123  3.70% 
      Total  3,327  100.00% 153 
 
TABLE A.2 
BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT DISTRIBUTION 
This table gives the full list of 89 bankruptcy districts used in the sample, and the number of sample firms in each 
district.  The two districts in Arkansas share bankruptcy judges, and so are treated as one district in this study.  The 




firms  %     Bankruptcy court 
No. of 
firms  % 
Alaska  5  0.15% 
 
Louisiana - East  21  0.63% 
Alabama - Middle  13  0.39% 
 
Louisiana - Middle  4  0.12% 
Alabama - North  22  0.66% 
 
Louisiana - West  22  0.66% 
Alabama - South  13  0.39% 
 
Massachusetts  63  1.89% 
Arkansas  23  0.69% 
 
Maryland  59  1.77% 
Arizona  78  2.34% 
 
Maine  16  0.48% 
California - Central  181  5.44% 
 
Michigan - East  64  1.92% 
California - East  38  1.14% 
 
Michigan - West  24  0.72% 
California - North  71  2.13% 
 
Minnesota  43  1.29% 
California - South  30  0.90% 
 
Missouri - East  13  0.39% 
Colorado  59  1.77% 
 
Missouri - West  24  0.72% 
Connecticut  28  0.84% 
 
Mississippi - North  11  0.33% 
Washington, D.C.  12  0.36% 
 
Mississippi - South  18  0.54% 
Delaware  115  3.46% 
 
Montana  6  0.18% 
Florida - Middle  139  4.18% 
 
North Carolina - East  32  0.96% 
Florida - North  10  0.30% 
 
North Carolina - Middle  14  0.42% 
Florida - South  74  2.22% 
 
North Carolina - West  23  0.69% 
Georgia - Middle  9  0.27% 
 
North Dakota  2  0.06% 
Georgia - North  107  3.22% 
 
Nebraska  20  0.60% 
Georgia - South  12  0.36% 
 
New Hampshire  14  0.42% 
Hawaii  9  0.27% 
 
New Jersey  127  3.82% 
Iowa – North  6  0.18% 
 
New Mexico  11  0.33% 
Iowa – South  4  0.12% 
 
Nevada  66  1.98% 
Idaho  9  0.27% 
 
New York - East  71  2.13% 
Illinois - Central  12  0.36% 
 
New York - North  35  1.05% 
Illinois - North  98  2.95% 
 
New York - South  206  6.19% 
Illinois - South  10  0.30% 
 
New York - West  22  0.66% 
Indiana - North  31  0.93% 
 
Ohio - North  54  1.62% 
Indiana - South  53  1.59% 
 
Ohio - South  27  0.81% 
Kansas  22  0.66% 
 
Oklahoma - East  4  0.12% 
Kentucky - East  17  0.51% 
 
Oklahoma - North  12  0.36% 










firms  %     Bankruptcy court 
No. of 
firms  % 
Oregon  12  0.36% 
 
Texas - West  62  1.86% 
Pennsylvania - East  43  1.29% 
 
Utah  12  0.36% 
Pennsylvania - Middle  25  0.75% 
 
Virginia - East  56  1.68% 
Pennsylvania - West  58  1.74% 
 
Virginia - West  13  0.39% 
Rhode Island  4  0.12% 
 
Vermont  1  0.03% 
South Carolina  31  0.93% 
 
Washington - East  14  0.42% 
South Dakota  5  0.15% 
 
Washington - West  49  1.47% 
Tennessee - East  22  0.66% 
 
Wisconsin - East  13  0.39% 
Tennessee - Middle  25  0.75% 
 
Wisconsin - West  9  0.27% 
Tennessee - West  18  0.54% 
 
West Virginia - North  6  0.18% 
Texas – East  32  0.96%     West Virginia - South  13  0.39% 
Texas – North  158  4.75% 
 
Wyoming  9  0.27% 
Texas – South  157  4.72% 
       
                          Total  3,327  100.00% 
 
for each filing in my sample, and keep only one observation per group.  This reduces the total number of 
filings in my sample period to 14,825 separate bankrupt entities.  As described in the text, I have full 
financial information for 3,327 of these filings. 
Tables A.1 and A.2 show the distribution of the 3,327 bankruptcies in my final sample across 
industries and bankruptcy districts. 
A.2.2. Recidivism 
Among dismissed firms in my sample, 7.4% re-file for bankruptcy more than 3 months but less 
than 3 years after their original filing.  An additional 2.0% of dismissed firms re-file within 3 months of 
their original filing.  Meanwhile, 1.6% of reorganized firms re-file within 3 months of their initial filing, 
and 2.5% re-file between 3 months and 3 years.   These recidivism rates are substantially lower than the 
rate  reported  by  Hotchkiss  (1995),  who  finds  that  17.7%  of  the  firms  in  her  sample  file  a  second 
bankruptcy, but slightly higher (on average across both dismissed and reorganized firms) than the 2.9% 
rate reported by Chang & Schoar (2007).  Differences between the reported refilling rates can likely be 
attributed to the fact that Hotchkiss (1995) considers a longer period of time post-bankruptcy (generally 5 155 
 
years) while Chang & Schoar (2007) consider only firms that re-file in the same district within 3 years.  In 
addition, Morrison (2005) finds that a significant number of small businesses fail in the first year after 
bankruptcy without re-filing for bankruptcy.  This will depress the observed recidivism rate in my sample 
and Chang & Schoar (2007), as our samples contain much smaller firms than Hotchkiss (1995).  Across 
all business Chapter 11 filings in LexisNexis from 1990-2011, I find that about 10% of all firms re-file for 
either Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 bankruptcy at any point after the bankruptcy. 
A.2.3. Bank loan loss accounting 
The results on default costs borne by commercial banks use data obtained from the Consolidated 
Report of Condition and Income (commonly known as the Call Reports), available from the Federal 
Financial Institutions Examination Council at https://cdr.ffiec.gov/public/.  I measure default costs as the 
net charge-off rate, defined as  
                   
                              
(
∑              
 
   
  )
  
where   indexes quarters.  Because charge-offs and recoveries are reported on a year-to-date basis, I only 
use the financial reports from December of each year (i.e.   pertains only to the 4
th quarter of each year, 
and the denominator is simply the average reported outstanding loans over each quarterly report in a 
given year).  This gives a total of four observations per bank, one for each year from 2004 through 2007.  
The denominator uses the average loan balances during the year to account for possible differences in the 
timing of reported charge-offs and recoveries.  Specifically, the accounting standards in FAS 114 state 
that bad debt should be written off when ―it is probable that a creditor will be unable to collect all 
amounts  due  according  to  the  contractual  terms  of  the  loan  agreement.‖    Obviously,  there  is  some 
discretion in this exact timing, and certainly some of the charge-offs reported at time   correspond to 
loans that were on the books in previous quarters but, since they have been written off, are no longer 
recorded at time  .  Because the amount of total loans is relatively stable across time for most banks, this 156 
 
choice to average across four quarters makes little difference in my estimates.  I find essentially identical 
results if the denominator is total loans at time   or if the average is taken over the previous 6 quarters. 
  Because  banks  have  some  discretion  in  reporting  charge-offs  and  recoveries,  one  might  be 
concerned that this affects my measure of default costs. While it likely makes the measure noisier, the 
difference-in-differences identification should account for biases in a particular direction. Further, it is 
important  to  recognize  that  charge-offs  and  recoveries  have  no  direct  effect  on  either  the  income 
statement or the balance sheet of the bank, which minimizes the incentive for banks to manage these 
accounts. This is because banks create a loan loss reserve which acts as a contra asset on the balance 
sheet, and absorbs any net movement in loan losses.  
A simple example will illustrate how this works.  Suppose that in period 1 a bank disburses $1000 
worth of new loans.  The bank will expect that some of these loans will default, and will thus provision 
for loan losses by adding, say, $30 to the loan loss reserve, a contra-asset that reduces the total amount of 
loans on the balance sheet.  This $30 reserve must come out of income in this period; it cannot be 
deferred until later.  Thus, in period 1, the impact of the new lending on the bank’s balance sheet and 
income statement is: 
Loans $1,000 Loan loss provision ($30)




In period 2, suppose that $25 worth of lending goes into default, but the bank chooses to wait to 
see if the default can be cured before it writes off the loans as losses.  Then, in this period nothing 
changes on the balance sheet, but $25 of loans will be reported as non-performing in a separate schedule 
in the Call Reports.   
In period 3 the bank learns that it will only recover $10 of the $25 total of defaulted loans, 
resulting in a net charge-off of $15.  It is this net charge-off that I use in my analysis, rather than the loan 
loss provision recorded in period 1.  Net charge-offs in period 3 do not affect either the balance sheet or 
the income statement of the bank, since these losses were already accounted for in period 1.  Specifically, 157 
 
the $15 loss will reduce the amount of loans but also reduce the contra-asset, so that the new balance 
sheet will be: 
Loans $975 Gross charge-off $25
Loan loss reserve ($15) Recovery $10
Cash (from recovery) $10 Net charge-off $15
Total $970 Non-performing loans $0
Assets
Charge-offs, recoveries, and Non-
performing loans
 
Total assets still stand at $970, so recognizing the loss does not affect assets.  It also does not affect 
income in period 3 because the loan losses were provisioned in period 1.  Because actual losses are 
isolated  from  earnings  and  assets  in  this  way,  bank  managers  that  are  seeking  to  meet  earnings 
expectations will typically do so by managing the provision for loan losses recorded in period 1 rather 
than actual loan losses.  Liu & Ryan (2006) give further detail on the management of loan loss provisions 
by banks.   
A.3.  Robustness checks 
  In this appendix, I provide results and more detail on the robustness checks described in Section 
V.G of the text.  To be concise, I report regression results only for the three main results of the paper: the 
probability of reorganization, the recidivism rate, and charge-off rates at commercial banks.  All other 
results are available by request. 
A.3.1. Outliers 
As described in the text, two possible concerns related to outliers are the effects of extremely 
large firms in the sample and of the business-centric courts of Delaware and the Southern District of New 
York.  Table A.3 reports regression results when these outliers are winsorized.  In the case of firm size, I 
winsorize at the 99
th percentile, which reduces the mean size from $156.7 million to $28.5 million in the 
sample, but has only a small effect on average ln(size).  To account for Delaware and the Southern 
District of New York, I set their non-business caseload share at 54%, equal to the next lowest share in 
Alaska.  Reducing the impact of outliers in this way has no effect on the estimated impact of caseload on 
bankruptcy outcomes. 158 
 
TABLE A.3 
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS: OUTLIERS 
This table presents robustness checks of my main results after accounting for outliers in either size or in the non-
business share of caseload.  To be succinct, the coefficients on control variables have been omitted from the table, 
and I only report the results for the probability of being reorganized and of re-filing for bankruptcy within 3 years 
for dismissed firms.  The top four rows of the table repeat the baseline regression results reported in the text of the 
paper.  The next four lines report the coefficients on the main interaction variables when size has been winsorized at 
the 99
th percentile.  The bottom four rows again re-run the regression models except in these specifications the non-
business share of caseload for Delaware and the Southern District of New York has been ―winsorized‖ to 54%, 
equal to that of Alaska.  All specifications are otherwise identical to those presented in the tables in the paper.  
Standard errors are clustered by bankruptcy district and reported in parenthesis.  ***, ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at   1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Model:     Reorganized 
Re-filed for 
bankruptcy within 3 
years  
(Dismissed firms) 
Baseline  Busy court  0.149**  0.087  0.368***  0.413*** 
   
(0.061)  (0.068)  (0.131)  (0.130) 
 
Busy court * ln(size)  --  0.044**  --  -0.073** 




Size winsorized at 99th percentile  Busy court  0.149**  0.090  0.368***  0.416*** 
      (0.061)  (0.069)  (0.131)  (0.130) 
   Busy court * ln(size)  --  0.042*     -0.076* 
         (0.023)     (0.039) 
DE & SDNY winsorized  Busy court  0.169**  0.103  0.479***  0.504*** 
   
(0.081)  (0.091)  (0.167)  (0.169) 
 





         (0.046)     (0.052) 
 
A.3.2. Exclusion restriction 
I test for the possibility that three other channels could be biasing my estimates of the impact of 
caseload  on  bankruptcy  outcomes  by  allowing  time  fixed  effects  to  vary  by  firm  size,  industry,  or 
geographic region.  If firms of a particular size or industry are concentrated in bankruptcy districts with 
high non-business caseload, my estimates could be biased if these firms changed after BAPCPA for some 
reason  other  than  differences  in  judge  caseload.    Similarly,  general  regional  trends  could  bias  the 
estimates  if  bankruptcy  districts  with  high  or  low  non-business  caseload  are  clustered  together 
geographically.    The  downside  of  allowing  for  separate  time  effects  for  each  of  these  groups  is  it 159 
 
drastically reduces the statistical power available due to the inclusion of many more covariates.   For 
example, my main specifications include 30 industry fixed effects and 16 quarter fixed effects (in addition 
to the 89 bankruptcy district fixed effects), while taking every pairwise combination of these two groups 
in my data results in a total of 400 industry-quarter fixed effects.  Thus, one would expect that statistical 
power will be somewhat reduced in these specifications.   
Table A.4 shows the results with different time effects for each group.  In the first set of results, I 
allow  the  estimated impact  of  ln(size)  to  vary  of  each  quarter  by  including  ln(size)-by-quarter  fixed 
effects.  This does not affect the estimates or statistical significance in any way.  Adding industry-by-
quarter fixed effects reduces the statistical significance of the effect of caseload on the probability of 
reorganization (p-value=0.13) and the effect of caseload on the probability of re-filing for bankruptcy (p-
value=0.09).    In  both  cases  the  coefficient  estimates  are  nearly  identical  to  my  main  specifications, 
indicating that the loss of significance is due only to the reduced statistical power in these robustness 
checks.    Aside  from  these  two  estimates,  all  other  coefficients  retain  statistical  significance  and  are 
essentially unchanged with the inclusion of industry-quarter fixed effects.  Finally, I use the region of the 
country that each bankruptcy district lies in to create region-by-time fixed effects.  Regions are defined by 
the  U.S.  Census  into  nine  groups:  New  England,  Middle  Atlantic,  East  North  Central,  West  North 
Central, South Atlantic, East South Central, West South Central, Mountain, and Pacific.
3  These fixed 
effects account for any clustering of consumer-centric districts by using only variation within each region 
to identify the impact of BAPCPA on caseload.  Including separate time fixed effects for each region does 
not affect my estimates in any significant way. 
Table A.5 runs similar robustness checks on the commercial bank regressions.  Here I again allow 
for varying time effects by the size of the bank and by the region that the bank is located  in.  For banks 
with branches in multiple regions, I use the state in which the largest portion of the bank’s deposits are 
located to identify the census region it belongs to.  The inclusion of these additional controls does not 
affect my results. 
                                                                 




ROBUSTNESS CHECKS: EXCLUSION RESTRICTION 
This table presents robustness checks of my main results with the inclusion of time fixed effects that differ for 
groups of bankruptcy filings.  To be succinct, the coefficients on control variables have been omitted from the table, 
and I only report the results for the probability of being reorganized and of re-filing for bankruptcy within 3 years.  
The top four rows of the table repeat the baseline regression results reported in the text of the paper.  The next four 
lines report the coefficients on the main interaction variables when ln(size)-by-time fixed effects have been included 
in the set of controls.  The next four rows present results when separate time fixed effects are included for each of 
the 30 industries.  The bottom four rows contain results when separate time effects have been included for each the 9 
census divisions: New England, Middle Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central, South Atlantic, East 
South  Central,  West  South  Central,  Mountain,  and  Pacific.    All  specifications  are  otherwise  identical  to  those 
presented in the tables in the paper.  Standard errors are clustered by bankruptcy district and reported in parenthesis.  
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at   1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 Model:     Reorganized 
Re-filed for 




(135 total fixed effects) 
Busy court  0.149**  0.087  0.368***  0.413*** 
 
(0.061)  (0.068)  (0.131)  (0.130) 
Busy court * ln(size)  --  0.044**  --  -0.073** 





Size X time fixed effects  
(16 additional fixed effects) 
Busy court  0.159**  0.044  0.395***  0.352** 
   (0.069)  (0.081)  (0.144)  (0.148) 
Busy court * ln(size)  --  0.053**  --  -0.059* 
      (0.023)     (0.032) 
 
Industry X time fixed effects  
(354 additional fixed effects) 
Busy court  0.104  0.029  0.298**  0.356** 
 
(0.069)  (0.076)  (0.144)  (0.141) 
Busy court * ln(size)  --  0.049*  --  -0.101** 





Region X time fixed effects  
(144 additional fixed effects) 
Busy court  0.213***  0.168**  0.422**  0.460*** 
   (0.069)  (0.083)  (0.163)  (0.167) 
Busy court * ln(size)  --  0.030  --  -0.075** 
      (0.021)     (0.035) 
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TABLE A.5 
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS: EXCLUSION RESTRICTION ON BANK DATA 
This table presents robustness checks of my main results that examine the effect of caseload on bank charge-offs.  In 
these regressions, I allow for time fixed effects that vary by the size or geographic region of the bank.  To be 
succinct, the coefficients on control variables have been omitted from the table, and I only report the results for the 
probability of being reorganized and of re-filing for bankruptcy within 3 years.  The top four rows of the table repeat 
the baseline regression results reported in the text of the paper.  The next four lines report the coefficients on the 
main interaction variables when ln(size)-by-time fixed effects have been included in the set of controls.  The bottom 
four  rows  contain  results  when  separate  time  effects  have  been  included  for  each  the  9  census  division:  New 
England, Middle Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central, South Atlantic, East South Central, West South 
Central, Mountain, and Pacific.  All specifications are otherwise identical to those presented in the tables in the 
paper.  Standard errors are clustered by commercial bank and  reported in parenthesis.  ***, ** and * indicate 
statistical significance at   1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Model:    
Net charge-offs on 
C&I loans  
(% of total C&I loans) 
Baseline  Busy court  0.437**  1.151 
   
(0.194)  (0.729) 
 
Busy court * ln(size)  --  -0.127 
     
(0.120) 
Ln(assets) X time fixed effects  Busy court  0.432**  1.147 
(4 additional fixed effects)     (0.194)  (0.729) 
   Busy court * ln(size)  --  -0.128 
         (0.120) 
Region X time fixed effects  Busy court  0.403*  0.929 
(36 additional fixed effects) 
 
(0.218)  (0.745) 
 
Busy court * ln(size)  --  -0.093 
         (0.121) 
 
A.3.3. Alternative measures of bank loan losses 
In the text of the paper, I scale net charge-offs by the average total outstanding amount of lending 
during the year as a measure of bank loan losses.  Scaling net charge-offs by total loans means that this 
charge-off  rate  is  roughly  equivalent  to  the  probability  of  default  times  the  loss  given  default  for  a 
particular loan: 
                               
One would expect that busy bankruptcy courts principally impact      rather than    , and therefore it 
would  be  ideal  to  measure        alone  for  each  bank  by  scaling  net  charge-offs  by  the  amount  of 162 
 
defaulted loans rather than scaling by total loans.  In practice, however, matching charge-offs directly to 
loans that are in default is impossible using Call Report data.  In each quarter, banks report their year-to-
date charge-offs and recoveries as well as the current balance of ―non-performing‖ loans – loans that are 
over 90-days past-due or non-accruing – which I use as a measure of total defaulted loans.  However, the 
reported net charge-offs in quarter   could be related to loans that were non-performing in some previous 
quarter.  Thus, scaling net charge-offs by non-performing loans from period   gives an incorrect estimate 
of     , but it is unclear how to combine the non-performing loan data from previous quarters to get a 
better measure.  For example, the following is data from an actual bank in my sample: 
TABLE A.6 
EXAMPLE BANK DATA 
Date 
Year-to-date 










off Rate  LGD1  LGD2 
2005q1  -22  244  35460 
      2005q2  103  121  34840 
      2005q3  117  501  31225 
      2005q4  211  353  33249  0.63%  69.24%  42.12% 
2006q1  101  286  31102 
      2006q2  170  232  31640 
      2006q3  145  320  31234 
      2006q4  263  81  29666  0.85%  114.47%  82.19% 
In aggregate, this bank lost $211,000 in bad debt in 2005.  The net charge-off rate used in the text of the 
paper  (displayed  in  the  fifth  column)  is  calculated  by  scaling  this  amount  by  the  average  of  total 
outstanding C&I loans for the year, in this case $33.7 million, giving a total charge-off rate of 0.63% in 
2005.  Because total loans are fairly stable over time, this is likely a close estimate of the true            
for that year.  Estimating      by itself is not straightforward because the level of non-performing loans 
fluctuates widely over time and charge-offs are not matched directly to non-performing loans.  The table 
above gives two possible alternatives.       is calculated by dividing end-of-year net charge offs by the 
average  of  non-performing  loans  over  the  year,  e.g.  211  /  304.75  in  2005.    This  is  similar  to  how 
                 is calculated, but it has the drawback of being very volatile.  For example,      in 163 
 
2006 is greater than 100%, which logically doesn’t make sense and is likely because the bank wrote off a 
large portion of loans in late 2006, leaving a low non-performing loan balance at the end of the year but 
high net charge-offs.       alleviates this problem to some extent by scaling net charge-offs instead by 
the maximum of non-performing loans during the year, e.g. 211 / 501 in 2005 and 263 / 320 in 2006.  
This measure has the advantage of ignoring low values of non-performing loans, which in most cases 
gives a more accurate estimate of the true loss given default since non-performing loans decrease after 
charge-offs are recognized. 
  Importantly, neither      or      is likely to be a biased measure of loss given default, only 
noisy.  Accordingly, Table A.7 presents regressions similar to those in Table 1.11 in the text of the paper 
except it uses these two alternative definitions of loss given default as the dependent variable.  As in the 
text of the paper, all bank variables are winsorized at the 1
st and 99
th percentile to account for outliers, an 
adjustment that is particularly important for the noisy measures of loss given default.  The regressions 
show that these two alternative measures of credit losses produce nearly identical results to those in Table 
1.11, although the statistical significance of      and      is slightly lower because they are less 
precisely measured.  Specifically, a 306-hour increase in caseload is estimated to increase      by 37 
percentage points, a 46% increase relative to its mean value of 80 percent.  As measured by     , the 
same shock to caseload increases losses by 19 percentage points, a 52% rise relative to its mean of 36 
percent.  Thus, the impact of a 306-hour rise in caseload by any of the three measures of credit losses is 
close to a 50% increase relative to the mean loss amount. 
One  interesting  point  that  comes  from  using        rather than  overall  credit  losses  is that it 
appears that small banks experience the largest credit losses when bankruptcy courts become busy.  In the 
main regressions in Table 1.11, I do not find any differential effects for large and small banks.  If it is 
indeed the case that small banks are most affected by crowded courts, this mirrors the fact that larger 
debtors are able to sway the courts in their favor when judges are busy.  Similarly, these findings suggest 
that large banks may be able to lobby the busy judge or otherwise mitigate the effects of crowded courts.    164 
 
TABLE A.7 
ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF BANK CREDIT LOSSES 
This table repeats the regressions of Table 1.11 in the text of the paper using two alternative measures of credit 
losses.  In the first three columns the dependent variable is net C&I loan charge-offs scaled by the average balance 
of non-performing C&I loans reported by the bank during that year.  The last three columns scale net charge-offs by 
the maximum reported non-performing C&I loan balance during the year.  Control variables are defined as in Table 
1.8 in the paper, except net charge-off rate on all other loans is defined similarly to the dependent variable—e.g. it 
is scaled by average or maximum non-performing loans.  All regressions include fixed effects for the 6,896 banks 
included in the sample as well as year fixed effects.  All models are estimated by OLS.  Standard errors are clustered 
by commercial bank and reported in parenthesis.  ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at   1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. 
Dependent Variable: 
Net charge-offs on C&I loans 
% of average non-performing C&I 
loans (LGD1) 
% of maximum non-performing C&I 
loans (LGD2) 
              Busy court  90.657*  66.978  379.329***  43.887**  34.219*  144.768*** 
 
(49.823)  (51.958)  (130.927)  (19.264)  (20.065)  (50.414) 
Busy court * ln(Assets)  --  --  -53.182***  --  --  -18.806** 
     
(19.620) 
   
(7.568) 
Post BAPCPA * ln(Assets)  --  --  -36.649**  --  --  -12.209** 
     
(15.523) 
   
(5.969) 
Asset growth  -6.987  2.415  4.178  -10.731  -6.518  -5.677 
 
(21.894)  (22.002)  (21.990)  (8.479)  (8.498)  (8.485) 
Net charge-off rate on  
all other loans  0.048  0.049  0.049  0.034  0.034  0.035 
 
(0.041)  (0.041)  (0.041)  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.030) 
Ln(per captia income)  --  81.824  56.997  --  23.156  10.648 
   
(126.359)  (127.450) 
 
(50.522)  (51.057) 
Ln(population)  --  -258.819  -285.763  --  -65.803  -78.252 
   
(180.676)  (180.858) 
 
(79.089)  (79.284) 
Unemployment rate  --  6.462  6.718  --  2.037  2.257 
   
(7.168)  (7.212) 
 
(2.796)  (2.808) 
House price appreciation  --  -190.139***  -170.195**  --  -84.947***  -73.727*** 
   
(65.335)  (66.715) 
 
(26.195)  (26.619) 
Fixed effects: 
               Bank  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
   Year  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
              Observations  22,008  22,008  22,008  22,008  22,008  22,008 
R-squared  0.001  0.002  0.002  0.001  0.002  0.003 165 
 
FIGURE A.1 
PARTIES INVOLVED IN BANKRUPTCY 
This schematic depicts the various parties involved in bankruptcy courts and how they interact with the bankruptcy 
judge.  When BAPCPA passed, it dramatically reduced the number of household bankruptcy filings, on the right.  
This feeds through to the judge, who is left with a far lighter docket, while the corporations, creditors, and corporate 






















Appendix to Chapter 2 
 
 
B.1.  Details of data received from claims administrators 
 Data for the study were made available by four leading providers of restructuring and insolvency 
administrative  services:  BMC  Group,  EPIQ  Bankruptcy  Solutions,  Donlin  Recano  &  Company,  and 
Kurtzman Carson Consultants (KCC). These firms made available to us an electronic version of the 
claims register, voting tabulations, and claims transfers for each bankruptcy.  The information from each 
administrator was largely the same and compiling it together is unlikely to bias our results. However, the 
format of the data varies for each provider. Below we illustrate details of the different data formats and 
how we identify if a given claim was allowed to vote, if it was transferred in bankruptcy, and if a given 
claimholder was a trustee for public bond-holders. 
B.1.1.BMC Group (43 bankruptcy cases; 36 cases with complete register and tabulation data) 
For each bankruptcy case, BMC Group provided data that contained information from the credit 
register (t1), voting tabulations (t2) and transfers in one consolidated dataset. There are two BMC cases for 
which no register data was received, and five cases with no tabulation data. So we can unambiguously 167 
 
track each claim from t1 to t2 for 36 cases. The following is a simple example of what the data actually 
looks like: 
TABLE B.1 
EXAMPLE BMC DATA 
 








Fleet National Bank  $150,000  Secured           
Nelson, Arthur  $58,000  Unsecured  Sierra Liquidity Fund  5  $58,000     
The Bank of New 
York as trustee 
$1,600,000  Unsecured    5  $980,000  $600,000  $20,000 
 
In this example, Fleet National’s claim was not transferred nor was it allowed to vote. Arthur Nelson’s 
claim of $58,000 was sold to Sierra Liquidity Fund.  This claim was allowed to vote on the plan of 
reorganization as part of voting class 5. We use information from the disclosure statement filed with the 
court to determine what types of claims constitute this voting class (e.g., general unsecured claims).   
The Bank of New York claim illustrates a case in which the bank is acting as a custodian. We 
identify  these  cases  by  searching  in  the  creditor  name  for  the  terms  ―trustee‖  and  ―custodian‖  (or 
abbreviations  of  these).    In  addition,  we  identified  trustees  of  public  bond  issues  by  examining  the 
disclosure statements which typically outline the basic pre-petition capital structure of the debtor.  Also 
note that since this claim represents multiple public bonds, portions of the claim can accept, reject, and 
abstain from voting, depending on how each bondholder reported his vote to the Bank of New York.  
B.1.2. Donlin Recano & Company (10 bankruptcy cases) 
Simlar to BMC Group, Donlin Recano provided data in a single dataset for each case.  However, 
Donlin Recano only provided information on claims that were permitted to vote (i.e., in our example, 
Donlin Recano records would be missing Fleet National Bank).   
B.1.3. EPIQ Bankruptcy Solutions (52 bankruptcy cases) 
The data provided by EPIQ came in two datasets, the claims register and the voting tabulation.  
Claim trading was tracked within the register as in the following example: 168 
 
TABLE B.2 
EXAMPLE EPIQ REGISTER DATA 
 
Creditor  Amount  Claim type 
Fleet National Bank  $150,000  Secured 
Nelson, Arthur  fully transferred to: Sierra Liquidity Fund  $58,000  Unsecured 
The Bank of New York as trustee  $1,600,000  Unsecured 
 
To determine whether a claim was traded, we searched for the term ―transferred‖ in the creditor name 
and/or address. Based on the search results we created a record of buyers and sellers. This record is 
additionally cross-checked with the information in the voting-tabulation file as the transferred claims only 
show the name of the claim buyer. Using the same example, a voting tabulation from EPIQ would look 
like: 
TABLE B.3 
EXAMPLE EPIQ TABULATION DATA 
 








Sierra Liquidity Fund  $58,000  5  $58,000     
The Bank of New York as trustee  $1,600,000  5  $980,000  $600,000  $20,000 
 
From this example, we also see that Fleet National Bank’s claim does not appear in the voting 
tabulations. This enables us to conclude that Fleet’s claim was not allowed to vote. There is no unique 
identifier that would allow us to merge the tabulation to the credit register.  We merge the two  sets 
together by creditor name and claim amount. This procedure however is not without caveats because 
creditor names are not always consistent between the two datasets, claim amounts can change somewhat 
(e.g. due to accrued interest, or portions of claims that are disallowed), and the presence of multiple 
claims held by the same creditor of the same amount.  
B.1.4. Kurtzman Carson Consultants (31 bankruptcy cases) 
KCC provided us with three datasets for each case identifying claims at register, voter tabulation, 
and a list of transferred claims.  The claims register and voter tabulations look very similar to those 169 
 
provided  by  EPIQ,  except  that  the  claims  register  contains  no  information  on  whether  a  claim  was 
transferred, since this information is kept in the third dataset.  Again there is no unique identifier that 
allows us to match the three datasets together, and inconsistencies in names and amounts could potentially 
introduce an error in matching. 
While we received our data privately in an easily readable electronic format, all of the data are 
also available publically in flat-text or scanned-text format through the U.S. Public Access to Court 
Electronic Records (PACER) system of bankruptcy filings, the disclosure of which is regulated by the 
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. All documents disclosed in a bankruptcy filing—including the 
schedules of assets and liabilities, and voting tabulations—are public information and can be accessed on-
line using PACER This makes PACER an immensely rich source of information.  However, data from 
filings are not organized in any way that allows for easy assimilation, and instead are stored as separate 
PDF files numbered according to how and when they appear in the court docket. As a result, there are 
thousands of scanned documents per case, and there is no other way of finding the relevant information, 
but by individually reviewing each one of these files. For example, to give a sense of how the list of files 
could grow very rapidly, each filing of a 3001(e) proof of claim transfer would be entered as a separate 
document,  as  would  any  filing  that  would  be  object  to  the  transfer.  Although  the  docket  is  easily 
searchable and provides short descriptions of each filing, for our analysis, which relies on identification of 








LIST OF BANKRUPTCY CASES IN THE SAMPLE 
This table lists the 136 bankrupt firms in our sample and provides information on the bankruptcy, including the filing and exit dates, size at filing, the bankruptcy 
outcome, and the identification and role of hedge fund involvement in the bankruptcy.  The debtors are grouped by their single-digit SIC code and sort 
chronologically by filing date with the groupings.  Assets at filing is the self-reported asset size of the firm, recorded on the voluntary petition for Chapter 11 
protection.  Outcome references whether the firm is reorganized within Chapter 11, sold as a going-concern to a financial or strategic buyer, or liquidated 
piecemeal. Hedge funds (our data) indicates whether we observe hedge fund holdings in the debtor at the filing of the schedules of assets and liabilities (t1), or at 
the tabulation of votes on a plan of reorganization (t2), or both. Hedge funds (public sources) lists the hedge funds involved in the case if a public source, such as 
The Deal Pipeline or the bankruptcy disclosure statement, identifies the hedge fund.  Hedge funds’ role (public sources) uses the same public source to group the 
stated role of the hedge funds in the case into whether the hedge fund was the acquirer in a 363 sale, a controlling equity owner upon exiting a Chapter 11 
reorganization, a DIP lender, a provider of debt financing upon exiting a Chapter 11 reorganization, or a provider of equity financing through a rights offering 
upon exiting a Chapter 11 reorganization. 
 
Filing Date  Debtor  Assets at filing 




Hedge funds’ role 
(public sources) 
Mining & construction:               
11/13/2002  Horizon Natural Resources   --     9/30/2004  Sold to financial buyer  t1, t2  W.L. Ross & Co.  Acquirer in 363 sale 
9/25/2003  JA Jones  --     8/18/2004  Liquidated   --   --   -- 
10/29/2006  I E Liquidation/Ideal Electric  $22.60      5/26/2007  Sold to strategic buyer  t1, t2   --   -- 
12/12/2008  CDX Gas  $500.00      9/22/2009  Reorganized  t2   --   -- 
Manufacturing:               
4/2/2001  W.R. Grace & Co.  $2,584.90      --  In process  t1, t2   --   -- 
6/28/2001  360 Networks  $6,326.00      11/12/2002  Reorganized  t2  W.L. Ross & Co.  Controlling investor at exit 
11/2/2001  General Datacomm Ind.  $64.00      9/15/2003  Reorganized  t2  Ableco Finance (Cerberus)  Exit debt financing 
12/5/2001  Hayes Lemmerz Intern.  $2,800.00      6/3/2003  Reorganized  t1  Apollo Management  Controlling investor at exit 
3/12/2002  Zenith Industrial  $166.00      5/22/2002  Sold to financial buyer  --   Questor Management  Acquirer in 363 sale 
3/13/2002  Guilford Mills  $551.10   Yes  9/30/2002  Reorganized  --   --   -- 
4/15/2002  Exide  $2,100.00      5/5/2004  Reorganized  t2  R2 Top Hat, Silver Oak  Controlling investor at exit 
5/31/2002  Farmland  $2,700.00      5/1/2004  Liquidated  t1   --   -- 
6/8/2002  DESA Holdings  $235.00      4/1/2005  Sold to financial buyer  t1, t2  H.I.G. Capital Management  Acquirer in 363 sale 
11/15/2002  Oakwood Homes  $812.00   Yes  4/20/2004  Sold to financial buyer  t2  Greenwich Capital Markets, Ranch 
Capital, Berkshire Hathaway 
DIP lender 
5/19/2003  Weirton Steel   $696.00      8/24/2004  Sold to financial buyer  --   W.L. Ross & Co.  Acquirer in 363 sale 
7/15/2003  Loral Space Communications  $2,654.00      11/21/2005  Reorganized  t1   --   -- 
8/20/2003  Ddi Corp.  $203.00   Yes  12/12/2003  Reorganized  t2  Symphony Asset Management, 
Courage Capital,  Pacific Edge 
Investment 
Controlling investor at exit 
8/26/2003  Met-Coil Systems   $50.00      10/19/2004  Reorganized  --   --    
3/31/2004  Dan River  $441.80      2/14/2005  Reorganized  t1, t2  Ableco Finance (Cerberus)  Exit debt financing 
9/1/2004  Techneglas  $100.00      11/1/2005  Reorganized  t1, t2   --   -- 
9/3/2004  Quigley (Pfizer Sub)  $155.20      --  Liquidated  --    --   -- 
12/16/2004  Tropical Sportwear   $247.10      5/17/2005  Sold to strategic buyer  --    --   -- 
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7/26/2005  Protocol Services  $140.50      1/1/2006  Reorganized  t2  Bayside Recovery  Controlling investor at exit 
12/1/2005  Nobex Corp.  $10.00      10/11/2006  Sold to strategic buyer  --    --   -- 
2/10/2006  JL French  $341.40   Yes  6/30/2006  Reorganized  t1   --   -- 
3/3/2006  Dana Corporation  $7,900.00      2/1/2008  Reorganized  t1, t2  Centerbrige  Partners, Avenue 
Capital, Silver Point, Quadrangle 
Equity rights offering participant, 
controlling investor at exit 
4/10/2006  Global Home Products  $472.50      2/15/2008  Reorganized  t2  Global Home Product Investors 
(Cerberus) 
Controlling investor at exit 
7/27/2006  Source Enterprises  $4.30      10/2/2007  Reorganized  --   Greenwich Street Corporate 
Growth Partners 
DIP lender, controlling investor at 
exit 
                 
8/17/2006  Weld Wheel Industries  $31.70      6/5/2007  Sold to strategic buyer  --   --  --  
8/21/2006  Radnor Holdings  $361.50      11/29/2006  Sold to financial buyer  t1, t2  Silver Point Capital, Tennenbaum 
Capital Partners 
DIP lender, controlling investor at 
exit 
8/31/2006  Portrait Corporation of America  $153.20      7/17/2007  Sold to strategic buyer  --   --   -- 
9/20/2006  CEP Holdings  $20.00      5/27/2007  Liquidated  --   --   -- 
10/30/2006  Dura Automotive Systems  $1,990.00      6/27/2008  Reorganized  t1, t2  Blackstone Distressed 
Securities/GSO Capital Partners, 
Pacificor 
Exit debt financing, controlling 
investor at exit 
1/29/2007  PT Holdings Company  $153.70      8/28/2007  Reorganized  t1, t2  Golden Tree Asset Management, 
Catalyst Investment, Delaware 
Investment Company 
DIP lender, equity rights offering, 
controlling investor at exit 
8/16/2007  Quaker Fabric  $155.20      8/27/2008  Liquidated  t1  GB Merchant Partners  DIP lender 
11/9/2007  Levitt and Sons  $411.00      2/20/2009  Liquidated  t1  --   --  
1/7/2008  Heartland Automotive   $334.00      1/16/2009  Reorganized  --   Quad C Partners  Controlling investor at exit 
1/28/2008  American LaFrance  $189.00      7/23/2008  Reorganized  t1  Patriarch Partners  DIP lender, exit debt financing, 
controlling investor at exit 
2/22/2008  Wellman  $124.30      1/31/2009  Reorganized  t2  Sola  Exit debt financing, controlling 
investor at exit 
3/5/2008  Ziff Davis Media  $313.00   Yes  7/1/2008  Reorganized  t1, t2  --   --  
3/16/2008  Shapes-Arch Holdings  $0.10      8/8/2008  Sold to financial buyer  t1  H.I.G. Capital Management  Acquirer in 363 sale 
3/30/2008  AMPEX Corporation  $26.50   Yes  10/3/2008  Reorganized  t1, t2  Hillside Capital  Exit debt financing, controlling 
investor at exit 
4/4/2008  Sturgis Iron & Metal Co.  $23.40      5/4/2009  Liquidated  --   --   --  
4/23/2008  Kimball Hill  $795.50      3/24/2009  Liquidated  t1  --   --  
7/8/2008  Syntax-Brillian Corporation  $175.70      7/7/2009  Liquidated  --   Silver Point Capital  DIP lender 
7/15/2008  Pierre Foods  $304.20      12/12/2008  Reorganized  t2  Oaktree Capital Management  DIP lender, controlling investor at 
exit 
8/27/2008  NetEffect  $1.00      6/1/2009  Sold to strategic buyer  t1, t2  --   --  
11/13/2008  The Antioch Company  $66.40   Yes  2/6/2009  Reorganized  --   --   --  
12/30/2008  Constar International  $420.00   Yes  5/29/2009  Reorganized  --   --   --  
1/2/2009  Recycled Paper Greetings  $100.00   Yes  2/24/2009  Sold to strategic buyer  t1  --   --  
2/21/2009  Journal Register Company  $142.20   Yes  8/7/2009  Reorganized  t2  --   --  
3/16/2009  Masonite Corporation  $1,527.50   Yes  6/9/2009  Reorganized  --   --   --  
Services:                 
7/19/1998  FPA Medical  $831.20   Yes  6/1/1999  Sold to strategic buyer  --   --   --  
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1/19/2005  American Banknote Corp  $124.70   Yes  4/8/2005  Reorganized  --   Bay Harbour Investments, Highland 
Capital Management 
Controlling investor at exit 
2/18/2005  Access Cardiosystems  $10.00      5/25/2007  Reorganized  --   --   --  
5/31/2005  WATTS Health Foundation  $54.80      5/2/2007  Sold to strategic buyer  t1, t2  --   --  
7/5/2005  St. Vincent’s Medical Centers  $971.90      8/31/2007  Reorganized  t1, t2  --   --  
9/30/2005  The Brooklyn Hospital  $233.00      10/23/2007  Reorganized  t2  --   --  
4/16/2007  Bayonne Medical Center  $88.00      2/1/2008  Sold to strategic buyer  --   --   --  
1/23/2008  PRC  $354.00   Yes  6/30/2008  Reorganized  t2  Silver Point Capital, Bayside 
Capital, and Babson Capital  
Exit debt financing, controlling 
investor at exit 
2/14/2008  Charys Holding  $245.00   Yes  3/12/2009  Reorganized  t1, t2  --   --  
3/10/2008  Terisa Systems  $12.00   Yes  5/5/2008  Reorganized  --   --   --  
3/11/2008  Louisiana Riverboat Gaming   $250.40      6/17/2009  Reorganized  t2  --   --  
                 
5/5/2008  Tropicana Entertainment  $2,840.00      7/1/2009  Reorganized  t1  Silver Point Capital, Icahn Capital  DIP lender, exit debt financing, 
controlling investor at exit 
7/7/2008  National Dry Cleaners  $0.50      5/31/2009  Liquidated  --   --   --  
1/12/2009  Apex Silver Mines  $721.30   Yes  3/24/2009  Reorganized  t2  Gilder, Gagnon, and Howe  Co., 
Sentient Executive Group 
Controlling investor at exit 
Transportation, communication, and utilities:               
5/21/2001  Teligent  $1,200.00      9/12/2002  Reorganized  --  --   -- 
11/13/2001  ANC Rental   $6,497.50      4/6/2004  Sold to financial buyer  --   Cerberus  Capital Partners  Acquirer in 363 sale 
1/28/2002  Global Crossing  $22,400.00      12/9/2003  Sold to strategic buyer  t1, t2  --     
12/19/2002  Focal Communications   $561.00      7/7/2003  Reorganized  t1, t2  Madison Dearborn, Frontenac  Controlling investor at exit 
3/14/2003  TWI  --     5/27/2005  Liquidated  t1  --   --  
6/19/2003  Touch America  $1,608.10      10/4/2004  Liquidated  t2  --   --  
7/8/2003  National Energy & Gas   $7,613.00      10/29/2004  Reorganized  t1, t2  --   --  
7/8/2003  USGEN New England  $2,337.40      6/1/2005  Liquidated  t1, t2  --   --  
9/14/2003  Northwestern Corporation  $2,624.90      11/1/2004  Reorganized  t1, t2  --   --  
9/12/2004  US Airways  $8,806.00      9/27/2005  Sold to strategic buyer  --   Wellington Management, Par 
Investment Partners, Peninsula 
Investment, Tudor Investment 
Exit debt financing, equity rights 
participant 
9/14/2005  Delta Air Lines  $21,561.00      4/30/2007  Reorganized  t1, t2  --   --  
9/14/2005  Northwest Airlines  $14,352.00      5/31/2007  Reorganized  t1, t2  --   --  
9/23/2005  Entergy New Orleans  $703.20      5/8/2007  Reorganized  t2  --   --  
11/7/2005  FLYi/Atlantic Coast Airlines   $378.50      3/30/2007  Liquidated  --   --   --  
12/20/2005  Calpine Corporation  $26,628.80      1/31/2008  Reorganized  t1  Harbinger Capital  Controlling investor at exit 
1/25/2006  Leaseway Motorcar Transport  $177.70      1/29/2007  Reorganized  t2  Yucaipa Cos.  Controlling investor at exit 
10/15/2006  Sea Containers  $1,700.00      2/11/2009  Reorganized  t1, t2  Dune Capital, Trilogy Capital, 
Caspian Capital Partners 
DIP lender 
10/15/2007  Kitty Hawk  $40.00      7/9/2008  Liquidated  t1  Laurus Master Fund  DIP lender 
11/8/2007  SN Liquidation   $97.00   Yes  10/22/2008  Sold to financial buyer  --   Versa Capital Management  DIP lender, controlling investor at 
exit 
11/19/2007  Performance Transport   $20.50      7/14/2008  Liquidated  --   Black Diamond Capital  DIP lender 
12/24/2007  Maxjet  $14.80      8/13/2009  Liquidated  --   --   --  
4/2/2008  ATA Airlines  $250.40      3/31/2009  Liquidated  t1  --   --  
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4/26/2008  EOS Airlines  $70.20      2/18/2009  Liquidated  --   --   --  
Wholesale & retail trade:                      
10/12/2001  Polaroid Corp.  $1,800.00      7/31/2002  Sold to financial buyer  --   Wingate Partners, One Equity 
Partners 
DIP lender, controlling investor at 
exit 
12/2/2001  Enron   $24,700.00      11/17/2004  Sold to strategic buyer  t1       
1/22/2002  Kmart  $16,287.00      5/6/2003  Reorganized  t1, t2  ESL Investments, Third Avenue 
Trust 
Equity rights offering participant, 
controlling investor at exit 
10/1/2002  Agway   $1,574.40      5/3/2004  Liquidated  --        
1/31/2003  American Commercial Lines  $838.90      1/11/2005  Reorganized  t1, t2  HY I Investments (Sam Zell 
controlled) 
Controlling investor at exit 
4/1/2003  Fleming Companies  $4,200.00      8/23/2004  Reorganized  t1, t2  Sankaty  Exit debt financing, controlling 
investor at exit 
5/13/2003  Orion Refining  $691.00      6/25/2004  Liquidated  --   --   --  
5/30/2003  The Penn Traffic Company  $742.00      4/13/2005  Reorganized  --   --   --  
10/8/2003  Chi-Chi's   $50.00      12/27/2005  Liquidated  t2  --   --  
10/29/2003  Piccadilly  $159.00   Yes  2/13/2004  Sold to financial buyer  t2  Yucaipa  Acquirer in 363 sale 
1/20/2004  Wickes   $155.50      12/18/2007  Liquidated  --   Sagamore Hill Capital 
Management, Highland Capital, 
Contrarian Funds  
DIP lender 
4/29/2004  Women First Healthcare  $49.10      12/28/2004  Liquidated  t1  Whitney Private Debt Fund  DIP lender 
6/14/2004  ACR Management  $100.00   Yes  1/31/2005  Reorganized  t1, t2  Carl Marks Strategies  Controlling investor at exit 
6/15/2004  Kiel Bros. Oil Comp.  $50.20      12/29/2006  Liquidated  --   --   --  
11/4/2004  Rhodes Inc.  $50.00      5/23/2006  Liquidated  --   --   --  
1/11/2005  Ultimate Electronics  $329.10      1/11/2006  Sold to strategic buyer  t1  --   --  
4/8/2005  Norstan Apparel  $19.60      8/20/2008  Liquidated  t2  --   --  
7/11/2005  GT Brands Holding  $208.80      9/6/2006  Liquidated  --   --   --  
1/12/2006  Musicland  $371.50      1/18/2008  Liquidated  t1, t2  --   --  
1/25/2006  G+G Retail  $83.60   Yes  12/7/2006  Sold to strategic buyer  t1, t2  Prentice Capital Management  DIP lender 
2/3/2006  Glazed Investment  $28.60   Yes  6/13/2006  Sold to strategic buyer  --   --   --  
12/29/2006  Advanced Marketing Services  $100.00      11/15/2007  Liquidated  t2  Marathon Structured Finance Fund  DIP lender 
10/16/2007  Movie Gallery  $892.00   Yes  5/20/2008  Reorganized  t2  Sopris Capital Advisors  Exit debt financing, controlling 
investor at exit 
1/22/2008  Buffets Holdings  $963.00      4/28/2009  Reorganized  t2  --   --  
2/7/2008  Manchester  $131.60      6/23/2008  In process  --   Palm Beach Multi Strategy Fund  Controlling investor at exit 
3/26/2008  Hoop Retail Stores  $100.00      12/15/2008  Liquidated  t1  --   --  
5/2/2008  Linens 'n Things  $1,740.40      6/15/2009  Liquidated  t1  Hilco Consumer Capital/Gordon 
Brothers Brands 
Acquirer in 363 sale 
8/20/2008  Hines Horticulture  $297.40      4/10/2009  Sold to financial buyer  --   Black Diamond Capital  Acquirer in 363 sale 
10/6/2008  Paper International  $100.00      6/20/2009  Reorganized  --   --   --  
11/24/2008  T H Agriculture & Nutrition  $78.00      11/30/2009  Reorganized  --   --   --  
1/5/2009  Blue Tulip  $6.70      6/5/2009  Liquidated  t1, t2  --   --  
1/5/2009  Smitty's Building Supply  $21.20      6/29/2009  Reorganized  --   --   --  
Finance, insurance, and real estate:               
10/31/2000  PRS Insurance Group        3/2/2007  Liquidated  --   --   --  
12/17/2002  Conseco  $1,794.80      9/10/2003  Reorganized  t1, t2  Cerberus Capital, Fortress 
Investment, JC Flowers, Appaloosa  
DIP lender, controlling investor at 
exit 
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3/6/2006  Plus Funds Group  $7.80      8/2/2007  Liquidated  t1  DIP Funding Group, Sphinx 
Funding Group 
DIP lender, exit debt financing 
4/13/2006  USA Commercial Mortgage   $100.00      3/12/2007  Sold to financial buyer  --   Compass Partners  Acquirer in 363 sale 
12/28/2006  Ownit Mortgage Solutions  $696.60      1/16/2008  Liquidated  --   --   --  
2/5/2007  Mortgage Lenders Network   $464.80      6/10/2009  Liquidated  --   --   --  
7/30/2007  New 118
th  $2.70      --  In process  --   --   --  
8/6/2007  American Home Mortgage  $20,553.90      2/12/2009  Liquidated  t1, t2  W.L. Ross & Co.  DIP lender 
9/28/2007  NetBank  $87.20      10/3/2008  Liquidated  --   --   --  
2/10/2008  Cornerstone Ministries Invest.  $159.10      9/25/2009  Liquidated  t1  --   --  





LINKS BETWEEN CLAIMHOLDERS AND CHAPTER 11 FINANCING AND CONTROL EVENTS 
This table reports the frequency in which investors observed holding Chapter 11 claims at the filing of the schedules 
of assets and liabilities (t1,) and the tabulation of votes on the plan of reorganization (t2) also participate in strategic 
events associated with the Chapter 11 restructuring. The strategic events include providing financing to the bankrupt 
firm,  either  as  debtor-in-possession  (DIP)  financing  during  the  case  or  as  new  debt  and  equity  financing  at 
bankruptcy exit, and acquiring the firm via a 363 sale. We derive the data on participations in strategic events from 
public news sources, such as The Deal Pipeline, and the debtor’s bankruptcy disclosure statement. 
   
    Proportion of events including a claimant 
Event:  Total number of events 
At filing of Schedule of 
Assets and Liabilities (t1),   
all creditors 
At votes tabulation (t2), 
voting creditors only 
DIP loan  95  58.9%  34.7% 
Exit financing (debt)  37  51.4%  45.9% 
Exit financing (equity)  10  50.0%  70.0% 





WHAT DETERMINES THAT A CLAIM IS TRADED? 
This table presents a set of probit regressions analyzing the likelihood that a given claim is traded. The dependent 
variable is equal to 1 if the claim was sold and 0 otherwise. The focus is on the size of the claims and, specifically, 
on the size of trade claims (Owned by corporation). Claims are sorted in terciles. Claims in the bottom size-tercile 
(between $50 and $100 thousand) are considered to be small; claims in the top size-tercile (claims above $300 
thousand) are considered to be large.  Mid-size claim is between $100 and $300 thousand. (Remember that we 
exclude  claims  below  $50  from  the  analysis.)    Reported  coefficients  are  marginal  effects;  0.1  stand  for  10% 
percentage point change in the dependent variable.  Active investors include asset management firms, hedge funds, 
and private equity affiliated funds. Omitted category (other creditors) is all claims owned by: custodian banks, 
potentially  financial,  insurance,  real  estate,  other  financial,  government,  intra  company,  and  unknown.  The 
institutional type is defined at the parent level. The analysis is at the claim level; i.e., there are multiple claims per 
bankruptcy. All regressions include industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by bankruptcy. *** , ** and 
* indicate statistical significance at   1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
 
Dependent variable:   1 if the claim was traded, 
0 otherwise 
Mid-size claim  -0.073*  -0.105** 
 
(0.047)  (0.056) 
Large claim  -0.044  -0.079* 
 
(0.042)  (0.053) 
Owned by: 
       Corporations  0.030***  -0.054 
 
(0.013)  (0.038) 
   Banks   0.241***  0.266*** 
 
(0.069)  (0.081) 
   Active investors   0.271***  0.285*** 
 
(0.102)  (0.106) 
   Persons  0.067  0.046 
 
(0.081)  (0.067) 
Owned by corporation * Mid-size  claim  --  0.238** 
   
(0.160) 
Owned by corporation * Large claim  --  0.197** 
   
(0.131) 
Portion of claim that is secured  0.006  0.007 
 
(0.040)  (0.039) 
Portion of claim that is unsecured  0.131***  0.128*** 
 
(0.071)  (0.068) 
      Observations  78,933  78,933 








CREDITOR CONCENTRATION BY INSTITUTIONAL TYPE AND BANKRUPTCY OUTCOME 
This table extends the results in Table 2.6 by focusing on the identity of the claimholders by institutional type. Each reported number corresponds to the 
coefficient in a regression of a bankruptcy outcome on a measure of concentration of interest. Active investors include asset management firms, hedge funds, and 
private equity affiliated funds. The institutional type is defined at the parent level. We include one institutional type at a time (i.e., in Panel A, each number 
corresponds  to  a  different  regression);  the  correlation  in  concentration  across  institutional  types  is  economically  and  statistically  weak.  In  Panel  A,  the 
explanatory variable of interest is the percentage share of the total claims held by a given institutional type. In Panel B, in addition to the share of claims we look 
at the concentration of the holdings, as measured by Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) within an institutional type. The interaction term between the two 
measures is meant to capture cases where a given institutional type is a large creditor and the holdings are concentrated among a few investors. If for a given 
bankruptcy an institutional type is missing, HHI is not well defined (i.e., unlike share, it cannot be set to zero); as a result, the number of observations in Panel B 
varies. In addition to the reported variables, each regression includes benchmark control variables defined in Table 2.6.  For compactness of reporting, we omit 
other control variables and standard errors. Each panel reports two sets of results: (i) creditors’ concentration as computed at the file of the Schedule of Assets 
and Liabilities, and (ii) creditors’ concentration as computed at the voting tabulation. Voting tabulation only includes voting (impaired) classes. All models are 
estimated using linear least squares. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at   1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
Panel A: Explanatory variable –share (%) of the total claims by institutional type 
 
 























































































































































































































Banks      0.32*  -5.37   0.21   0.06  -0.23  -0.38**      -7.48**   0.24   0.05  -0.25  -0.28*** 
Trustees (bonds)       0.25  -7.59*   0.28   0.04  -0.28*  -0.17 
 
  -4.41   0.72***  -0.55**  -0.15   0.22 
Active investors (all)     0.23**  -2.30   0.15   0.11  -0.19  -0.01 
 
   0.10   0.40**  -0.23*  -0.13  -0.17 
  Asset managers    -0.12  -0.26    0.38*  -0.13  -0.18   0.04 
 
  -0.73   0.41*  -0.41***   0.03  -0.13 
  Hedge funds     4.63**  -19.75   0.76*   1.32  -2.04  -0.30       10.74*   0.83***  -0.34**  -0.47*  -0.12 
  PE-affiliated funds     0.66***  -4.90***  -0.32**   0.49***  -0.11  -0.08 
 
  -3.59   0.10   0.12*  -0.18  -0.21 
Non-financials    -0.36***   6.87**  -0.27**  -0.09   0.27   0.34** 
 
   3.78  -0.41***   0.18   0.18*   0.04 
Observations     119   115   119   119   119   107 
 















TABLE B.7 – continued 
 
Panel B: Explanatory variable –share (%) of the total claims and concentration by institutional type 
 
 































































































































































































































Banks:                             
  Share   106   0.66  -20.95**   0.58   0.17  -0.44  -0.19 
 
80  -4.83  -0.21   0.14   0.21  -0.59** 
  Concentration     0.25  -3.72   0.20  -0.15   0.12   0.32 
 
  -2.88  -0.27   0.08   0.23  -0.36 
  Share*Concentration    -0.35   18.54  -0.47  -0.08   0.19  -0.35 
 
  -3.11   0.54   0.02  -0.69   0.68* 
Trustees (bonds):                             
  Share   56   1.43  -1.14   0.26   0.22  -0.49   0.35 
 
39  -15.83**   0.13  -0.48*   0.10   0.65 
  Concentration     0.06  -3.61  -0.05   0.17  -0.12   0.06 
 
   0.49  -0.65  -0.01   0.51   0.32 
  Share*Concentration    -1.60  -11.99  -0.00  -0.09   0.09  -0.43 
 
   25.66   0.11   0.30   0.03  -0.49 
Active investors (all)                             
  Share   89  -0.33  -5.81   0.91  -0.67***  -0.30   0.69 
 
86  -10.32   0.57  -0.82   0.49  -0.62 
  Concentration    -0.18   1.89  -0.33**  -0.04   0.31  -0.28 
 
  -4.20  -0.46  -0.06   0.59**  -0.28 
  Share*Concentration     0.69   1.80  -0.78   0.89***   0.07  -0.81 
 
   12.74  -0.32   0.66  -0.57*   0.64 
Asset managers:                              
  Share   74  -0.26  -3.80   0.37  -0.54   0.14   1.13 
 
70  -6.09   0.15  -0.90   1.04**  -0.79 
  Concentration    -0.07   0.65  -0.60***   0.00   0.63*  -0.27 
 
   0.59  -0.59***  -0.03    0.67**  -0.21 
  Share*Concentration     0.18   1.88   0.16   0.51  -0.54  -1.48* 
 
   11.11   0.06   0.41  -0.77*   0.71 
Hedge funds:                              
  Share   33   5.38  -10.05   2.70  -6.12*   2.11*   1.28 
 
43  -33.74  -1.22   2.50  -1.77   2.95 
  Concentration    -0.09  -1.96  -0.11  -0.41   0.43*  -0.11 
 
  -4.14  -0.80***   0.19***   0.46**   0.09 
  Share*Concentration     0.80  -23.94  -5.22   11.55**  -5.12***   0.30 
 
   46.67   1.92  -2.63   1.22  -2.85 
PE-affiliated funds                             
  Share   35   4.03  -405.89  -137.67***   21.67   116.00***   47.94*** 
 
33  -179.05***   5.89  -5.56  -0.33  -5.47*** 
  Concentration     0.47*  -18.15   0.17   0.82  -0.99**   0.65*** 
 
  -17.15   0.40  -0.32  -0.08  -0.79** 
  Share*Concentration    -3.16   402.51   137.26***  -21.07  -116.20***  -47.96*** 
 
   165.56**  -6.21*  5.81   0.40   5.46*** 
Non-financials                             
  Share   117  -0.42**   6.29  -0.48*   0.08   0.33   0.70* 
 
108   4.67  -0.68**  0.12   0.50*   0.50 
  Concentration 
 
-0.13  -4.06  -0.33   0.54  -0.19   0.34 
 
  -4.63  -0.49  0.15   0.34*   0.11 
  Share*Concentration      0.45  -3.13   0.86  -0.70  -0.28  -1.36 
 




ROBUSTNESS: IMPACT OF INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECTS 
This table displays how the results in Table 2.5 would be affected by the exclusion of the industry fixed effects.  In 
Panel A, we display the coefficient on Creditor concentration (t1) both with and without industry fixed effects.  In 
Panel B, we display how the exclusion of industry fixed effects impacts the overall R-squared of the regressions.  
Note that the R-squared reported in Table 2.5 (and other tables in the paper) is the within industry R-squared, while 
the values reported in Panel B of this table are overall R-squared. 
Panel A: Coefficient on Creditor concentration (t1) 
Dependent variable  With industry fixed effects  Without industry fixed effects 
Prearranged bankruptcy  0.371***  0.351** 
  (0.089)  (0.095) 
Time in bankruptcy  -6.671**  -7.439** 
  (2.24)  (2.496) 
Reorganized  0.389**  0.485** 
  (0.135)  (0.140) 
Sold  0.073  0.065 
  (0.297)  (0.253) 
Liquidated  -0.465  -0.555 
  (0.353)  (0.332) 
Recovery rate  -1.096  -0.884 
  (0.616)  (0.585) 
   
Panel B: R-squared 
Dependent variable:  With industry fixed effects  Without industry fixed effects 
Prearranged bankruptcy  0.123  0.066 
Time in bankruptcy  0.396  0.377 
Reorganized  0.316  0.244 
Sold  0.171  0.127 
Liquidated  0.293  0.196 
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